Balancing fundamental principles of the EU and the primacy of UN law: in search of a multilateral approach to the protection of human rights by Marino Noberasco, G
1 
	
Balancing fundamental principles of the EU and the primacy of UN law:  
in search of a multilateral approach to the protection of human rights  
 
 
Submitted by Gabriele Marino Noberasco to the University of Exeter  
as a dissertation for the degree of  
Master of Philosophy in Law 
In November 2018 
 
 
This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is 
copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published 
without proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 









Which model should be applied to regulate the interaction between the UN and 
EU legal systems in the particular field of human rights, when international peace 
and security are at stake in the fight against terrorism? And how to reach a viable 
multilateral approach to the protection of said human rights? Starting from these 
questions this research focuses on the complex relationship between UN and EU 
law, particularly, with regard to individual counter-terrorism measures established 
by the UN Security Council and their implementation by the EU; a relationship 
that very much depends on the particular nature of the European Union as an 
international organisation, and the unique structure of its legal system. While a 
number of conflicts have aroused over the years between the two legal orders, 
the most relevant ones are related to the level of protection afforded to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, regarded as ‘constitutional’ values of the EU. 
In fact, the most severe conflicts were sparked by the UN blacklisting system, 
aimed at preventing and combating the financing of transnational terrorism, and 
by the measures adopted at the EU level to give effect to such system. Solutions 
to these problems provided by a number of scholars and institutions failed to 
achieve a long-term balance between EU fundamental principles and the primacy 
of UN law, preventing the development of a multilateral and shared approach to 
the protection of human rights, while safeguarding international peace and 
security. Starting from the analysis of the well-known Kadi I case before the 
General Court and the Court of Justice, this research outlines the inadequacy of 
the monistic and dualistic approaches to settle the conflicts between UN and EU 
law in this particular field, proposing a more nuanced solution, based on a 
rigorous interpretation of the EU Treaties and of the UN Charter. In order to 
ground this approach, the second part of this research addresses Article 103 of 
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the UN Charter, to maintain that it shouldn’t be interpreted as a rule of hierarchy, 
but rather as a particular kind of conflict avoidance clause. The final part of this 
work takes the diachronic evolution of UN counter-terrorism blacklists and their 
implementation by the EU as a case-study, to test the proposed solution and 
maintain that promoting the globalisation of EU fundamental values while 
safeguarding the primacy of UN law is – in fact – possible through the action and 
common attitude that EU Member States are bound to adopt at the UN level.    
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The focus of this research is to consider and understand the interaction between 
the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) legal systems, with 
particular regard to the protection of fundamental human rights in the field of 
counter-terrorism measures, when international peace and security are at risk 
and a proper balance is often hard to strike. In this perspective, this research 
addresses the case of financial sanctions adopted by the Security Council of the 
United Nations against individuals suspected of being involved with transnational 
terrorism, and the implementing measures enacted by the European Union.  
The complex and sometimes ‘blurry’ relationship between the two legal 
systems in this area of law is closely related to the particular nature of the 
European Union as an international organisation,1 the first consequence of which 
is the equally peculiar structure of the EU legal system. The interaction at stake, 




1 The very nature of the EU as an international organisation has been the subject for scholarly 
debate, where scholars tended to stress the differences between the EU and other organisations. 
According to the opinion of Joxerramon Bengoetxea, the EU can be regarded as a sui generis 
international organisation. In particular, the high degree of ‘constitutional’ development and rule 
of law features make it look more like a federation of states. Joxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘The EU 
as (more than) an international organisation’, in Jan Klabbers, Asa Wallendahl (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Law of International Organisations (Northampton 2011) 448, 449. Klaus-Dieter 
Borchardt stresses the importance of the EU being based on the rule of law, in order to maintain 
that the Union is much closer to a supranational structure (i.e. to a federation) than to an 
international organisation. Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of European Union Law 
(Publications Office of the European Union 2018), 79. Following the idea of Armin Von Bogdandy, 
the specific relationship with the legal orders of the Member States and the concept of ‘primacy’ 
show how the EU is progressing towards a federation. Armin Von Bogdandy, ‘Neither an 
International Organization Nor A Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation’, in Erik 
Jones, Anand Menon, Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union 
(Oxford 2012) 761, 765. A slightly different stance is taken by Marek Hlavac, who regards the EU 
as a unique experience, with some state-like features, within a closed number of policy areas. 
Marek Hlavac, ‘Less Than a state, more than an international organization: the Sui generis nature 
of the European Union’, MPRA Paper (2 December 2010), 12. 
2 The particular nature of the EU as an international organisation has given rise to a political 
tendency towards exceptionalism, when it comes to consider the relationship between EU law 
and international law. This point is analysed by Magdalena Ličková, ‘European Exceptionalism in 
International Law’ (2008) 19 EJIL 463, 465.	
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more significant as they affect the level of protection afforded to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Over the years, a number of questions arose with respect 
to the position to be taken by the EU itself, in relation to UN law. The crucial ones 
could probably be which model should be applied to regulate the interaction 
between the UN and EU legal systems and which path (if any) may lead to a 
viable multilateral approach to the protection of human rights. 
 In this respect, counter-terrorism policies that have been adopted by the 
UN over the last two decades are probably the field where conflicts between UN 
and EU law have most clearly emerged. On the one hand, transnational terrorism 
(and more generally jihadism) represent a significant threat to international peace 
and security,3 the maintenance of which is the first purpose of the United Nations4 
and of the UN legal system in general; on the other hand, the ‘constitutional’ path 
followed by EU law strengthened its vocation for independence in the context of 
international law,5 especially when it comes to safeguarding human rights. As a 
consequence, while the primacy of UN law (established by Article 103 of the 
Charter of the United Nations) was intended as a tool to ensure better protection 
for global peace and security, it now risks to overtly clash with the stronger stance 




3 An analysis of transnational terrorism and its qualification as a threat to peace is provided by 
René Värk, ‘Terrorism as a Threat to Peace’, (2009) XVI Juridica International 216. To this extent, 
the UN mechanism aimed at protecting international peace and security tended to adapt is 
operational models to the terrorist threat. These changes (towards a ‘legislative’ approach of the 
UN Security Council) are stressed by Paul C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council starts legislating’ 
(2002)  4 AJIL 901, 904 and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘The ‘war on terror’ and extremism: assessing 
the relevance of the women, Peace and Security agenda’ (2016) 92 International Affairs 275, 283. 
4 According to Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
5 The EU has developed its own fundamental principles of law – that derive from those enshrined 
in the constitutional charters of EU Member States – in a number of areas. This tendency has the 
effect of influencing both the relationship between Member States and the EU (as an institution), 
which is plainly something very different from what happens at the UN level, and the relationship 
between the EU and third countries or international organisations, where the EU increasingly 
tends to behave in a ‘state-like’ fashion, as explained by Ličková (n 2). 
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 The relationship between EU and UN law in the particular field of human 
rights, has been addressed by scholars6 and international institutions,7 especially 
by the Court of Justice of the EU.8 However, none of the proposed solutions were 
entirely convincing. In the wide majority of cases, problems concerning the 
interaction between the UN and the EU legal systems were addressed by 
resorting to two somehow classical models, namely the monist model and the 
dualist model. Adherence to one model or the other very much depends on the 
theoretical background of the interpreters. Those positions that support an 
historical approach to international law tend to embrace the monist theory and 




6 A relevant number of scholars have addressed this issue over the years, particularly in the light 
of the case-law of both the General Court of the EU and of the European Court of Justice, and 
some of these positions will be addressed within the following paragraphs (spec. in Chapter 1). 
For a first and comprehensive approach to the EU-UN relationship in terms of legal systems, see 
inter al. Franziska Brantner, Richard Gowan, ‘Complex Engagement: the EU and the UN system’ 
in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed), The European Union and International Organizations (Routledge 
2009) 37. A more focused overview with regard to the interaction of UN and EU law in the field of 
human rights is offered by Inger Österdahl, ‘Defer and rule: The relationship between the EU, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the UN’ (2012) 5 Uppsala Faculty of Law Working 
Paper, available at https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:575710/FULLTEXT01.pdf, 9. A 
complete analysis of the problem as well as an historical overview of relevant EU case-law is 
provided by Fiona de Londras, Suzanne Kingston, ‘Rights, Security and Conflicting International 
Obligations: Exploring Inter-Jurisdictional Judicial Dialogues in Europe’ (2010) 58 AJCL 359. A 
further perspective on the evolution of the relationship between UN and EU law (in judicial terms) 
is the one provided by Samantha Besson, ‘European Legal Pluralims after Kadi’ (2009) 5 ECLR 
237.  
7 This subject has been considered both on the EU and on the UN side. One may recall the wide 
study edited by Martin Ortega for the EU Institute for Security Studies in 2005, which elaborates 
on a number of issues related to the EU-UN relationship in the field of human rights, Martin Ortega 
(ed), ‘The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in effective multilateralism’ (2005) 
78 Chaillot Paper, available at iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp078.pdf. In 2011 the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations published an extensive 
report, edited by Israel de Jesús Butler, focused on the relationship between the EU and general 
human rights law, whose third chapter provides relevant insight. Israel de Jesús Butler (ed), The 
EU and International Human Rights Law (OHCHR – Europe Regional Office 2011), available at 
https://europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf, 24. 
8 The reference is to the case-law of the General Court of the EU and that of the European Court 
of Justice on the subject matter, which will be analised within this work, both in Chapter 1 and in 
Chapter 3.   
9 Among others, a particularly recent and clear example of monist approach, with regard to the 
relationship between general international law, EU law and also domestic law, is the one adopted 
by Paul Gragl, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Legal Monism – Epistemological Truth and Empirical 
Plausibility’ (2015) 70 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 665. Paul Gragl starts from the teaching of 
the Vienna School (and of Hans Kelsen, regarded as a ‘noble father’ of legal monism) to contend 
that monism – based on the unity of the law – is still the more suitable theory to resolve and 
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Focusing on the necessary and intrinsic coherence of general international law, 
they are inclined to solve actual or potential conflicts in terms of hierarchy, A 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional interpretation of the Charter of the United 
Nations (UNC), pivoted on Article 103 of the same Charter as a hierarchical rule, 
often underlies this kind of approach. By contrast, those positions who focus on 
the independence, autonomy and separateness of the EU legal system, are likely 
to embrace the dualist theory,10 stressing the closure of such legal system to any 
external interference, which is not consistent with the hard core of the EU 
‘constitutional principles’. 
 Both these approaches appear unsatisfactory, since they fail to balance 
the consistency needs of the international legal order (and the will of EU Member 
States to comply with their obligations under UN law) with the undoubtedly unique 
dimension of the EU legal system, grounded on common constitutional traditions 
and committed to ensure an increasing protection for human rights, within and 




prevent conflicts between different legal systems (including the UN and the EU). These ideas are 
further developed in Paul Gragl, Legal Monism: Law, Philosophy and Politics (Oxford 2018). The 
attitude of the Court of Justice of the EU towards UN law, at least until the early 2000, is described 
as generally monist. See Andrea Gattini, ‘Effects of Decisions of the UN Security Council in the 
EU Legal Order’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law 
as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 215, 216. 
10 An example of the dualist stance with regard to the relationship between UN and EU law in the 
field of human rights is offered, among others, by Piet Eeckhout, ‘The Growing Influence of 
European Union Law’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1490, 1497. Contrary to the 
opinion of Gattini (n 9), Piet Eeckhout also considers dualism as a natural evolution of the case-
law of the Court of Justice of the EU. In relation to the dualist evolution in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the EU see also (with some critical remarks) Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European 
Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi (2010) 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal 1, 2.  
11 An analysis of both approaches and their ‘failure’ is provided by Ramses A. Wessel, ‘General 
Issues: Monism, Dualism and the European Legal order. Reconsidering the Relationship Between 
International and EU law: Towards a Content-Based Approach?’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo 
Palchetti, Ramses A. Wessel (eds) International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus 
Nijhoff  2012) 5.  
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 In order to set the scene of this research path, the first chapter starts by 
analysing one of the most relevant cases of the last two decades, in relation to 
this subject matter: the so-called Kadi I case, adjudicated by the General Court 
of the EU (GCEU) on first instance,12 and then appealed before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). 13  A focused analysis of both judgments realises a 
complete comparison between the two classical models of legal systems 
interaction – the monist model relied on by the GCEU and the seemingly dualist 
model adopted by the Court of Justice – to expose the strengths and limits of 
both approaches. Based on the study of this case, the last section of the first 
chapter propose a more nuanced and reasonable approach to the relationship 
between UN and EU law in the particular field at stake, rooted on a rigorous 
interpretation of relevant provisions within the EU Treaties, in conjunction with 
Article 103 UNC. Such approach aims at balancing the need for safeguarding EU 
Member States obligations under UN law, and the necessary compliance of EU 
secondary legislation with the fundamental (or ‘constitutional’) principles of 
European law, based on the assumption that Article 103 UNC is not intended to 
establish a hierarchy of norms in international law.  
 The second chapter is entirely dedicated to discussing and supporting this 
latter assumption, providing an in-depth study of Article 103 UNC. In particular, 
the first section of this chapter retraces the genesis of the primacy clause, from 
its predecessor (Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations) to the San 
Francisco Conference of 1945 and the travaux préparatoires that led to the text 




12 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-03649. 
13 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Jassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-06351. 
	 12 
elements in favour and against each interpretation of Article 103 UNC and of the 
consequences of such interpretative choices, to uphold the idea of the primacy 
clause as a source of interpretation, rather than a ground for constitutionalising 
international law.  
 The third and last chapter offers an analysis of the so-called blacklists (i.e. 
the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council in order to tackle the financing 
of transnational terrorism) as a case-study, to test the feasibility of the proposed 
approach. In particular, the Chapter provides a diachronic analysis of all the 
Resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in this regard from 1999 to 2014, 
describing the measures adopted by the EU in order to implement them, as well 
as the critical issues that both UN Resolutions and EU implementing measures 
presented in terms of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This 
analysis shows how UN secondary legislation at stake has evolved, in terms of 
substantial and procedural safeguards, right before and in the aftermath of the 
Kadi I judgment of the European Court of Justice, even if such decision could not 
and did not directly affect UN measures. It concludes that ensuring the primacy 
of UN law while promoting the ‘globalisation’ of EU standards in terms of human 
rights protection is, in fact, possible based on the EU Treaties, whose provisions 
encourage Member States to take action at the UN level in order to progressively 
overcome any inconsistencies between UN-derived obligations and EU law. 
 The research methodology that I applied is a classical one and is pivoted 
on analysing the evolution of a relevant case (the Kadi I case), in order to outline 
strengths and weaknesses in the arguments of involved courts and subsequently 
discuss a viable and rather innovative approach to the legal problem in question. 
While this inductive methodology may be regarded as less theoretical and mostly 
practical, it has the advantage of simplifying the understanding of complex legal 
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issues, focusing on the applicative solutions provided by courts and institutions, 
which are the ultimate interpreters of legal research. 
 The analysis of the leading case, offered within the first chapter, includes 
an overview of relevant treaty provisions and their judicial interpretation, on which 
the following theoretical proposals are rooted. In particular, the interpretation of 
Article 103 UNC that underlies (and grounds) the whole research, is developed 
and further explained within the second chapter: here, the non-hierarchical nature 
of the primacy clause is supported by means of an historical review that starts 
from the Covenant of the League of Nations and passes through the travaux 
préparatoires of the UN Charter. The final chapter switches back to a practical 
approach, showing how the evolution of UN measures (aimed at preventing the 
financing of transnational terrorism) may be indirectly influenced by EU law and 
the case-law of the Court of Justice, through the action of Member States within 
the UN.  
 The whole research has the ambition of providing a different point of view 
on a long debated topic, abandoning approaches that are based, alternatively, 
on international law as a comprehensive and entire system (monistic) or on the 
independence of European law (dualistic) and looking back at the legal tools 
offered by both the EU Treaties and the UN Charter to discuss chances for a 
unitary (or multilateral) approach to the problem. In particular the research aims 
at showing how the EU Treaties themselves contain a number of ‘last resort’ 
provisions that may help Member States complying with their obligations under 
UN law, while not acting in breach of EU law. Starting from these provisions and 
their interpretation, this research shows how compliance of UN institutions with 
EU legal standards in the field of human rights (as developed by the Court of 
Justice of the EU) should be promoted and achieved by Member States, acting 
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in their capacity as members of the United Nations. The case-study provided by 
this research empirically shows how the proposed approach may be effective and 
– in the long term – progressively reduce conflicts between UN and EU law in the 





JUDICIAL REVIEW OF UN BLACKLISTS AT THE ECJ: MONISM, DUALISM AND MORE 
I. Introduction – II. A monist approach: Kadi I at the General Court – III. A dualist 
approach: Kadi I at the Court of Justice – IV. A different approach to the UN and 
EU legal systems interaction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter follows the path of the so-called Kadi I case, with the purpose 
of comparing the different approaches adopted by the General Court and the 
Court of Justice to the conundrum of legal systems interaction between UN and 
EU law. As I anticipated, the GCEU adhered to a strictly monist stance, regarding 
UN law as capable of interfering with and possibly outranking EU law; by contrast, 
the ECJ stressed the autonomy and independence of the EU legal system, 
focusing on the need to safeguard its ‘constitutional’ principles as enshrined in 
the EU Treaties. This chapter will discuss the pros and cons of each approach, 
maintaining that both are unsatisfactory in order to adequately resolve potential 
conflicts between UN and EU law in the field of human rights. This will set the 
scene for the emergence of a ‘brand new’ and autonomous model.   
The case brought before the ECJ by Yassin Abdullah Kadi in 2001 was 




14 Council Regulation (EC) 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial 
resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) 337/2000 
[2001] OJ L67/1; Commission Regulation (EC) 2062/2001 amending, for the third time, 
Regulation 467/2001 [2001] OJ L277/25; Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama 
bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Regulation No 467/2001 [2002] 
OJ L139/9. 
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both by the Council and the Commission – to implement the so-called blacklists 
system.15 This system was designed by the UN Security Council to ‘freeze’ the 
assets of certain individuals or entities, allegedly linked to (the Taliban regime, 
Usama Bin-Laden and) the Al-Qaeda network, in the wider context of the UN 
counter-terrorism policy.  
In dealing with the Kadi I case, the General Court and the Court of Justice 
were called to address a substantial number of challenging legal issues, both with 
respect to procedural aspects and with regard to the merits of the case. From a 
formal and procedural point of view, both courts focused their reasoning onto two 
aspects, namely the legal basis for the adoption of the contested regulations 
within the EU (then the Community) legal framework  and the limits that the 
European judiciary should encounter in reviewing EU legislation, adopted to 
implement UN Security Council resolutions, in the light of the obligations set forth 
by the UN Charter (and by Article 103 UNC in particular). In both cases, as I will 
consider hereafter, the analysis of the merits – i.e. the violations of human rights 
alleged by the claimant – was greatly influenced by the Court’s assessment of its 
own jurisdiction.  
For the purpose of this research the critical analysis of the courts’ words 
will be necessarily limited in scope to the nodal point of jurisdiction, to understand 
whether one of the existing models (monist or dualist) could apply to interactions 
between the EU and the UN legal systems in the delicate field of human rights or 




15 On the blacklists system and its legal basis vis-à-vis EU law, in general, see the work of Alina 
Miron, ‘Les sanctions ciblées’ du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Réflexions sur la 
qualification juridique des listes du Conseil de sécurité’ (2009) Revue du marché commun et de 
l'Union européenne 355. 
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As is widely known, the monist and the dualist theory represent two 
classical approaches that were originally developed for addressing the interaction 
between national and international law.16 The monist view is based on the work 
of prominent scholars in the early twentieth century,17 where a central role was 
undoubtedly played by Hans Kelsen 18  and his pure theory of law. The 
fundamental assumption of monism can be synthesised in the idea of the unity of 
the legal world order,19 which is directly derived from the adherence of Hans 
Kelsen to the neo-Kantian epistemological theory.20 Applying a monist paradigm 
brings two substantial consequences, that can be summarised in the words ‘unity’ 
and ‘hierarchy’. Firstly, monism considers international law and domestic law as 
a single legal system so that, in general terms, international law (i.e. be it 
conventional or customary) needs to be applied by domestic authorities and 
judges as they do with national law. Secondly, the monist theory tends to 
establish a rule of hierarchy that considers international law as the fundamental 
set of norms, from which municipal laws are derived.21 In this context, conflicts of 




16 For a general introduction to monism and dualism see Marko Novakovic (ed), Basic concepts 
of public international law: monism & dualism (Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, Institute of 
Comparative Law, Institute of International Politics and Economics 2013). A brief and clear 
overview of the two theories and their application in practice is provided by Tom Ginsburg ‘Locking 
in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law’ (2006) 38 N.Y.U.J. Int’l. L. & 
Pol. 707, 713.  
17 Among the most relevant academic efforts of the time that contend a monistic idea around the 
relationship between domestic and international law, see Léon Duguit, Soiveraineté et liberté (La 
Mémoire du Droit 1922); Georges Scelle, Précis de droit de gens: Principes et systématique (vol. 
1, Surey 1932); Alfred Verdross, ‘Le Fondement du droit international’ (1927) 16 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 247. See also Gragl, Legal Monism: Law, Philosophy 
and Politics (n 9). 
18 Hans Kelsen, ‘Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public’ 
(1926) 14 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 227. 
19 See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (UC Press 1967), 328 and criticism by Gaetano Arangio-
Ruiz, ‘International law and Interindividual law’ in Janne Nijman, André Nollkaemper (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford 2007) 15, 18. 
20 Lando Kirchmair, ‘Who Has the Final Say? The Relationship between International, EU and 
National Law’ (2018) Special Issue, European Journal of Legal Studies 47, 55. 
21 Kelsen (n 19), 330.	
	 18 
therefore, national laws that are deemed incompatible with provisions of 
international law would plainly be outranked and invalid, giving precedence to the 
international law rule. In the specific context of the relationship between 
international law and EU law, a tendency of the EU (then-the EC) to lean towards 
a seemingly monist approach was maintained,22 which implied acceptance of 
binding international norms as part of the EU legal order.23 This idea is based on 
a very broad interpretation of Article 216.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
European Union (TFEU)24 and of the case-law of the ECJ25 that may suggest 
some sort of ‘automatic reception’ of general international law within the EU legal 
order, as an ‘integral part’ of the latter.26 Furthermore, it was maintained that a 
separation between EU law and international law would be inconceivable: on the 
one hand, international law would be a necessary ‘functioning tool’ for the EU 
itself; 27  on the other hand, a net separation would frustrate the contribution 





22 Henry G. Schermers, ‘Community Law and International Law’ (1975) 12 C.M.L.Rev. 77, 87; 
Andrea Ott, ‘Multilevel Regulations Reviewed by Multilevel Jurisdictions: The ECJ, the National 
Courts and the ECtHR’ in Andreas Follesdal, Ramses A. Wessel, Jan Wouters (eds), Multilevel 
Regulation and the EU: The Interplay between Global, European and National Normative 
Processes (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 345, 347.  
23 Timothy Dunne, ‘Good Citizen Europe’ (2008) 84 International Affairs 13; Ott (n 22), 348. 
24 Article 216.2 TFEU reads as follows: ‘[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon 
the institutions of the Union and on its Member States’. While the scope of this provision is clearly 
limited to those international agreements that are concluded by the EU itself, still some reads it 
as way to consolidate a monist approach in the EU Treaties. As will be explained hereinafter, no 
other provisions in the EU Treaties suggest this approach. 
25 See Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the 
Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice', in Alan Dashwood, Marc Maresceau (eds), 
Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape 
(Cambridge 2008) 13, 33; Gattini (n 9). 
26 See Case C-181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para. 5. 
27 This thesis is developed by Bruno de Witte, ‘Using International Law for the European Union’s 
Domestic Affairs’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International 
Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 133,  
28 See Frank Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice under International Law’ in Marise 
Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford 2008) 37, 95.	
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For as simple as that it may seem, however, applying a straightforward 
monist paradigm to the relationship between EU law and general international 
law would raise a number of problems. It was argued29 (and I share this point of 
view) that declaring general international law as being an ‘integral part’ of the EU 
legal system does not necessarily imply accepting a relationship of hierarchy 
between the two legal orders, where international law is set to prevail over EU 
law. In the same fashion, it is quite difficult to maintain that general international 
law would always enjoy direct applicability within EU law. In fact, while it 
welcomed international law as part of the EU legal system, the ECJ awarded it 
some sort of primacy over secondary sources of EU law, but not over primary 
sources.30 As a consequence, when a rule of general international law may be 
valid under EU law, it still remains uncertain whether it would prevail over any 
conflicting rule of EU law, and such uncertainty has been further fostered by an 
interpretation of mentioned Article 216.2 TFEU, provided by the ECJ itself.31 In 
terms of direct applicability, the same Court has long denied it in relation to the 
laws of the World Trade Organization (WTO)32 – still undoubtedly valid within the 
EU legal order – and more recently in relation to the UN Convention on the Law 




29 Wessel (n 11), 13. 
30 See Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655, para. 45.  
31 According to the Court, ‘the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community 
over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as 
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those arguments’. Case C-61/94 
Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, para. 52. At the time, the provision of current Article 
216.2 TFEU was contained in Article 300.7 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
32 Case C-377/02 NV Firma Léon Van Parys v. Belgisch Interventie-en Restitutiebureau [2005] 
ECR I-1465, para. 39, with ref. to Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV v. 
Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219. 
33 Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR I-4057, 
para. 64.		
	 20 
A second problem arises from the possible overlap between the principle 
of primacy of EU law over Member States’ laws (which is one of the fundamental 
principles, on which the functioning of the EU legal system is based) and the 
application of a monistic paradigm with regard to the relationship between EU law 
and general international law. It was argued34 that the idea of considering general 
international law as an ‘integral part’ of the EU legal order would have necessarily 
granted general international law the same primacy that is granted to EU law, vis-
à-vis the laws of Member States, irrespective of any divergent national traditions 
in this context. As a consequence, EU law would have been exploited as ‘door 
opener’ for general international law, to enter the legal orders of Member States. 
In sum, these main arguments show how applying a plain monist paradigm to the 
relationship between general international law and EU law would hardly be a 
simple and viable path. Eventually, a full-blown monist approach would, on the 
one side, conflict with the special nature of EU law as developed by the ECJ over 
the years35 and, on the other hand, have distortionary effects on the relationship 
between the EU legal system and the laws of Member States, interfering with the 
individual approach of the latter towards general international law.  
In contraposition to the monist paradigm, the dualist theory starts from the 
well-known position of Heinrich Triepel, according to whom the international legal 
order and municipal legal orders are like ‘circles, which possibly touch, but never 




34 Franz C. Mayer, ‘European Law as a Door Opener for Public International Law?’, in Droit 
International et Diversité des Cultures Juridiques – International Law and Diversity of Legal 
Cultures (Pedone 2008) 241, 253; Wessel (n 11), 12. 
35 With particular regard to the position of international law in relation to primary EU law, discussed 
above, and the necessary prevalence of EU fundamental principles. 
36 Heirich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Hirschfeld 1899), III, as translated by Lando 
Kirchmair, ‘Who Has the Final Say? The Relationship between International, EU and National 
Law’ (2018) Special Issue, European Journal of Legal Studies 47, 52. 
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legal systems as two separate ‘entities’, which are based on different grounds for 
validity, have different contents and are addressed at distinct categories of 
subjects. In particular, while national law is generally addressed to any natural or 
legal person within the relevant jurisdiction, international law is regarded as solely 
inter-state (rectius addressed at the international community of states, including 
international organisations and other subjects of international law), without having 
any direct effect or being direct applicable within domestic legal orders.37  As a 
consequence, according to the dualist theory, it lies with national law to establish 
the conditions for recognising a certain norm of international law within a domestic 
legal system so that, ultimately, international law could be applied within national 
legal systems if and only if national laws so provide.  
Looking for a moment at the relationship between EU law and the laws of 
Member States, the application of a dualist paradigm seems to be excluded: it is 
clear that a straightforward dualist approach would imply for EU law to be valid 
within the domestic legal systems of Member States under the conditions set forth 
by each national law;38 in addition, EU law would only be addressed at Member 
States, thus excluding any direct effect for natural or legal persons actin within 
the legal orders of the same Member States. These consequences conflict with 
the idea of the EU legal system that the Court of Justice of the EU has been 
developing since its landmark judgments in Van Gend & Loos and Costa,39 




37 See Dionisio Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (Sirey 1929), 46.	
38 See, in general terms, Kirchmair (n 36), 54, with reference to the thesis elaborated by Joseph 
Gabriel Starke ‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ (1936) 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l 
L. 66. 
39  Case C-26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1; Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585.  
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independent from national laws, the provisions of which system are to take 
precedence over the laws of Member States in case of conflict and can enjoy 
direct effect or being directly applicable within domestic legal systems, under the 
conditions set forth by EU law itself (not by Member States’ laws). To this extent 
it was noted40 that the position of the ECJ with regard to the relationship between 
EU law and the laws of Member States has coherently evolved over the years 
along the path of monism, in order to stress and preserve the concept of ‘primacy 
of EU law’. By contrast, the position of the same Court has never been entirely 
monist (as it was briefly discussed above)41 with regard looking at the relationship 
between international law and EU law, where it has introduced a number of 
distinctive features, showing drifts towards elements of the dualist paradigm.42 
As it was observed, the dualist path risk to stress the isolation of EU law from 
general international law, sacrificing any future opportunities for a fruitful cross-
contamination.43 Nonetheless, in more recent years, the ECJ was solicited to 
embrace a clear dualist position, in the sense that any interplay between 
international law and EU law should be regulated according to the latter,44 which 
it adopted in Kadi I, focusing on the constitutional dimension of EU law. However, 




40 Lando Kirchmair, ‘The ‘Janus Face’ of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A Theoretical 
Appraisal of the EU Legal Order’s Relationship with International and Member State Law (2012) 
4 Goettingen Journal of International Law 677, 680, 683, 685. 
41 The reference is to the approach of the ECJ to WTO law and to the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, as cited in n 32 and n 33. In relation to this attitude of the Court of Justice See Jan W. 
van Rossem, ‘Interaction between EU Law and International Law in the Light of Intertanko and 
Kadi: the Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but not the Community’ (2009) 40 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 183, 195.  
42 An evolution praised by Eeckhout (n 10) and criticised by de Bùrca (n 10). 
43 See de Witte (n 27) and Hoffmeister (n 28). 
44 According to Advocate General Poiares Maduro ‘international law can permeate [the legal order 
of the EU] only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles [of the EU]’. Opinion of 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, 
para. 21. 
	 23 
approach does not seem to solve the problems raised by the interaction between 
UN law and EU law in full, since differences between the two legal systems tend 
to be more nuanced.45   
The sections that follow will retrace the path of the Kadi I case: section II 
will firstly analyse the monist approach of the General Court, which asserted the 
overwhelming primacy of UN law and led to a complete dismissal of the claimant’s 
action. Section III will deal with the approach adopted by the Court of Justice, 
whose dualist solution of the case led the judgment of the General Court to be 
set aside and the disputed regulations to be annulled. Section IV will finally 
discuss the outcomes and consequences of these two opposite models, for the 
purpose of outlining their points of strength, but especially their weaknesses in 
the case at stake. This latter section will stress the need to develop an individual 
model to deal with the interactions and contrasts between the EU and the UN 
legal systems in the field of human rights. The analysis illustrated above carries 
with it a number of key theoretical questions, some of which were directly 
addressed by the courts, namely: does the EU have an obligation – either direct 
or indirect – to implement Security Council resolutions? If so, under what 
conditions is the EU entitled (or obliged) to implement UN law in place of its 




45 The works of Kirchmair (n 36), 60, 65, and Wessel (n 11), 22, 27, describe two further existing 
theories, beside monism and dualism, namely: global legal pluralism, which postulate the possible 
co-existence of more than a legal system within a certain jurisdiction, and global constitutionalism, 
that tends to address the relationship between different legal systems in terms of constitutional 
norms and principles. As pointed out by Kirchmair, both theories do not solve the problem. Global 
legal pluralism does not exclude, at the very end, conflicts between co-existent legal systems and 
the need for a set of rules aimed at resolving or preventing such conflicts. Global constitutionalism 
does not provide a solution for conflict arising between two legal systems that are, or claim to be, 
both constitutional or present constitutional-like features. In particular, it fails to determine which 
one – out of two ‘constitutional systems’ – is set to prevail. It was convincingly argued by Marcus 
Klamert that global legal pluralism ends up being nothing more than a nuanced evolution of 
dualism, which stresses the need to find area of cooperation and communication between 
different legal system. Marcus Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU law (Oxford 2014), 227.  
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legislation, when it is passed to implement Security Council resolutions? What 
legal standard should the ECJ adopt to perform its review? What role should 
common ‘constitutional traditions’ of the EU Member States play within the ECJ 
review process and are such traditions outranked by Article 103 of the UN 
Charter? To these and some other questions, this chapter is aimed at providing 
an answer.  
II. A MONIST APPROACH: KADI I AT THE GENERAL COURT 
The first step of this analysis will consider the approach of the General Court (at 
the time of the case, officially known as Court of First Instance) to the interaction 
between the EU and UN legal systems in the field of human rights, and the 
answers it provided to the questions outlined above. 
a. The Court’s ‘declaration of intent’ 
At the beginning of its judgment,46 the Court pointed out that a prior assessment 
on the scope of its own jurisdiction should be regarded as a necessary 
precondition to ‘rule on the pleas alleging breach of the applicant’s fundamental 
rights’, insofar as such breach could – ‘if proved’47 – lead to the annulment of the 
contested Regulations, as the applicant demanded. This preliminary statement 
on jurisdiction could be regarded as a ‘declaration of intent’ by the Court, of great 
importance for its whole reasoning, as it is accompanied by an unequivocal 
endorsement of the monist approach.48 To this extent, the argumentative path of 




46 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission (Kadi I) [2005] ECR II-03649. 
47 Ibid, para 176.  
48 Patrick Daillier ‘Contribution au débat entre monisme et dualisme de l'ordre juridique de l'Union 
européenne’ (2009) Revue du marché commun et de l'Union européenne 394, 396.  
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the Court affirmed the prevalence of UN law over any other international 
obligations imposed onto Member States.49 The Court did so by relying both on 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, and on its interpretation on a number of norms in 
the EU Treaties, and in particular Article 307 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (EC), safeguarding international obligations undertaken by 
Member States pursuant to international law, prior of entering into the EU Treaties 
themselves. Secondly, the Court came to consider that, while it could not be 
affirmed that the EU is subject to UN law per se, Member States nonetheless 
imposed an indirect duty of compliance with UN law onto the EU, by means of 
the same EU Treaties.50 In fact, according to the Court, as they transferred to the 
Union a number of powers, Member States implicitly made the EU bound to 
perform their obligations under the UN Charter, as long as their performance 
should be achieved by means of those transferred powers. Third, as long as EU 
institutions adopt measures in order to implement Security Council resolutions, 
they merely perform the Member States’ obligations under the UN Charter (by 
virtue of the powers that the same Member States have transferred to the EU). 
The institutions have no discretionary power to determine the content of such 
measures.51 Therefore, judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU needs to 
be limited in scope to the sole compliance with the EU Treaties of the procedure 
followed by the EU to adopt the measures at stake. Hereafter, the arguments of 




49 Kadi I (n 46), paras 176-186. 
50 Kadi I (n 46), paras 192-204. 
51 Kadi I (n 46), paras 213-225. 
52 The position of the GCEU raised widespread criticism. Among others, Christina Eckes argues 
that the stance adopted by the GCEU in relation to the obligations of EU institutions under UN 
law and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is contrary to the wording of the EU Treaties and 
to the ECJ previous case-law. Christina Eckes, ‘Judicial review of European anti-terrorism 
measures – the Yusuf and Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance’ (2008) 14 ELR 74. In 
relation to the ‘self-restraint’ approach adopted by the GCEU, Nikolaos Lavranos stresses the 
	 26 
From a normative standpoint, the position of the Court can be easily 
identified in the Court’s words when it considered that ‘the obligations imposed 
on the Community and its Member States by the Charter of the United Nations 
prevail over every other obligation of international, Community or domestic law’.53 
In line with its preliminary statement, the Court further specified its argument by 
stressing that ‘from the standpoint of international law’,54 obligations imposed 
onto states by the UN Charter should always prevail over their commitments 
under different legal instruments, including the European Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the EU 
Treaties in particular.  
 According to the Court, Member States’ national law should always yield 
to international obligations stemming from the UN Charter, by virtue of customary 
international law and the provisions set forth by Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (VCLT). In fact, Article 27 
VCLT excludes conflict with domestic laws as a valid defence for a state’s failure 
to comply with a treaty. Hence – in this sense – the whole set of national human 
rights guarantees, including constitutional ones, could possibly be ‘set aside’ 
(rectius derogated) by an incompatible obligation, deriving its authority from the 




role that domestic courts should be playing in filling the gap opened by the GCEU, as regards a 
full judicial review of UN-derived legislation. Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Judicial review of UN Sanctions 
by the Court of First Instance’ (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 471. 
53 Kadi I (n 46), para 177. 
54 Kadi I (n 46), para 181. 
55 Kadi I (n 46), para 182. The firm position of the GCEU is criticised by Piet Eeckhout, who 
considers the choice made by the GCEU as the worst possible option and calls for a more 
constitutionally oriented approach to the case. Piet Eeckhout, ‘Community terrorism listings, 
fundamental rights, and UN Security Council resolution. In search of the right fit’ (2007) 3 ECLR 
183, 195, 197. 
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With regard to conventional international law, the Court explicitly made 
reference to Article 103 of the UN Charter and the case-law of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) to infer that even regional and multilateral treaties – such 
as the EU Treaties and the ECHR – are hierarchically subordinate to the Charter 
of the United Nations, whose provisions enjoy unconditional priority over these 
treaties in case of conflict, irrespective of them preceding or following the Charter 
in time.56 Moreover, according to the established case-law of the ICJ, Article 103 
of the UN Charter should apply not only to primary law, but also to UN secondary 
law, such as binding Security Council resolutions, whose authority and binding 
value is derived from the Charter itself. As a consequence, in the ‘hierarchy of 
norms’ considered by the Court, even Security Council resolutions could 
potentially outrank the EU Treaties (and the ECHR), regardless for the derivative 
nature of the obligations they entail.57  
From a European perspective, the Court offered a strict interpretation of 
EU treaty norms, to conclude that even those provisions entailed a classical 
monist idea of the international legal order, where the European legal system 
made no exception at all. In the view of the Court, EU Treaties – and Article 307 
EC58 in particular – exclude that any international agreement entered into by 
Member States prior to their accession to the Community (now to the Union) can 
howsoever be repealed, derogated or affected by Member States’ obligations 
under European law. Such an interpretation, according to the Court, would have 
been confirmed by the ECJ case-law on Article 307 EC, which always subjected 




56 To this extent, the VCLT provides an express derogation to the usual rule of ‘succession of 
laws’ with regard to Article 103 of the UN Charter. 
57 Kadi I (n 46), para 183-184. 
58 Now Article 351 TFEU. 
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toward third states, under pre-existing international instruments.59 Furthermore, 
in the view of the Court, Article 297 EC,60 which prompts Member States to 
consult in order to ‘prevent the functioning of the common market being affected 
by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take […] in order to 
carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and 
international security, should apply to the duties vested into Member States by 
the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, a joint interpretation of general 
international law (either customary or conventional) and the EU Treaties would 
imply for Member States a specific obligation to take action together, ‘in that 
capacity’61, to abide by Security Council resolutions, as long as they may interfere 
with the functioning of the common market.62  
As a consequence, according to the Court, Member States bear a specific 
duty to disregard (‘leave unapplied’)63 European law – be that a provision of the 
EU Treaties or a general principle of the EU legal system – to the extent that it 
may prevent their compliance with the UN Charter.64 What is more, the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 347 TFEU requires Member States to perform their 
obligations and duties under the Charter of the United Nations by means of 





59 Kadi I (n 46), para 187. 
60 Now Article 347 TFEU 
61 Kadi I (n 46), paras 188-189. 
62 In this respect, the reading of the GCEU seems to go beyond the very same words of the EU 
Treaties, as pointed out by Eckes (n 52). Partially contra Peter Hilpold, who considers the choice 
made by the GCEU as coherent with the Court’s previous case-law. Peter Hilpold, ‘EU Law and 
UN Law in Conflict: the Kadi Case’, in Armin Von Bogdandy, Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, (vol. 13, Brill 2009) 141, 169.	
63 Kadi I (n 46), para 190.  
64 The potential ‘fragmentation’ brought along by this stance of the GCEU is particularly criticised 
by Martin Nettesheim, who points out the risks of weakening the autonomy of the EU legal system 
vis-à-vis international law. Martin Nettesheim, ‘U.N. Sanctions against individuals – a challenge 
to the architecture of European Union governance’ (2007) 44 C.M.L.Rev. 567, 600. 
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It is worth noting, at this point, how the General Court strictly adhered to 
the monist model65 and came to postulate not only the possibility for EU law of 
being derogated by conflicting UN law (according to the general hierarchy 
principle lex superior derogat legi inferiori), but also a positive duty placed upon 
Member States to completely disapply EU law, including general principles such 
as the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in order to perform 
their obligations under the UN Charter. To this extent, following the reasoning of 
the Court, actions undertaken by Member States beyond and against EU law 
would not only be justified, but rather desirable, in the view of complying with 
obligations higher in rank. Moreover, while being adopted ‘in contrast’ with 
European law (even against EU core principles, such as human rights protection), 
these actions should nonetheless be concerted, to prevent the common market 
from being jeopardised.  
b. Effects of UN law on the EU 
Following its logical path, the Court subsequently proceeded to discuss two of 
the key questions outlined above: whether or not the EU itself, separately from 
its Member States, bears an obligation to comply with the UN Charter and to what 
extent, therefore, it should act in order to implement Security Council resolutions. 
As a preliminary theoretical point, the Court plainly stated that the EU 
cannot be regarded to be bound by the Charter of the United Nations per se. To 




65 According to Koen Lenaerts, the GCEU approach should be defined as an ‘internationalist’ one, 
rather than a monist one, since the Court did not disregard existing differences between EU law 
and international law but argued in favour of an (indirect) obligation of EU institution to comply 
with UN law. Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Kadi Saga and the Rule of Law within the EU’ (2014) 67 SMU 
Law Review 708, 709. 
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law has ever required the EU to comply with Security Council resolutions. Nor 
can Article 103 of the UN Charter impose the EU to act in coherence with UN 
law. The reason for such non-application, in the words of the Court, lays in the 
EU not being a member of the UN, nor ‘an addressee of the resolutions of the 
Security Council, or the successor to the rights and obligations of the Member 
States for the purposes of public international law’. 66  This is a particularly 
important step in the Court’s line of argument, since it appears to suggest (in a 
seeming contradiction with the monist approach adopted by the Court) that no 
obligation can be imposed on the EU itself – by virtue of the UN Charter – given 
that the Union is a self-standing legal order, in a way superiorem non 
recognoscens. Such an unobjectionable logical premise, by contrast, led the 
court to affirm the contrary: while the Charter of the United Nations cannot exert 
any direct binding effect on the EU (following a ‘top-down scheme’), the duties 
and obligations that stem from that Charter can however have effect within the 
EU legal system, since they are absolutely binding for Member States (hence, 
following a ‘bottom-up scheme’).67  
The reasoning of the Court in this respect is of especial interest and can 
be divided into four steps. Firstly, as a matter of fact, at the time they established 
or entered into the European Community, Member States were already part of 
the UN and bound by the UN Charter (with the relevant exception of Germany). 
Secondly, by entering into a treaty between each other, establishing a new 
international organisation, they could not transfer to this organisation ‘more 
powers than they possessed’ (according to the well-established principle nemo 




66 Kadi I (n 46), para 192. 
67 Ibid, para 193. 
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prior obligations towards third parties.68 As a consequence, in the opinion of the 
Court, since the Charter of the United Nations – and Article 103 in particular – 
limited UN member states sovereign powers within the scope of the Charter itself, 
any further transfer or delegation of such powers to newly established 
international bodies, should be affected by that very same limit. Thirdly, Member 
States voluntarily reaffirmed within the EU Treaties their obligations under the UN 
Charter by providing, in this regard, express safeguards and derogations to EU 
law, by means of the aforementioned Articles 347 and 351 TFEU. These 
derogations, according to the Court, imply a specific duty for EU institutions not 
to interfere with Member States performance of their obligations under the UN 
Charter.69 Fourthly, insofar as Member States decided to transfer to the EU all 
(or some of) the powers required to comply with their duties within the UN legal 
system, they implicitly agreed to make the EU itself bound by UN law and required 
to comply with Security Council resolutions, taking action to implement them as 
appropriate.70  
In brief, while it excluded the EU to be directly bound by the Charter of the 
United Nations in terms of public international law stricto sensu, someway 
refusing to admit the existence of an autonomous hierarchical relationship 
between UN and EU law, nonetheless the Court considered EU Treaties to be 




68 Ibid, para 195 with expl. reference to Joined Cases C-21/72 to C-24/72 International Fruit 
Company and Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (International Fruit) [1972] ECR I-
1219, para 11. 
69 Ibid, para 196-197. 
70 Ibid, para 198.  
71 To this extent, as it was briefly noted above, the Court appears to imply a particular relationship 
between Member States and the EU: while the Union is an international organisation, provided 
with its own legal personality and – in general terms – its self-standing legal system, still Member 
States cannot be regarded altogether as ‘third parties’ with respect to the EU. In particular, the 
powers that the EU autonomously exerts do exist insofar as Member States have transferred 
them to the Union in order to fulfil its functions. On the basis of this idea, the assumption that 
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by virtue of a self-imposed obligation (rectius an obligation placed on the EU by 
Member States).  
This obligation, according to the Court, appears to be particularly relevant 
in the field of economic sanctions: in fact, Article 215 TFEU72 specially provides 
the legal basis for the adoption of financial and economic restrictive measures, 
decided by Member States for political reasons within the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), as the same Court pointed out, ‘most commonly pursuant 
to a resolution of the Security Council requiring the adoption of such sanctions’.73 
This is exactly the case – in the view of the Court – of the measures adopted by 
the EU to implement the Security Council resolutions that established the UN 
blacklists systems, with the purpose of striking down the flow of funds towards 
Usama Bin-Laden and the Al-Qaeda network around the world. In conclusion, as 
the General Court clearly spelled out, ‘the applicant’s arguments based on the 
view that the Community legal order is a legal order independent of the United 
Nations, governed by its own rules of law, must be rejected’.74 
c. Limits to the jurisdiction of the Court 
Affirming – as the Court did – that the EU carries an obligation to comply with and 
implement UN law, and Security Council resolutions in particular, bears 
fundamental consequences with regard to some of the other questions this 
research aims at addressing, namely: what limits does the jurisdiction of the Court 




seems to underlie the argument of the Court is that Member States somewhat reflected their own 
obligations (under the UN Charter) onto the EU, by means of the EU Treaties and indirectly 
subjected the Union to those very same obligations.   
72 Former Article 301 EC. 
73 Kadi I (n 46), para 202. 
74 Ibid, para 208. 
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implement Security Council resolutions? And what legal standard the same Court 
of Justice of the EU should adopt to perform its review? 
Opening the argument with regard to its own jurisdiction, the Court firstly 
considered that, the EU being a legal order based on the rule of law, Member 
States established the Court of Justice, vested with the power to review 
compatibility of their own actions – as well as the actions of the institutions – with 
the ‘constitutional charter’ (the EU Treaties)75. In this respect, the Court regarded 
judicial review as a fundamental principle of EU law, which derives from the 
constitutional traditions common to Member States, as well as from the long-
standing interpretation of the ECHR. In compliance with this fundamental 
principle, Article 263 TFEU76 is such as to ensure every individual – directly 
affected by an act of EU institutions – to challenge its legitimacy before the GCEU 
(and the ECJ in second instance), both from a procedural and from a substantive 
point of view. However, according to the Court, judicial review may encounter 
structural limits, which can be set by general international law or by the same EU 
Treaties, depending on the different kind of power that was exerted by EU 
institutions to adopt each particular act.  
In particular, as the Court pointed out, when they enact legislation in order 
to implement Security Council resolutions, EU institutions have their powers 
limited by the scope of UN law, whose substantial content they can neither 
question nor amend. As a consequence, should the Court review the ‘internal 




75 Ibid, para 209, with expl. reference to Case C-294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR I-
1339, para 23; Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, para 
16; Case C-314/91 Weber v Parliament [1993] ECR I-1093, para 8; Joined Cases T-222/99, T-
327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and Others v Parliament [2001] ECR II- 2823, para 48. 
76 Former Article 230 EC. 
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protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, its assessment would 
come to consider, de facto, compliance of Security Council resolutions with EU 
founding principles.77 Hence, any action seeking annulment of EU regulations – 
adopted to implement Security Council resolutions – alleging violation of the 
claimant’s fundamental rights protected by EU law, may lead ‘the Court to declare 
by implication that the provision of international law at issue [i.e. the resolution] 
infringes the fundamental rights of individuals’, protected by the EU Treaties 
within the EU legal order.78 According to the Court, such an outcome is neither 
admissible nor desirable. Conversely, since the UN Charter imposes binding 
obligations onto the EU and its institutions (for all the reasons described above), 
these obligations represent a limit for European judiciary as well. In the opinion 
of the General Court, as a consequence, judicial review of EU regulations, 
implementing Security Council resolutions, should be limited in scope to the 
assessment of ‘formal and procedural requirements’ being respected by EU 
institutions – including reference to the proper legal basis – and to evaluate 
whether EU legislation at stake respected the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, in relation to the Security Council resolutions it was to implement. 
Any evaluation whatsoever as of the respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms by Security Council resolutions (implemented by means of EU 
legislation) falls outside of the Court’s jurisdiction and would overtly clash with the 
EU Treaties and general international law that the Court is bound to enforce. 
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case, ‘affect the validity of a Security Council measure or its effect in the territory’ 
of the EU, as per the ECJ’s well-established case-law.79  
Having established a strict perimeter to circumscribe its jurisdiction on UN-
derived EU regulations, the General Court nonetheless acknowledged that, 
whether a substantial and indirect evaluation of the legitimacy 80  of Security 
Council resolutions may take place at the European level, it should occur with 
sole regard to jus cogens: a hard core of peremptory international norms, ‘from 
which no derogation is possible’,81 neither by UN institutions.82 To this extent the 
General Court further observed that the UN Charter has always regarded the 
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law, pre-existent to the Charter itself. Such principle being at any effect an integral 
part of UN law, it certainly requires UN bodies not to infringe fundamental human 
rights while performing their duties under the Charter, insofar as protection of 
these rights falls within the scope of jus cogens. Should the Security Council 
adopt a resolution contrary to jus cogens, it would be considered null and void ab 
origine and would not enjoy any binding effect, neither for Member States nor for 
the EU.83  
d. On the merits of the Kadi I case 
As a consequence, the Court undertook the analysis of the contested regulations 
with the purpose of understanding whether or not those regulations and the 
Security Council resolutions they implemented violated the claimant’s 
fundamental rights as protected by peremptory norms of general international 
law. In this regard, it has to be stressed that the legal reasoning of the General 
Court seems to be grounded on a (implicit but still) essential assumption that the 
fundamental human rights recalled by the preamble to the UN Charter, as an 
integral part of the general principles of UN law, are all and only those human 
rights that can be considered a part of jus cogens norms too. That is to say that 
general principles of UN law, which should in any case be respected by UN 
institutions, cannot be extended, by means of interpretation, beyond the scope of 
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On these grounds, the General Court addressed the analysis of the 
disputed regulation vis-à-vis the protection of human rights awarded by jus 
cogens and eventually considered the complaint filed by the applicant to be ill 
founded. In fact, being an ensemble of public international law norms, generally 
regarded and accepted as peremptory by the community of States, jus cogens 
entails a standard level of protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
which is less comprehensive by far in comparison with internationally recognised 
best practices. In this sense, having established jus cogens as the standard of 
reference, the judgment of the General Court provided a brief and at times 
superficial assessment of the claimant’s allegations, whose outcome is as 
obvious as it is unsatisfactory. As regards the alleged breach of the right to own 
property, the Court grounded its evaluation on Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1948, the second paragraph of which provides that ‘[n]o one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’. In the Court’s view, the measures 
adopted by the UN Security Council and implemented by the disputed 
regulations, were not to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of property. On 
the one hand, they were not arbitrary, since they were adopted to pursue ‘an 
objective of fundamental public interest for the international community’85, such 
as the fight against international terrorism. Furthermore, they were especially 
targeted to a number of individual and entities, whose alleged links with Usama 
Bin-Laden or the Al-Qaeda network made it reasonable to adopt restrictive 




standards to be applied by the UN Security Council, which I briefly deal with in the Introduction to 
Chapter 3.   
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support to international terrorists. On the other hand, the freezing of one’s assets 
was considered by the General Court to be a ‘temporary precautionary measure’, 
which did not entails – per se – a deprivation of property, but only a provisional 
prohibition on the use of assets, with the essence of the right remaining 
undisputed.86 Moreover, Security Council resolutions (and in parallel the EU 
regulations that implemented them) provided for a number of relevant exceptions 
that competent national authorities may grant, to allow the individuals affected by 
freezing measures to make use of their properties and funds in order to assure 
them and their family the necessary material support for the needs of everyday 
life, including (upon authorisation of the Sanction Committee of the Security 
Council) extraordinary expenses that may occur. In this sense, the freezing 
measures were not such to submit targeted individuals and their families to 
‘inhuman or degrading treatment’.87  
As regards the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to be heard, the 
Court adopted a distinction between the right to be heard by EU institutions – the 
Council in particular – prior to adopting the disputed regulations, and the right to 
a fair hearing before the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council, in relation 
to the inclusion of the claimant within the list of person and entities whose assets 
were to be frozen. With respect to the EU, the General Court maintained that, 
while the right to be heard represents a general principle of EU law in all 
proceedings that may lead to the adoption of measures directly affecting an 
individual, nonetheless such a principle ‘is correlated to the exercise of discretion 
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right to a fair hearing should not ab origine be applied to EU regulations when 
they are adopted to implement Security Council resolutions, given that in those 
cases no authority to reconsider individual situations is granted to EU institutions, 
neither the hearing of concerned individuals may lead to a factual review of their 
position.89 With regard to the UN, the Court considered the UN law at issue to be 
consistent with jus cogens, since it allowed concerned individuals to address their 
request for re-consideration to the Security Council, through the intermediary of 
competent national authorities. According to the Court, even if the review 
procedure provided by UN law did not award concerned individuals with a right 
to be heard in person by the Sanctions Committee (relying, by contrast, on the 
role of each national authority, entitled to receive applications for reconsideration 
by its own nationals), this restriction is nonetheless justified by the administrative 
nature of the measures at stake, where national authorities ‘play an indispensable 
part’.90 
Finally, taking into account the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to 
effective judicial review, the General Court briefly reaffirmed the findings on its 
own jurisdiction: according to the Court, from a European point of view, the right 
to challenge the lawfulness of disputed regulations was – in fact – guaranteed to 
the applicant, since the same Court was able to assess the correctness of the 
procedure followed by EU institutions to adopt such regulations and their legal 
basis, besides their consistency and proportionality, having regard to the Security 
Council resolutions they were to implement. From a UN law point of view, in turn, 
the General Court considered the absence of any available judicial protection per 
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access to the courts – provided by Article 8 UDHR – should not be considered as 
absolute in nature. 
In fact, this right encounters major limitations both in the case of a ‘public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation’, 91  and with regard to the 
‘doctrine of State immunity’92 (itself a norm of jus cogens) that excludes liability 
of UN member states in domestic courts, for those measures adopted pursuant 
to Security Council resolutions. Moreover, in the opinion of the General Court, 
the ‘absence of an international court having jurisdiction to ascertain whether acts 
of the Security Council are lawful’ did not prevent the fundamental right of 
concerned individuals, as guaranteed by jus cogens, to be adequately protected 
by means of the administrative review procedure described above.93  
The General Court’s assessment of the merits of the case clearly reflect the 
rigorous monist approach of the judges and the great institutional deference paid 
to the UN legal system at large. On the one side, the Court reaffirmed the primacy 
of UN law, which leaves EU institutions no discretion when they are called upon 
to implement Security Council resolutions. On the other side, the Court stressed 
the need for ECJ jurisdiction to be strictly limited to the external lawfulness of 
disputed legislation under EU Treaties and the respect of jus cogens norms.94 To 
this extent, the appropriateness and the legality of the resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council could not be called into question within the EU legal system, 
neither by EU political institutions, nor by the ECJ, being the ‘question whether 
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and the choice on the measures to take in order to confront that threat, the sole 
province of the Security Council of the United Nations, pursuant to the mandate 
conferred on it by the UN Charter.95   
III. A DUALIST APPROACH: KADI I AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Following the path of the judicial case, this section will be dedicated to the 
analysis of the different approach adopted by the ECJ96  with regard to the 
problem of regime interaction between the UN and EU legal systems in the field 
of human rights. The aim of this section, in particular, is understanding the 
arguments that led the judges at second instance to embrace a dualist model,97 
setting aside the judgment of the General Court.98   
a. The autonomy of the EU legal order under its ‘constitutional’ Treaties 
First of all, the reasoning of the ECJ focused on the matter of jurisdiction, which 
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legislation and the respect of jus cogens norms. In this respect, the ECJ 
immediately made clear its different point of view, reaffirming its ‘universal’ 
jurisdiction to perform a full review of the acts adopted by European institutions 
and Member States, on the basis of EU ‘constitutional’ Treaties.99 According to 
the ECJ, the EU being based on the rule of law, it provided for an autonomous 
system of judicial remedies, which conferred upon the Court itself a full mandate 
to enforce its constitutional charter, ensuring the primacy of the same rule of law 
and the ‘closure’ of the EU legal system.100 To this extent, in the view of the Court, 
no international agreement (such as the UN Charter) can interfere with the 
‘allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties’ or curtail the jurisdiction of the ECJ, 
provided by Article 5 TFEU, which is a crucial part of the constitutional structure 
of the Union. What is more, in the opinion of the ECJ, its exclusive jurisdiction is 
such to safeguard the autonomy of the European legal system that should under 
no circumstance be put into question.101  
Following this paradigm, when the ECJ is called to perform a judicial 
review of European regulations adopted to implement Security Council 
resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it should not address the 
lawfulness of such resolutions, neither in relation to peremptory norms of public 
international law, but rather assess the complete consistency of the regulations 
at issue with the EU ‘constitutional’ Treaties. According to the Court, should the 
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Council resolutions is contrary to a higher norm in the EU legal order, it ‘would 
not entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law’.102  
By means of this opening argument, the ECJ overtly declared its 
endorsement for the dualist model, which considers the EU legal system as an 
autonomous and separate order from the UN legal system and international law 
in general.103 In so doing, the ECJ marked a clear contrast with the General 
Court, whose entire judgment was rooted in the unconditional adherence to the 
monist theory. Furthermore, the Court directly addressed another of the 
fundamental questions this chapter is aimed at answering, namely: what role 
should common ‘constitutional traditions’ of EU Member States play within the 
ECJ review process and are such traditions outranked by Article 103 of the UN 
Charter? 
Indeed, the key element that led the ECJ to disavow the opinion of the 
General Court must be found in the profound difference between the two Courts 
as to the theoretical framing of the EU legal order. While the General Court clearly 
considers the EU legal order to be a subset of general international law, much 
akin to other treaty-established international organisations and substantially part 
of the hierarchy of norms which is characteristic of that area of law, the ECJ 
identified the EU legal system as a constitutional order and grounded its 
reasoning on the theoretical categories that are typical of constitutional law. Not 
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recalled the ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’105 and the 
rules set forth by the ECHR as the fundamental principles to be followed by the 
European judiciary when assessing the lawfulness of EU legislation. To this 
extent, following the path of many European constitutional courts,106 the ECJ 
identified a set of ‘hard-core’ constitutional norms at the basis of the EU legal 
order, which should admit no derogation by virtue of international agreements 
whatsoever (neither by the Charter of the United Nations). In fact, in the opinion 
of the ECJ, respect for fundamental rights (as they stem from the constitutions of 
Member States and the ECHR) represents a condition of constitutional 
lawfulness for any act of EU institutions, regardless of it being adopted to comply 
with obligations imposed onto Member States by the UN Charter.107  
Notwithstanding these findings, the ECJ considered that – according to its 
earlier case-law – the EU in fact has an obligation to act consistently with 
international law while exercising its powers. In particular, special attention 
should be paid to the fact that Article 24 of the UN Charter identifies the Security 
Council as the primary responsible organ for the maintenance of international 
peace and security at the global level and such responsibility ‘includes the power 
to determine what and who poses a threat to international peace and security and 
to take the measures necessary to maintain or restore them’.108 While Article 215 
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implementing Security Council resolutions – pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter – procedures for implementation should always be coherent with the 
legal order in which they take place as, in the case at stake, that of the European 
Union. Since the UN Charter does not provide for a specific model in order to give 
effect to Security Council resolutions in the ‘recipient’ legal systems, one could 
not infer that judicial review addressing the internal lawfulness of the EU 
regulations in question is such as to jeopardise the principles presiding over the 
international legal order, including the primacy of UN law.109      
According to the Court, within the EU ‘constitutional’ order, immunity from 
jurisdiction granted to acts adopted by UN bodies (i.e. Security Council 
resolutions), as a consequence of the principle of primacy ‘at the level of 
international law’ provided by Article 103 of the UN Charter, does not extend to 
EU regulations adopted to comply with such act of the United Nations.110 Even if 
Article 351 TFEU 111  prevents any international agreement entered into by 
Member States prior to their accession to the EU from being affected by Member 
States’ obligations under European law, it does not – under any circumstance – 
allow any derogation from the fundamental principles of the EU, such as ‘liberty, 
democracy and respect for human rights’, derived from national constitutions and 
the ECHR.112 Neither does Article 347 TFEU, which safeguards international 
obligations imposed onto Member States to protect international peace and 
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international agreements would only apply to secondary EU law, but not to 
primary law and in particular ‘to the principles that form part of the very foundation 
of the [EU] legal order’ that includes the necessary protection of fundamental 
human rights and a full judicial review of EU measures, vis-à-vis those rights. 
Within the EU legal order (similarly to what happens with domestic legal systems), 
basic constitutional principles could never be outranked by the obligation to 
implement Security Council resolutions, notwithstanding the ‘alleged’ absolute 
primacy of these resolutions under Article 103 of the UN Charter.113  
To support its argument with a comparative perspective, the ECJ made 
reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, 
as the ECJ pointed out, the Court of Strasbourg has always denied its jurisdiction 
ratione personae, in those case involving measures directly attributable to the 
United Nations as an international organisation other than the Council of Europe, 
that enjoys full immunity within the international legal order.114 Conversely, the 
European Court of Human Rights unequivocally claimed its jurisdiction over those 
measures that – although enacted to implement Security Council resolutions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – were adopted by national authorities of a 
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state. 115  While the judicial review performed by the ECJ should under no 
circumstance address the lawfulness of Security Council resolutions as such, this 
is without prejudice for the duty to ensure the full compliance of EU regulations 
with the constitutional principles enshrined in the EU Treaties, as an autonomous 
legal system.116  
b. The Court as master of its own jurisdiction 
To conclude its reasoning as regards jurisdiction, the ECJ considered whether 
the administrative review procedure established by the Security Council 
resolution at issue could itself be the ground for affirming a ‘generalised immunity 
from jurisdiction’, to be granted to EU measures implementing these 
resolutions.117 Indeed, after the judgment of the General Court in Kadi I, few 
amendments were made to the review procedure, to allow individuals or entities, 
whose assets were frozen, to directly address the Sanctions Committee of the 
Security Council, seeking reassessment of their position. In this respect, the ECJ 
maintained that the administrative review procedure provided by UN law (as 
amended after the judgment of the General Court) was not such as to offer the 
same guarantees as the judicial review performed by the Court, within the EU 
legal order. The ECJ further stressed how the administrative procedure was ‘still 
in essence diplomatic and intergovernmental’,118 governed by the unanimity rule, 
with neither a factual chance for those seeking review to present their position 
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known the reason for their assets to be frozen.119 These being the safeguards 
provided by UN law, according to the ECJ, the European judiciary could not 
refrain from exerting a full judicial review of EU regulations, as provided by the 
EU Treaties.120  
With this latter brief argument, the ECJ seemed to evoke the well-known 
Solange II case-law of the German Constitutional Court,121 to apply the principles 
outlined therein to the relationship between the UN and EU legal systems.122 In 
particular, the reasoning of the ECJ implied its own power to decide whether to 
exert a full judicial review and ultimately whether to assert or deny its jurisdiction, 
on the basis of the level of protection for fundamental human rights, afforded 
within a legal system other than the EU, whose norms European measures were 
called to implement.123 As a consequence, in the opinion of the Court, the ECJ 
could refrain from reviewing the lawfulness of EU legislation, adopted to comply 
with obligations provided by the UN Charter, insofar as the UN legal system 
provided a level of protection for fundamental human rights, which the ECJ itself 
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to procedural improvements within the UN system. Juliane Kokott, Cristoph Sobotta, ‘The Kadi 
Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?’ (2012) 23 EJIL 
1015, 1019. Vanessa Arslanian takes a further step, stressing the importance of establishing a 
form of independent judicial review for UN sanctions. Vanessa Arslanian, ‘Great Accountability 
Should Accompany Great Power: The ECJ and the U.N. Security Council in Kadi I & II’ (2013) 35 
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 13.	
120 Kadi I, Appeals (n 96), paras 324-326. 
121 Judgment of 22 October 1986. 73 BVerfGE 339. 
122 See also, Francisco Javier Mena Parras, ‘Retour sur Kadi: de la nécessité d’une jurisprudence 
de type Solange I dans les rapports entre le droit de l’Union européenne et le droit des Nations 
Unies’ (2010) 5-6 Cahiers de droit européen 683. 
123 This kind of ‘constitutional’ approach by the ECJ, which enables the Court to decide on the 
scope of its own jurisdiction, is welcomed by André Nollkaemper as a proper tool to deal with the 
lack of judicial review at the international level. André Nollkaemper, ‘The Rapprochement 
Between the Supremacy of International Law at International and National Levels’ (2008) 2 Select 
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law 239, 240. 
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case, it would be for European judges to fully assess the compatibility of EU 
measures with the EU constitutional Treaties, irrespective of them being adopted 
to implement Security Council resolutions.124  
Hence, while on the one hand the ECJ asserted its universal jurisdiction 
over any source of secondary EU law, to assess its constitutional lawfulness vis-
à-vis the EU Treaties, on the other hand it admitted its power to decline such 
jurisdiction, should the EU legislation at stake be derived from UN measures, and 
the Court consider the UN legal system to provide an adequate level of protection 
for fundamental human rights. This apparent contradiction (which will be further 
analysed in section IV hereinafter), made the ECJ the ultimate ‘master’ of its own 
jurisdiction, the broadness of which could be substantially varied, upon the 
Court’s consideration, on a case-by-case basis.125  
IV. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE UN AND EU LEGAL SYSTEMS INTERACTION 
Having carefully analysed the sometimes diametrically opposite answers 
provided by the General Court and the ECJ to some of the key questions that 
have been outlined since the introduction of this chapter, it is now time to consider 
whether these answers were convincing or, by contrast, whether a different 
approach seems preferable to reach a comprehensive settlement of the 
interaction between the UN and EU legal systems in the delicate field of human 
rights. To do so, the findings of both Courts will be critically evaluated, in order to 




124 Kadi I, Appeals (n 96), para 324. 
125 An overview of the case-law that followed Kadi I Appeals is provided by Takis Tridimas, who 
maintains that the judgment of the ECJ did not say the final word on the problem of legal systems 
interaction between UN and EU law. Takis Tridimas, ‘Economic Sanctions, Procedural Rights and 
Judicial Scrutiny: Post-Kadi Developments’ in Catherine Barnard, Okeoghene Odudu (eds), 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2009-2010 (vol. 12, Hart 2010), 455, 489. 
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a. On the effects of UN law for the EU 
Once again, the path towards a possible solution to the proposed ‘academic 
dilemma’ starts with two (by now) well-known questions, namely: does the EU 
have an obligation – either direct or indirect – to implement Security Council 
resolutions? If so, under what conditions is the EU entitled (or obliged) to 
implement UN law, in place of its Member States? More generally, any analysis 
of the interaction between the UN and the EU legal systems cannot boast a solid 
foundation without having offered an answer to a somehow simpler question: is 
the EU under any obligation (either direct or indirect) to comply with UN law? 
 It should firstly be observed that, as the General Court correctly stressed 
in Kadi I, the EU – as an international organisation with its own legal personality 
– cannot be deemed as being directly bound by the duties and obligations 
stemming from the UN Charter, separately from its Member States. Indeed, since 
the EU is neither a member of the United Nations, nor it is ‘an addressee of the 
resolutions of the Security Council, or the successor to the rights and obligations 
of the Member States’ 126  under UN law, no obligation of general (public) 
international law could possibly require the EU to comply with or implement 
Security Council resolutions, nor Article 103 of the UN Charter (which refers to 
the obligations of the ‘Members of the United Nations’) can be considered as 
directly applicable to the EU itself. However, maintaining (as I do assume) that 
the UN Charter cannot (and does not) impose any obligation onto the EU per se, 
should not lead the interpreter to affirm its complete irrelevance from the point of 




126 Kadi I (n 46), para 192. 
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 As the General Court further observed, on the one hand, pursuant to 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations imposed onto Member States by the 
same Charter should normally be regarded as prevailing over any other 
commitments under different instruments of international law, such as the EU 
Treaties and the ECHR. In this regard, Article 103 UNC (expressly safeguarded 
by the first paragraph of Article 30 VCLT) seemingly provide for UN primary and 
secondary law, including Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, to take precedence over any other regional or multilateral 
treaties, whose obligations should yield to UN law, in case antinomies occur.  
 On the other hand, from the point of view of European law, Member States 
felt the necessity to introduce, within the EU Treaties, a set of specific clauses, to 
regulate in advance the relationship between their obligations under EU law and 
any previous obligation under general international law. In particular, the first 
paragraph of Article 351 TFEU was set to explicitly safeguard any international 
agreement entered into by Member States prior to their accession to the 
Community (as is the case of the UN Charter) from being repealed, derogated or 
anyhow prejudiced by their obligations under European law. In addition, Article 
347 TFEU provides for Member States a specific duty to ‘consult’, in order to 
‘carry out obligations’ they have ‘accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace 
and international security’, without prejudice for the functioning of the common 
market.  
 Do such normative arguments, as the General Court finally held, entail an 
obligation for Member States to disregard European law, as far as it may interfere 
with their duties under UN law? And, what is more, should Member States take 
all the necessary steps to abide by their obligations under the UN Charter by 
means of common initiatives, in their capacity as members of the EU?  Providing 
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an answer to these two (seemingly related) questions is not as straightforward as 
it may appear.  
 First of all (to follow the argumentative path of the Court) it is certainly true 
that, by the time they entered into the Treaties that established the European 
Community (a regional organisation of states, with its own legal personality of 
international law) or became part of such Treaties, by means of accession, most 
of EU Member States were already bound by the Charter of the United Nations. 
To this extent, since not every member state of the United Nations is at the same 
time a member state of the European Union, by entering into the EU Treaties, EU 
Member States could not consider to free themselves from prior obligation they 
undertook towards third states (i.e. the other members of the UN). Such a 
conclusion can be generally upheld regardless of Article 103 of the UN Charter, 
establishing the primacy of said Charter over other international agreements. In 
fact,  codifying the general principle pacta sunt servanda, paragraph 4 of Article 
30 VCLT provided that ‘When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the 
parties to the earlier one […] as between a State party to both treaties and a State 
party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties 
governs their mutual rights and obligations’. Therefore, if one were to apply the 
law of treaties, as relationships between EU Member States and other member 
states of the UN come into question, the UN Charter should certainly take 
precedence over the EU Treaties.127  
 Secondly, again without making reference to Article 103 of the UN Charter, 




127 Indeed, also the UN itself could insist on the performance of any duties it is owed by EU 
Member States under the UN Charter, since from the UN point of view the EU Treaties could 
legitimately be regarded as pacta tertiis. 
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Article 351 TFEU, as interpreted by the ECJ over the years. In providing that ‘[the] 
rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 
or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more 
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, 
shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties’, Member States showed 
the undeniable intention to resolve a priori any conflict between their obligations 
under the EU Treaties and any prior commitment towards third states (as in the 
case of the UN Charter), in favour of the latter. In general terms, the first 
paragraph of Article 351 TFEU represents a paradigmatic example of ‘conflict 
avoidance clause’, in the sense of paragraph 2 of Article 30 VCLT, according to 
which ‘[when] a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered 
as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty 
prevail’. As a consequence, when it comes to decide whether Member States’ 
obligations under the UN Charter should prevail over their obligations under the 
EU Treaties in case of a conflict, a first answer can be drawn from the EU Treaties 
themselves and be an affirmative one. It follows from Article 351 TFEU that 
Member States performance of their obligations under the UN Charter cannot – 
in any case – entail a violation of EU law and European institutions bear a duty 




128 The principle of ‘non-interference’ was developed by the ECJ on the basis of Article 351 TFEU. 
It postulates that, since Member States have drafted Article 351 TFEU in order to ensure prior 
international obligations not being set aside by the EU Treaties, they also have imposed an 
obligation onto EU institutions (including the Court of Justice) not to impede their legitimate 
performance (see, inter al. Court of Justice, Case C-812/79, Attorney General v. Burgoa, [1980] 
ECR I-2787, para 9). In this regard, see also Allan Rosas, ‘The Status in EU Law of International 
Agreements Concluded by EU Member States, (2011) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 
1304, 1321; Pietro Manzini ‘The Priority of Pre-existing Treaties of EC Member States within the 
Framework of International Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL 781. While the ECJ, over the years, has 
progressively stressed the importance of eliminating the incompatibilities between previous 
international agreements and the EU Treaties (pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 351 
TFEU), still this principle is of the utmost importance in case paragraph 1 of Article 351 TFEU 
does apply. 
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 According to the ECJ, ‘[t]he purpose of [Article 351.1 TFEU] is to lay down, 
in accordance with the principles of international law, that the application of the 
Treaty does not affect the duty of the member state concerned to respect the right 
of non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations 
thereunder’.129 In other words, as stressed by Advocate General Kokott in Air 
Transport Association of America,130 ‘membership of the European Union does 
not impose an obligation on Member States to act, vis-à-vis third countries, in 
breach of international agreements previously entered into’. Moreover, following 
the case-law of the ECJ, Article 351.1 TFEU can allow derogation from primary 
EU law131 and ‘implicitly permits obstacles to the operation of the common market 
when they are caused by measures taken by a Member State to carry out the 
international obligations’.132  
 Article 351.2 TFEU, which provides that ‘[t]o the extent that such [prior] 
agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States 
concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities 
established’ and further specifies that ‘Member States shall, where necessary, 
assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common 
attitude’, does not limit the full force and application of Article 351.1 as explained 
above. However, it obliges Member States to guarantee, to the widest possible 
extent, that their international treaties comply with EU law. This obligation, as 




129 Court of Justice, Case C-812/79, Attorney General v. Burgoa, [1980] ECR I-2787, para 8, but 
also Case C-324/93, Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith, [1995] ECR I-563, para. 27; Case 
10/61, Commission v. Italy [1962] ECR 1; Case C-158/91, Levy [1993] ECR I-4287; Case C-
124/95, Centro-Com [1997] ECR p. I-81, para. 57.  
130 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America 
and Others, [2011] ECR I-3765, para. 56. 
131 Case C-124/95, Centro-Com (n 129), paras. 56-61. 
132 Kadi I Appeals (n 96), para 302.  
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curtail the right of Member States to perform their obligations under international 
law (as protected by Article 351.1 TFEU),133 but impose an active duty on the 
same Member State, to take all possible steps (also at the diplomatic level, if 
appropriate) in order to remove conflicts between EU law and the treaties at 
stake,134 irrespective of any political difficulties,135 and safeguard the entirety of 
the EU legal system. As a consequence, derogation to EU Treaties cannot 
reasonably be unlimited in time and Member States are duty bound to provide 
each other any possible assistance – including diplomatic support in any 
international fora – to overcome the need for such derogation. It must be clear, 
however, that Article 351.2 TFEU does not and cannot impose any obligation on 
Member State to achieve a specific result within a given lapse of time (i.e. does 
not represent any ‘sunset clause’ for Article 351.1 TFEU), but only to promptly 
take any proportional and legally available step to restore their full compliance 
with EU law.   
Lastly, in the particular case of Germany, which was admitted as a 
member of the UN only in 1973, more than a decade after the establishment of 
the European Community, conflicts between the UN Charter and the EU Treaties 
can be solved by resorting to general public international law. In fact, by the time 
Germany undertook to abide by the Charter of the United Nations, all members 
of the European Community were also long-time members of the UN. According 
to paragraph 3 of Article 30 VCLT, ‘[when] all the parties to the earlier treaty are 
parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended 




133 Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR I-5215, paras. 37-59. 
134 Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal (n 133), para. 38. 
135 Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal (n 133), para. 48; Case C-170/98, Commission v. 
Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681, paras. 37-42. 
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that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty’. Plainly, as the 
treaty that marked the admission of Germany to the United Nations came into 
force in 1973 and the UN Charter has started to apply to Germany since that 
same date, as regards the German case the UN Charter should be considered 
as lex posterior with respect to the EU Treaties and, to this extent, it should take 
precedence in case a conflict occurs. 
b. A normative approach 
In this context, as I showed above, a reasoning based on general rules of 
international public law can lead to legal consequences that seem altogether 
consistent with Article 103 of the UN Charter and ensure the primacy of the 
obligations imposed onto EU Member States by the Charter itself, against their 
commitments pursuant to the EU Treaties. Therefore, either by making reference 
to the special primacy clause provided by Article 103 of the UN Charter, or by 
simply resorting to general rules of international public law (and Article 30 VCLT 
in particular), a duty of EU Member States should be maintained, to leave 
European law unapplied, as far as it may interfere with their obligations under UN 
law. However, contrary to the opinion of the General Court, said conclusion, does 
not necessarily imply a further duty for EU Member States to abide by their 
obligations under the UN Charter by means of joint measures, in their capacity 
as members of the EU. By contrast, this assumption can be founded neither on 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, nor on Article 351 TFEU and the other norms of 
the EU Treaties, which directly or indirectly make reference to UN law.  
 In this regard, the reasoning of the General Court, which clearly upheld 
the latter duty as one necessarily derived from the primacy of UN law over the 
EU Treaties in case of conflict (both from the standpoint of general international 
public law, and from a strictly European perspective), does not seem to entirely 
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grasp the complexity of the problem. First and foremost, the argument according 
to which Article 103 of the UN Charter entails stricto sensu a limitation of 
sovereignty for Member States, whose powers to enter into new treaties should 
be ‘physically’ limited by the powers granted to the UN and its bodies (following 
the principle nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet) seems 
questionable. Indeed, even if its effect can be, de facto, that of compelling states 
not accept international obligations that appears to be conflicting with the UN 
Charter (or to repeal those conflicting obligations they may have previously 
accepted), Article 103 of the UN Charter does not ‘dare’ 136  to limit the 
international legal capacity of states per se. By contrast, it is set to establish that 
any conflict, which may arise between their obligations under the UN Charter and 
their duties under any other instruments of conventional international law, should 
be solved ensuring precedence to the former, irrespective of the conflicting norm 
being prior or subsequent to the Charter itself. Not to mention the fact that 
conflicts between UN law (either primary or secondary) and other international 
obligations of conventional law may not be evident prima facie and arise as a 
matter of interpretation or through the evolution of UN secondary law, as it 
happened in the case at stake. What is more, in the case of Germany, the 




136 This assumption is based on the idea that Article 103 of the UN Charter is – in fact – a 
(particular kind of) conflict avoidance clause and not a rule establishing a ‘constitutional-like’ 
hierarchy in international law. The interpretation of Article 103 UNC as a conflict avoidance clause 
is coherent with the explicit reference made to it by Article 30 VCLT. On this particular stance, 
see the comment on Article 103 of the UN Charter in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg 
Nolte, Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford 
2012). See also, inter al., Rain Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations 
Charter’, (2008) 55 ICLQ 583, 584; Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither 
Human Rights?’ (2009) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 69,76, all of whom 
share this point of view. For a slightly different perspective see the work of Samantha A. Miko, 
who considers the material effect of Article 103 UNC as a de facto hierarchisation of international 
law. Samantha A. Miko, ‘Norm Conflict, Fragmentation, and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 1351, 1361.  
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viable solution: in fact, the UN Charter – which Germany entered into in 1973 – 
could not have had any effect on its sovereignty back in 1958. As a consequence, 
from a strictly legal point of view, it is advisable to address Article 103 of the UN 
Charter as a clause, drafted to ensure the primacy of UN law but not to overtly 
interfere with the sovereignty of states in terms of their international legal 
capacity. Otherwise any conventional obligation conflicting with the UN Charter 
should be considered as illegitimate or void, while it merely entails the 
international responsibility of states, in case such obligation is performed in 
breach of the Charter.  
 Secondly, it can be questioned that (as the General Court maintains) 
Member States implicitly agreed to make the EU bound by UN law and required 
to comply with Security Council resolutions. In fact, such an agreement cannot 
be envisaged within the EU Treaties, 137  neither can it be derived from the 
(supposed) transfer to the EU of the powers required to comply with some duties 
under the Charter.  
 Indeed, unambiguous references to the United Nations (or to the UN 
Charter as such) can be found in various provisions within both the EU Treaties. 
Nevertheless, even if the number of such mentions has notably increased after 
the amendments brought by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, this circumstance had 
(and still have nowadays) no effect on the overall relationship between UN law 
and the EU legal system, whose autonomy cannot be brought into question, and 




137 In relation to the absence of this kind of provision within the EU Treaties see Paul Gragl, ‘The 
Silence of the Treaties: General International Law and the European Union’ (2014) 57 German 
Yearbook of International Law 1, 2. Partially contra, in relation to the scope of the principle of 
loyalty towards international law provided by the EU Treaties, see Judicaël Etienne, ‘Loyalty 
Towards International Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law?’ (2011) 03 Jean Monnet 
Working Paper Series – NYU School of Law, 25. 
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to UN law.138 Their relevance to the EU, by contrast, should be evaluated on a 
‘case by case’ basis, by contextualising them within the EU treaty norms (or 
groups of norms) in which they are contained. To this extent, it is useful to briefly 
recall those provisions of the EU Treaties, which makes explicit reference to the 
Charter of the United Nations or UN law, to clearly show how said references 
cannot be read as to implying any explicit or implicit general subjection of the EU 
to the obligations provided by the UN Charter.  
Within the first articles of Treaty on European Union (TEU), which address 
the aims and purposes of the EU in general terms, Article 3.5 TEU provides that 
‘the Union shall contribute to […] the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations charter’, when it comes to ‘its 
relations with the wider world’. Similarly, in the preamble of TFEU, Member States 
solemnly declare their intent to ‘confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the 
overseas countries […] in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations’. Both provisions could be classified as ‘programmatic norms’ and 
generally refer to the action of Member States and the Union within the 
international community, establishing such action to be ‘consistent with’ or 
‘inspired by’ the UN Charter in terms of ‘principles’ (i.e. those set forth by Article 
1 and Article 2 of the Charter). Reasonably none of the aforementioned 
provisions could have the effect or being interpreted as to have the effect of 




138 This does not mean, however, that the EU can remain completely indifferent to Member States 
obligations under the UN Charter: such obligations are relevant to the EU insofar as the Union 
shall be aware of their existence and cannot prevent Member States from complying with them. 
Furthermore, as I noted above, in case Member States decide to address these obligations by 
means of actions taken in their capacity as members of the EU, the Union itself will certainly be 
called to comply with both EU and UN law.  
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Charter of the United Nations, nor the specific obligations imposed onto UN 
member states by Chapter VII of the same Charter.139  
 Similarly, Article 21 TEU, related to the ‘Union’s action on the international 
scene’, provides it to be ‘guided [inter alia] by the principles of the United Nations 
Charter’, developing relations and partnerships with ‘regional or global 
organisations’ and promoting ‘multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations’. The provision in question 
appears to be, once again, a programmatic one, aimed at shaping the EU 
external action in order to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations Charter’, but still having limited or no effects on EU policies other 
than the ‘external action’, nor establishing any ‘self-imposed’ obligations of 
compliance with the UN Charter whatsoever, in terms of abiding by or 
implementing Security Council resolutions by means of EU legislative acts. The 
very same rationale lies behind Article 220 TFEU, while it provides for the EU to 
‘establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe’, the OSCE and the 
OECD.  
 A further commitment to strengthen international security ‘in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ is provided by Article 42 TEU, 
with limited regard to the common security and defence policy. To this extent, the 
seventh paragraph of said Article 42 TEU (the so-called ‘mutual assistance 
clause’) explicitly provides for Member States an ‘obligation of aid and assistance’ 




139 Ultimately, based on the wording of the norm at stake, it is only ‘solidarity’ that should be 
confirmed in accordance to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
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Charter’ (collective self-defence). While Article 42 TEU makes express reference 
to Article 51 of the UN Charter, still it does not provide any obligation for the EU 
as such, but for EU Member States in their autonomous defence capacity, neither 
it provides any general obligation of compliance to be (self-) imposed onto the 
EU.140 An analogous point could be made with regard to the second paragraph 
of Article 34 TEU, which establish for those Member States, which are also 
members of the UN Security Council – ‘without prejudice to their responsibilities 
under the provisions of the United Nations Charter’ – specific obligations to keep 
other Member States and the High Representative (of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy) fully informed and ‘defend the positions and the 
interests of the Union’.  
 The only explicit (bur rather bland) self-imposed obligations for the EU to 
comply with the UN Charter and UN policies in general can be found in Articles 
208 and 214 TFEU, related to the specific fields of development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid. In these particular cases, Member States considered it 
appropriate to ensure for the Union to ‘comply with the commitments […] they 
have approved in the context of the United Nations’ (with regard to development 
cooperation) and to act in coordination and consistence with UN-governed 
operations as regards humanitarian aid. On the one hand, such explicit 
obligations seems justified by the specific competence vested in the UN and its 
bodies with respect to these particular subject matters; on the other hand these 




140 In relation to Article 42.7 TEU as a norm addressed to Member States (and not to the EU as 
an international organisation) see Niklas I. M. Nováky, 'The Invocation of the European Union’s 
Mutual Assistance Clause: A Call for Enforced Solidarity' (2017) 22 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 357; Mattias G. Fischer, Daniel Thym, ‘Article 42’ in Hermann-Josef Blanke,  Stelio 
Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU). A Commentary (Springer 2013) 1201, 
1222. 
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appropriate to make the EU subject to specific UN laws and policies – either 
considered it necessary to establish said subjection by means of specific norms, 
which are clearly limited in scope.  
 As the brief analysis above has shown, no conventional obligation (be it 
defined ‘voluntary’ or ‘self-imposed) for the EU to comply with the UN Charter can 
be asserted, in general terms, on the basis of the EU Treaties as such. Apart from 
a general reference to the principles of the UN Charter when it comes to the 
‘Union’s action on the international scene’, references to the UN Charter within 
the EU Treaties are either addressed solely to Member States (e.g. Articles 34 
and 42 TEU), or specific and explicitly limited in scope (e.g. Articles 208 and 214 
TFEU). What is more, as I widely clarified above, Article 351 TFEU does not imply 
for the Union itself, and therefore for the EU legal system, any subjection to the 
international obligations stemming from the UN Charter, but simply set forth a 
conflict avoidance clause, in order to safeguard Member State’s performance of 
their own obligations under the same Charter from being impeded by the 
application of EU law.  
 Thirdly, in the particular case of restrictive financial measures adopted 
towards individuals or legal entities, it cannot be maintained that Member States 
have, in fact, transferred (or delegated) all the necessary power to the EU, so as 
to any measure aimed at implementing UN Security Council resolutions in that 
particular field should – de facto – be jointly adopted by Member States, within 
the EU legal framework. At a closer look, while it provides that ‘Member States 
shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent 
the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a 
Member State may be called upon to take [inter alia] in order to carry out 
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international 
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security’, Article 347 TFEU does not imply any delegation of power or obligation 
whatsoever for Member States to adopt such ‘measures’ by resorting to the EU 
legal framework. Indeed, it simply requires EU Member States to ‘consult’ in order 
to take ‘together the steps needed’ to prevent such measures – be they adopted 
by one or more states – to endanger the internal market (i.e. what Member States 
are required to do together is taking action to avoid the internal market being 
affected by the measures at stake, not to adopt said measures),141 which is 
plainly something very different from what the General Court has maintained.  
To this extent, Article 347 TFEU pairs with Article 348.1 TFEU, according 
to which ‘[i]f measures taken in the circumstances referred to in [Article 347 
TFEU] have the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the internal 
market, the Commission shall, together with the State concerned, examine how 
these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties’. The duty 
imposed by Article 348.1 TFEU (onto both the Commission and Member States), 
clarifies the ‘procedural’ scope of both provisions and realises an ideal link with 
Article 351.2 TFEU, which was mentioned and explained above: Article 351.2 
TFEU – as a general rule – commits Member States to ‘take all the appropriate 
steps’ in order to ensure that no conflicts occurs between their pre-existing 
international obligations and the EU Treaties. To this extent, Member States are 
encouraged to ‘assist each other to this end and […], where appropriate, adopt a 




141 Article 347 TFEU clarifies once again (as Article 351 TFEU does) that the EU is not indifferent 
to the existence of Member States obligations under the UN Charter and recognises their need 
to comply with said obligations. This sort of ‘emergency clause’, however, imposes a duty of 
cooperation and consultation, which cannot be confounded with a duty of joint compliance, by 
means of EU measures. In this sense see also Eva Nanopulos, ‘Judicial Review of Measures 
Implementing UN Resolutions. The Relevance of the EU Principle of Loyal Cooperation’, in 
Catherine Barnard, Albertina Albors Lorens, Marcus W. Gehring (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 2012-2013 (vol. 15, Hart 2013) 669, 681. 
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out obligations [that Member States] accepted for the purpose of maintaining 
peace and international security’, which may have an effect on the functioning of 
the internal market, Article 347 TFEU provides for Member States to consult each 
other, ‘with a view to taking together the steps’ that are needed to safeguard said 
functioning of the internal market. Once again, coherently with the general rule 
set forth by Article 351.2 TFEU, Member States are encouraged to, ‘assist each 
other’ to overcome the conflict. Lastly, when the measures at stake may affect 
competition in the internal market, Article 348.1 provides for the Commission – 
whose responsibility is, inter alia, to enforce EU pro-competition and antitrust 
rules – to interact directly with Member States and to assist them in order to 
introduce all adjustments that are needed to minimise the distortionary effect on 
market competition. 
Nothing in these provisions suggests that Member States are obliged to 
take action within the EU legal framework in order to comply with their obligations 
under the UN Charter (‘for the purpose of maintaining peace and international 
security’). They are, by contrast, the logical counterpart of the conflict avoidance 
clause contained in Article 351.1 TFEU and within the same Article 347 TFEU: 
while Member States are free to comply with pre-existing treaty obligations and 
to implement those measures that are set forth by the UN Security Council, still 
the unique nature of the EU as an international organisation and the fundamental 
principles that underlies its legal system need to be safeguarded to the maximum 
possible extent. As a consequence, Member States shall act in the international 
fora, providing each-other mutual assistance and working with the Commission 
in order to limit, both in scope and (possibly) in time, any derogations to EU law, 
especially if they affect the internal market and competition. This interpretation 
may be supported by looking at Article 348.2 TFEU, which enables any Member 
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State and the Commission to refer the matter to the ECJ in case of any suspected 
abuse of the ‘derogatory power’142, contained in Article 347 TFEU. At a closer 
look, Article 348.2 TFEU de facto, recalls the principles of proportionality and 
adequacy that are inherent to EU law, to be applied also for the evaluation of any 
(legitimate) derogation to the EU Treaties.  
This does not mean, however, that Member States could not decide to 
adopt restrictive financial measures as those provided by the UN Security Council 
resolutions, by means of decisions taken within the EU legal framework and 
resorting to the appropriate legal basis. In fact, Article 215 TFEU143 does provide 
such legal basis,144 but it neither implies any obligations for the EU to implement 
UN-derived measures, nor entails any necessary transfer or delegation of powers 
to the Union. It is up to the Council to consider whether to adopt a decision ‘in 
accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V’ TEU (referred to the CFSP), aimed at 
implementing Security Council resolutions and, if this is the case, to enact all the 
necessary measures. Plainly, there is no obligation for the Council to adopt such 
a decision under EU Treaties. 
In conclusion, neither did the Member States decide to subject the EU to 




142 The reference to Article 347 TFEU as a ‘derogatory’ or ‘emergency’ clause is clear in the View 
of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 13 June 2014 in the Opinion procedure 2/2013 of the 
Court of Justice, where Advocate General Kokott stresses the similar scope of Article 347 TFEU 
and Article 15 ECHR. 
143 Former Article 301 EC. 
144 Article 215 TFEU reads as follows: ‘1. Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 
2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or 
completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It 
shall inform the European Parliament thereof. 2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with 
Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt 
restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal 
persons and groups or non-State entities. 3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include 
necessary provisions on legal safeguards. 
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Security Council resolutions) nor did they provide an exclusive transfer or 
delegation of powers to the union in the field of ‘financial sanctions’, so that they 
are obliged to implement UN Security Council resolutions in that field, by means 
of common measures in their capacity as EU Member States; still they may 
voluntarily decide to do so, should they consider it appropriate within the common 
foreign and security policy. Having clarified that Member States’ joint 
performance of duties and obligations provided by the UN Charter (in the 
particular field of financial sanctions), although not necessary pursuant to the EU 
Treaties and to the Charter itself, still can occur on a voluntary basis, it now come 
to understand which legal framework should be applied in case Member States 
decide to address UN Security Council resolutions by means of an act of the EU. 
c.  In favour of a ‘case-by-case’ relationship 
Paragraphs above have shown that the relationship between EU law and UN law 
with regard to protecting fundamental rights, while preventing and countering the 
financing of terrorism, cannot be addressed by adopting a ‘one-fits-all’ model. On 
the one hand, both the primacy clause enshrined in Article 103 UNC and the 
conflict avoidance clause set forth by Article 351.1 TFEU has proven insufficient 
(and indeed were not construed) to establish a formal hierarchy between the legal 
systems at stake; on the other hand, while Member States’ obligations under the 
UN Charter are not howsoever superseded by the EU Treaties, their performance 
remains the sole duty of Member States themselves, without being transferred to 
the EU. However, the EU is obviously not indifferent to its Member States’ duties 
provided by the Charter: firstly, the EU Treaties as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice provide an obligation onto the EU not to interfere with the performance of 
Member States’ obligations derived from their membership of the UN; secondly, 
Member States are entitled to agree on the joint performance of said obligations 
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by mean of an act of the EU, being the appropriate legal basis enshrined in the 
EU Treaties. 
These considerations lead to address three of the questions I proposed 
above at the beginning of this chapter, namely: under what conditions is the EU 
entitled to implement UN law, in place of its Member States? What limits does 
the ECJ jurisdiction encounter in reviewing EU legislation, when it is passed to 
implement Security Council resolutions? What legal standard the ECJ should 
adopt to perform its review? Given that the obligations provided by the UN 
Charter do not bind the EU per se and Member States did not decide to make the 
Union subject to the Charter on a voluntary basis, the monist stance adopted by 
the General Court does not seem to be a viable choice in order to establish under 
what conditions the EU could implement UN law, in place of its Member States. 
In fact, no relationship of direct hierarchy can be established between UN law 
and EU law, in ‘absolute’ terms,145 such as to entitle an act adopted pursuant to 
UN law, by a UN body, to generally repeal or derogate an act adopted pursuant 
to EU law, within the EU legal system. If a hierarchy does exist between UN and 
EU law, it can only be asserted in ‘relative’ terms, with respect to each Member 
State and its legal position under international law. In other words, given the 
nature of international law, a relationship based on hierarchy between the UN 
Charter and the EU Treaties cannot be construed as for a ‘constitutional model’, 
where the non-compliance of the lower norm with the higher causes the former 
to succumb; conversely it should be construed as for concurring obligations, one 




145 One should consider, however, that particular provisions of the UN Charter may – in fact – be 
applicable to the EU, insofar as they express general principles of international customary law 
(e.g. the prohibition of threat or use of force in international relations, provided by Article 2 
paragraph 4 of the UN Charter) or jus cogens.  
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performance of both cannot be achieved. To summarise: Member States are 
certainly bound to perform their obligations under the UN Charter and their status 
as members of the EU does not affect, nor limit their duty of compliance. If 
Member States obligations under UN law can be performed consistently with EU 
law, they may legitimately be performed by means of EU measures (provided that 
a legal basis does exist within the EU Treaties). If, by contrast, Member States 
obligations under UN law appear to contrast with EU law, they should 
nonetheless be performed ‘outside’ the EU legal framework, whose norms, in that 
particular case, should simply remain unapplied.146 The violation of such rule of 
preference (e.g. performing an obligation pursuant to the EU Treaties instead of 
a conflicting obligation pursuant to the UN Charter) would certainly entail the 
international responsibility of the Member State in question, still having no strictly 
legal effect for the EU legal framework and the internal lawfulness of the acts 
adopted therein. Obviously, as it was clarified above, one cannot reasonably 
maintain that the EU should remain completely indifferent to Member States 
obligations under the UN Charter, even in case they conflict with EU law (and 
cannot be jointly performed by Member States, by means of EU measures). By 




146 It should be noted that, as specified above, the conjunction of Article 103 UNC (Article 30 
VCLT) and Article 351.1 TFEU is such to allow Member States to perform their obligations under 
the UN Charter by means of individual or intergovernmental actions, outside the EU legal 
framework, in case these obligations are incompatible with EU law. To this extent, the wording of 
Article 351.1 TFEU (‘[the] rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, [with third countries], 
shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties’) is unequivocally referred to the EU Treaties 
as a whole, including those norms that attribute or delegate exclusive competence to the EU in 
certain subject matters, such as the common commercial policy and the single market at large. 
Being themselves part of the Treaties, provision related to the competence of the EU make no 
exception in relation to the application of Article 351.1 TFEU, which is applicable to the whole set 
of EU primary norms. In line with this view, Article 347 TFEU obliges Member States to ‘consult 
each other’ to adopt the actions needed to prevent the single market (and obviously the common 
commercial policy) from being affected by domestic measures, adopted to comply with UN-
derived obligations.     
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on Member States by the UN Charter and refrain from impeding or interfering with 
their performance.147 
 Indeed, by means of the EU Treaties, regarded as conventional 
instruments of international law, Member States established (the Community and 
then) the EU as a brand-new complex international organisation; an autonomous 
supranational legal system, provided with its founding and fundamental 
principles, its ‘law-making’ procedures, its specific set of norms on the allocation 
of powers and its own jurisdiction, vested with the authority – inter alia – of 
adjudicating the legitimacy of EU secondary legislation. Irrespective of the 
solemn emphasis placed by the ECJ on the ‘constitutional nature’ of the EU 
Treaties and the legal order they establish (that can still be questioned), the EU 
framework can more smoothly be considered as a conventionally established, 
self-standing legal system, characterised by entirety, separateness and 




147 To this extent it is interesting to consider, mutatis mutandis, the stance of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Behrami case (supra n 116). In the judgment at stake the Court admits 
that the ECHR cannot be applied to COE member states, acting as ‘delegates’ of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (since their acts are attributable to the UN itself).  
148 These assumptions reflect the idea of the EU legal system as developed by the ECJ over the 
years. For a critical point of view on the whole issue, see Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowsky, who 
reject the idea of a complete separation of the EU legal system from general international law, in 
favour of an approach based on the lex specialis rule. Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowsky, ‘Of Planets 
and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483, 510. The 
separateness of the EU legal system is analysed, inter alia, by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, International Law 
Commission of the United Nations, 13 April 2006, and Marjorie Beulay ‘Les arrêts Kadi et Al 
Barakaat International Foundation. Réaffirmation par la Cour de justice de l'autonomie de l'ordre 
juridique communautaire vis-à-vis du droit international’ (2009) Revue du marché commun et de 
l'Union européenne 32. Bruno de Witte tends to scale back the idea of autonomy, as regards the  
EU legal system, in favour of a ‘relative autonomy’, which does not exclude EU law from being 
part of international law. Bruno de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal 
Order?’ (2010) 65 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 141, 142; meanwhile Jan-Willelm van Rossem 
maintains that the call for autonomy of the EU legal order hides a disguised call for (a sort of) 
sovereignty, taking the EU closer to the perspective of a state-like entity. In this respect, the EU 
could refrain from abiding by external norms of general international law if and only if such norms 
put the constitutional identity of the EU at risk. Jan-Willelm van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU 
Law: More is Less?’ in Ramses A. Wessel, Steven Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and 
Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations (Springer 
2013) 13, 28. See also, in more general terms, Inge Govaere, ‘The importance of International 
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interference or integration with extraneous legal systems, unless it is explicitly 
provided by the EU Treaties themselves. To this extent, for any act adopted within 
the EU legal framework to be valid (or rather lawful), it should necessarily be 
consistent with the law-making norms and procedures provided within the EU 
Treaties, that is to say: (i) the EU should enjoy the power and/or be competent to 
adopt that particular act in the field in question (necessity of a legal basis); (ii) the 
act should be adopted by the competent institutions within the EU; (iii) the act 
should be adopted following the proper law-making procedures; (iv) the act 
should be consistent with the fundamental principles, which Member States 
conventionally established within the EU Treaties as general parameters of 
legitimacy for any act of the EU.  
 To be part of the conventional legal system established by the EU Treaties 
(i.e. to be a valid part of the EU legal order), any secondary legislation adopted 
by EU institutions should verify all the four conditions outlined above, without 
reservation. In fact, given that the EU Treaties are ‘rigid’ conventional norms, 
Member States are not entitled to freely derogate or amend the provisions 
contained therein, unless they follow the specific procedures the EU Treaties 
themselves provide for that purpose.149 Hence, in terms of lawfulness under the 
EU legal system, no distinction whatsoever can be made between secondary 




Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the 
EC legal order’ (2009) 1 College of Europe Research Papers in Law, available at 
https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/importance-international-developments-case-law-
european-court-justice-kadi-and. 
149 While the law of treaties admits informal treaty amendments under certain conditions, such 
possibility seems to be excluded by the ECJ with respect to EU Treaties. See Robert Schütze, 
‘EC Law and International Agreements of the Member States. An Ambivalent Relationship?’, in 
Catherine Barnard (ed) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2006-2007 (vol. 9, Hart 
2007) 387, 439. Contra Trevor Hartley, ‘International Law and the Law of the European Union – 
a Reassessment’ (2001) 72 British Yearbook of International Law 1, 20. 
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obligations pursuant to the UN Charter, and any other act of secondary 
legislation: they both need to be fully compliant with the law-making norms and 
procedures provided within the EU Treaties, including the fundamental principles 
of the Union referred to as general parameters of legitimacy. In sum, should 
Member States consider it appropriate to address their obligations under the UN 
Charter by means of an action within the EU legal framework (and should the EU 
Treaties explicitly provide a legal basis for such action), the act of secondary 
legislation adopted to perform said obligations needs to be ‘doubly compliant’: on 
the one hand, in order to fully perform Member States’ obligations pursuant to the 
Charter, it would need to comply with relevant UN law; on the other hand, in order 
to be validly adopted as an act of the EU, it would either need to comply with EU 
primary law (including the fundamental principles of the Union itself).  
 It comes from the above that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
EU could not encounter any particular limit, neither could the Court adopt different 
legal standards, in order to review EU legislation, when it is passed to implement 
UN measures, such as Security Council resolutions. In this regard, the argument 
of both the GCEU and the ECJ in Kadi I were altogether not convincing. As of the 
General Court, its stance on jurisdiction is closely related to its (monist) idea of 
the relationship between the UN and the EU legal systems (widely addressed 
and criticised above). In particular, since the Court argued in favour of a general 
obligation – placed onto the EU by Member States – to comply with the UN 
Charter, it considered its jurisdiction to be necessarily curtailed by that very same 
obligation and be limited to a ‘procedural’ review, with regard to EU secondary 
legislation, adopted to implement UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, 
according to the General Court, EU institutions could exert limited or no control 
over the merits of these acts, whose content was almost entirely decided at the 
	 72 
UN level and simply ‘translated’ into EU law by the competent bodies of the 
Union. Otherwise, in the opinion of the General Court, a full judicial review of the 
EU measures at stake would imply for the Union’s judiciary (either indirectly) to 
breach the primacy of UN law by assessing its legitimacy vis-à-vis the EU 
Treaties. The position of the General Court as regards jurisdiction ends up 
reaffirming a relationship of absolute hierarchy between the UN and EU legal 
systems, which implies for EU law to be directly outranked (repealed and/or 
derogated) by UN law. As I clearly demonstrated above, however, such position 
can be upheld neither from the standpoint of international law, nor based on the 
EU Treaties; therefore, any limitation of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of 
the EU cannot be maintained on this basis. 
 Contrary to the General Court, in Kadi I, the ECJ ended up asserting its 
full jurisdiction over any act of the EU, including secondary legislation adopted to 
implement Security Council resolutions. As the ECJ clearly stated (and I properly 
showed above) substantive judicial review of European secondary legislation, 
adopted to implement UN Security Council resolutions, being ‘naturally’ limited to 
its internal lawfulness within the EU legal order, ‘would not entail any challenge 
to the primacy of that resolution in international law’,150 neither it would jeopardise 
the principles presiding over the international legal order or howsoever 
compromise the absolute immunity granted to UN bodies and their acts. In fact, 
no judicial review would be exerted over UN Security Council resolutions on the 
basis of EU law, but only over EU secondary legislation adopted to implement 
such resolutions. However, if the conclusions reached by the ECJ in the case at 




150 Kadi I, Appeals (n 96), para 285. 
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UN and EU legal systems, still some important steps of its argumentative path 
cannot be agreed upon. The ECJ, in particular, seemed to describe the EU legal 
system not only as an autonomous and self-standing one, but rather as a 
‘constitutional order’ stricto sensu, characterised by a set of hard-core 
constitutional rules that should admit no derogation by means of Member States’ 
international obligations under the UN Charter. According to the Court, respect 
for fundamental human rights forms a crucial part of the constitutional traditions 
common to Member States, which found the Union’s ‘constitutional identity’ and 
should necessarily be upheld by the EU judiciary. In addition, the ECJ took a 
further step towards its definition as a constitutional court proper, by affirming its 
power to decide whether to assert, limit or decline its jurisdiction, on the basis of 
the level of protection for fundamental rights, afforded within a legal system other 
than the EU, whose measures European secondary legislation is to implement: 
should this level be at least equivalent to the one provided by the EU legal 
framework, the Court could decide – as the master of its own jurisdiction – to 
perform limited or no review in that regard; otherwise its jurisdiction should 
encounter no limits.  
 Such ‘constitutional drift’ of the ECJ, although not unprecedented, still risks 
to bear effects that go beyond (or against) the same EU Treaties as they were 
intended by Member States at the time of their drafting.151 What is more, for the 
purpose of identifying a proper relationship within the UN and EU legal systems 




151 After the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon was 
drafted in such a manner as to guarantee a reinforcement of the European integration process, 
eliminating any reference to the constitutionalisation of the European legal system. As regard the 
ECJ, in particular, while its jurisdiction was considerably extended, still it remained a statutory 
regional court, whose tasks and limits are clearly identified by the EU Treaties themselves.  
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stricto sensu would not take any further benefit to the Court’s argument, if not the 
contrary. To affirm the absolute inviolability of the Union’s fundamental principles 
– which include protection for human rights – the ECJ made reference to 
constitutional traditions common to Member States and described them as a 
hard-core set of values that could not possibly be derogated or set aside. To 
justify the inviolability of these principles, the Court evoked the well-known 
‘counter-limits’ doctrine, first developed by the Italian Constitutional Court. 
According to this doctrine, those values that lie at the basis of a state’s 
constitutional identity should always prevail in case of conflict with international 
(or supranational) obligations. Said prevalence, in the case at stake, would imply 
the necessity for the ECJ to uphold EU constitutional values against the 
conflicting obligations imposed on EU Member States by the UN Charter, with 
the consequence of a full judicial review of EU secondary legislation to be always 
performed vis-à- vis fundamental human rights. This argument, however, does 
not seem to be entirely consistent with the Court’s previous reasoning and – in 
any case – appears unnecessary to reach the conclusions that the ECJ wished 
to achieve. First of all, the counter-limits doctrine was developed by the Italian 
Constitutional Court to address the relationship between the national legal 
system (properly a constitutional order) and a supranational legal order such as 
the one established by the EU Treaties. On the one hand, while the EU legal 
system is widely regarded as constitutional lato sensu, still it cannot be 
considered as a constitutional order within the meaning generally accepted by 
constitutional law (i.e. a legal order comparable to the domestic ones of EU 




152 First of all, the EU is neither based on a ‘constituent power’, nor it enjoys a comprehensive 
(universal or state-like) constituted power. It only relies on a number of attributions that Member 
	 75 
doctrine (as proposed by the ECJ) would imply for the obligations imposed on 
Member States by the UN Charter to be inherently binding within the EU legal 
framework, in order to be ‘counter-limited’ by European constitutional principles. 
As I seek to demonstrate above, on the basis of both international and EU law, 
and as the same ECJ maintained, such an assumption is highly questionable. In 
any case, the Court would not have needed to indulge on a debatable 
constitutional rhetoric to affirm the necessity for any act of the EU to comply with 
the fundamental principles enshrined in the EU Treaties, including respect for 
human rights as derived from constitutional traditions common to Member States. 
As I argued above, for any act of the Union to be lawful within the EU legal order, 
it should necessarily be consistent with the law-making norms and procedures 
provided within the EU Treaties; said norms plainly includes the necessity to 
safeguard human rights as they stem from common constitutional traditions, that 
Member States established as a general parameter of legitimacy. In fact, the 
reference made by the EU Treaties to shared constitutional traditions, could more 
cautiously (and still effectively) be deemed as a further conventional parameter 
(similarly to the ECHR) to be interpreted in the light of evolving national 




States voluntarily transferred to it, hence accepting to limit their own sovereignty (rectius jointly 
exercise certain sovereign powers), by means of a completely reversible process (see Article 50 
TFEU). First and foremost, the Union is a regional (or supranational) organisation based on the 
agreement of sovereign Member States, without which – differently from an autonomous 
constitutional order – it could not survive. It can be defined as a ‘pluralist entity […] neither a 
federal state, nor a confederacy’. In this regard, see the contribution of Matej Avbelj, ‘Pluralism 
and Systemic Defiance in the European Union’, in András Jakab, Dimitry Kochenov (eds) The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States' Compliance (Oxford 2017) 44. For 
an interesting critical view on the EU as ‘militant democracy’ on the basis of the Kadi case-law 
see Giuseppe Martinico, Anna Margherita Russo, 'Is the European Union a Militant Democracy? 
The Perspective of the Court of Justice in Zambrano and Kadi' (2015) 21 European Public Law 
659. 
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 As regards the ECJ alleged power to decide whether to assert, limit or 
decline its jurisdiction, once again the Court resorted to a doctrine proper of 
national constitutional law, and in particular the so-called Solange doctrine, 
developed by the German Constitutional Court in the eighties. Therefore, 
according to the ECJ, its review of EU legislation adopted to implement UN 
measures have to be full and substantial unless the UN legal system would 
ensure a protection for fundamental human rights that is comparable to that 
offered by the EU legal order. Criticism to this rather unnecessary choice of the 
Court could be based on quite similar arguments as for the counter-limits 
doctrine. Even the Solange case-law was developed in order to address the 
relationship between the German national legal system and Community (now EU) 
law; furthermore, while it often resort to legal arguments that are proper of 
constitutional case-law and – to some extent – behaves as the EU constitutional 
court lato sensu, still the ECJ is not the equivalent of national constitutional courts 
at the EU level.153 The ECJ remains, at any effect, a ‘statutory court’, whose 
powers, attributions and duties are conventional in nature and entirely derives 
from the EU Treaties.154 For the purpose of this analysis, in particular, Article 263 
TFEU155 (former Article 230 EC), clearly provides that ‘[t]he Court of Justice of 




153 On this particular topic, see Christian Joerges, ‘The Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: how a 
Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration Process’, in Leonardo Morlino, 
Gianluigi Palombella (eds), Rule of Law and Democracy. Inquiries into Internal and External 
Issues (Brill, 2010) 163, 173; partially contra Oreste Pollicino, Vincenzo Sciarabba, ‘La Corte 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo e la Corte di giustizia nella prospettiva della giustizia costituzionale’ 
in Luca Mezzetti (ed) Sistemi e modelli di giustizia costituzionale (vol. 2, CEDAM 2011) 1. See 
also Giuseppe Franco Ferrari (n 106). On the role of the Court of Justice in the field of CFSP see 
also Maja Brkan, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future’ in Paul James Cardwell 
(ed), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Springer 2012) 97, 104 
154 Mariani (n 99), 45-47.	
155 Former Article 231 EC. 
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‘intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’ and ‘shall for this purpose 
have jurisdiction […] on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of 
law relating to their application, or misuse of powers’. In addition, Article 264 
TFEU, peremptorily states that ‘[i]f the action is well founded, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union shall declare the act concerned to be void’. The relevant 
norms within the EU Treaties seem to leave no room for the Court to decide 
whether or not (and to what extent) perform a judicial review when it is requested 
to do so. In fact, if a claim is brought before the ECJ, based on the infringement 
of the EU Treaties (i.e. even on the violation of the fundamental rights that the 
same EU Treaties protect) the Court has no authority to limit its jurisdiction; it 
‘shall’, by contrast, perform a full judicial review on every ground set forth by 
Article 263 TFEU and declare the challenged act to be void, ‘if the action is well 
founded’.  
 In conclusion, the study proposed above tried to provide an answer to the 
key-questions I had outlined from the very beginning, based on the critical 
analysis of the arguments resorted to by the General Court and the ECJ in Kadi 
I. I became persuaded that, while EU Member States are bound to ensure the 
primacy of the UN Charter (either from the standpoint of international law, and 
from a European perspective), the EU as such is not subject to UN law in general 
terms, either directly or by means of a ‘voluntary’ obligation allegedly placed onto 
the Union by the same Member States. Irrespective of its alleged constitutional 
nature, the EU remains a self-standing legal order, generally characterised by 
entirety and closure, whose relationships with the UN legal system and 
international law at large cannot be addressed by means of a monistic approach; 
in fact, no relationship of direct hierarchy can be established between UN law and 
	 78 
EU law, in ‘absolute’ terms, such as to entitle an act adopted pursuant to UN law, 
by a UN body, to repeal or derogate an act adopted pursuant to EU law, within 
the EU legal system. What is more, based on the EU Treaties, one cannot 
maintain that Member States have an obligation to perform their duties under the 
UN Charter by means of common measures within the EU, if the measures to be 
adopted are incompatible with EU law. Indeed, as I widely discussed, Article 347 
TFEU does not imply any obligation aimed at ensuring a joint performance of UN-
derived obligations (but only obliges Member States to consult in order to 
safeguard the functioning of the internal market); also, while Article 215 TFEU 
certainly provides a legal basis for common measures to be (voluntarily) taken by 
Member States in the field at stake, it plainly does not provide for such actions to 
be necessary. As a consequence, Member States could either decide to 
implement Security Council resolutions by means of EU legal instruments 
(according to Article 215 TFEU) or rather to provide such implementation on their 
own.156 Where they consider it appropriate to take action together within the 
European legal order, the EU secondary legislation adopted to implement UN 
Security Council resolution should comply with both UN law and EU law (double 
compliance), making no exception with regard to any other act of the Union, and 
the ECJ should enjoy jurisdiction to exert a full and substantial judicial review, as 
set forth by the Treaties with no reservation. By contrast, where Member States 
consider it preferable to perform their obligations outside the EU legal framework, 
their capacity to do so wouldn’t encounter any limit by reason of the EU Treaties, 




156 See Aurel Sari, ‘The relationship between Community law and international law after Kadi: did 
the ECJ slam the door on effective multilateralism?’, in Matthew Happold (ed), International Law 
in a Multipolar World (Routledge 2012) 303.  
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case of conflict (pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 351 TFEU), with the sole 
obligation to ‘consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed 
to prevent the functioning of the internal market being affected’ by the measures 
taken.  
 In fact, as I reminded above, the wording of Article 351.1 TFEU157 (in 
conjunction with Article 103 UNC) is unequivocally referred to the Treaties as a 
whole, including those norms that attribute or delegate exclusive competence to 
the EU in certain subject matters, such as the common commercial policy and 
the single market at large. Being themselves part of the Treaties, provision related 
to the competence of the EU make no exception in relation to the application of 
Article 351.1 TFEU, which is applicable to the whole set of EU primary norms. In 
line with this view, Article 347 TFEU pairs with Article 351.1 and Article 351.2 
TFEU as it obliges Member States to ‘consult each other’ to adopt the actions 
needed to prevent the single market from being affected by national measures, 
adopted by Member States to comply with UN-derived obligations.158 
Ultimately, my reasoning shows how – as long as Member States decide 
to take joint measures within the EU legal framework – such measures should be 
adopted in full compliance with the norms of the Treaties, including the necessary 
respect for fundamental human rights; should said compliance be unlikely, still 
Member States remain bound to perform their obligations under the UN Charter 
outside the European system and able to do so without any limitation on the basis 




157 ‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for 
acceding States, before the date of their accession, [with third countries], shall not be affected by 
the provisions of the Treaties’. 
158 In this regard, the scope and the implications of Articles 351.2 and 351.3 will be analised and 
contextualised in the following chapters.  
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between UN and EU law could be addressed – in the case at stake – in terms of 
preventive conflict avoidance, where Member States could choose a European 
solution (and be fully bound by EU law) or rather ‘opt out’, and perform their 
international obligations otherwise. 
However, as long as they ‘opt out’, Member States are bound (pursuant 
Article 351.2 TFEU) to adopt every appropriate action at the international level – 
even by means of a ‘common attitude’ – in order to achieve a full consistency 
between the performance of their obligations under UN law and the principles of 
EU law. Eventually, the proposed solution allows Member States to comply with 
their duties under the UN Charter even if these duties are incompatible with the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the EU Treaties (by invoking the clause 
provided by Article 351.1 TFEU); meanwhile, it prompts Member States to take 
all the steps that are needed to eliminate existing conflicts between UN measures 
and EU law, so that resort to Article 351.1 TFEU is limited in time and the entirety 





ARTICLE 103 OF THE UN CHARTER: THE PRIMACY CLAUSE 
I. Introduction – II. Genesis of the Primacy Clause – III. Scope of Article 103 of 
the UN Charter: a Hierarchy Rule? – IV. Article 103 of the UN Charter as a Rule 
of Interpretation: European Consequences 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter of this work focused on analysing the judgments delivered by 
the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Kadi I 
case as paramount examples of the monist and dualist approaches to the 
problem of regime interaction between the UN and the EU legal systems. While 
they reached almost diametrically opposite outcomes on the merits of the case, 
it is undeniable that both courts decided to rely for the most part on European law 
in order to ground their judgments, rather than focusing on international law. In 
the case of the ECJ, this choice seems altogether coherent with the dualist 
approach adopted by the Court, committed to stressing the independence and 
distinct nature of the European legal system, vis-à-vis UN law, with the aim of 
reaffirming the necessary enforcement (performed by the Court itself) of the 
fundamental ‘constitutional’ principles of EU law, against any conflicting norm, 
regardless for its source. By contrast, in the case of the General Court, EU law 
was interpreted in order to show how the European legal system (and the EU 
Treaties in particular) somehow ‘incorporated’ UN law and recognised its 
primacy, making it necessary for the Union to perform the duties provided by the 
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UN Charter in lieu of the Member States, as long as they transferred the 
necessary powers to the European level of government.  
 Within the first chapter I also had the chance to outline the main 
shortcomings of both approaches and the many points they left open to providing 
a viable long-term solution to the problem. Furthermore, I tried to develop a new 
and more nuanced approach to the interaction between the UN and the EU legal 
systems, in an effort of balancing the specificity of the EU (as an international 
organisation with its own legal environment) with the need to preserve the stability 
and the unity of the international legal order as a whole, including and the 
prominent role of the UN. In view of my analysis, I maintained that, differently 
from its Member States, the EU as such is not subject to UN law in general terms, 
either directly or by means of a ‘voluntary’ obligation allegedly placed onto the 
Union by the same Member States. No proper hierarchy can be established 
between UN law and EU law in ‘absolute’ terms, such as to entitle an act adopted 
pursuant to UN law, by a UN body, to repeal or derogate an act adopted pursuant 
to EU law, within the EU legal system. What is more, based on the EU Treaties, 
one cannot generally maintain that Member States have a proper obligation to 
perform their duties under the UN Charter by means of actions taken together 
within the EU.159 As I observed, Member States could either decide to implement 
Security Council resolutions by means of a common measures within the EU or 
rather to provide for such implementation on their own. However, if they wish to 




159 As I observed above, the necessity or the opportunity to perform Member States’ duties under 
the UN Charter by means of an action within the EU may, nonetheless, appear preferable or even 
necessary, taking into account the exclusive competence of the EU in a number of fields. This is 
without prejudice – however – for Article 351 TFEU, whose provisions allow Member States to 
individually perform their obligations under the UN Charter, even in case such performance is in 
contrast with EU law.   
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adopted to implement UN Security Council resolution should comply with both 
UN law and EU law (a condition I referred to as ‘double compliance’) and the ECJ 
should enjoy jurisdiction to exert a full and substantial judicial review. By contrast, 
in case Member States decide to perform their obligations outside the EU legal 
framework, their capacity to do so would not encounter any limit by reason of the 
EU Treaties, whose provisions should yield to the primacy of UN law and remain 
plainly unapplied in case of conflict. The solution I proposed can be summarised 
as a preventive conflict avoidance rule: when it comes to performing their 
international duties, including obligations under the UN Charter, Member States 
can choose a European solution if available, therefore being fully bound by EU 
law, or rather ‘opt out’, and comply with said obligations otherwise, this latter 
choice being necessary in case the mentioned ‘double compliance’ cannot be 
achieved. 
 By analysing the provisions of the EU Treaties that deal with the UN and 
international law, I came to show that the proposed approach can be compatible 
with EU law and preserve its peculiar role for Member States, while not impairing 
the international legal order. One of the purposes of the approach I proposed, 
however, is to abandon the EU-based point of view, shown by the General Court 
and the ECJ, to adopt a more comprehensive standpoint that is soundly based, 
both in terms of EU law and in terms of general international law. Therefore, the 
following sections of this chapter will focus on Article 103 of the UN Charter, which 
represents the key provision to be studied, to better understand the reasoning 
that lies behind different approaches to the interaction between the UN and EU 
legal regimes. In particular, those who are in favour of a monist approach to the 
UN-EU relationship, generally consider Article 103 UNC something more than a 
conflict avoidance clause. In this respect, the provision is regarded as a 
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fundamental (or perhaps a ‘constitutional’) principle of the international legal 
order, capable of establishing a proper hierarchy between UN law and other 
sources of international law. The ‘constitutionalisation’ of the international legal 
order that derives from this assumption would imply for UN law to necessarily 
override EU law in case of a conflict. By contrast, those who reject the classical 
monist approach, tend to minimise the special character of Article 103 UNC, 
regarded as a conflict avoidance clause proper (i.e. as a source of interpretation). 
After a brief historical introduction aimed at describing the genesis of Article 103 
UNC, this chapter will analyse the two different standpoints sketched above and 
their effects on the relationship between the UN and EU legal systems. The 
chapter will eventually maintain (as I briefly explained within the last section the 
of the previous chapter) that Article 103 UNC shouldn’t be interpreted as a 
hierarchy norm, capable of curtailing member states’ sovereign power, but rather 
as a stronger species of conflict avoidance clause, aimed at ensuring the primacy 
of UN law, just in case conflicts occur. My analysis will confirm that a more 
nuanced (and pragmatic) approach to the problem is capable of preserving both 
the special character of the UN Charter and the independence of the EU legal 
system. 
II. GENESIS OF THE PRIMACY CLAUSE 
It should initially be noted that Article 103 UNC does not represent the first 
example in the history of a conventional provision aimed at ensuring the primacy 
of a treaty over the others. Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
(CLN) embodies the historical predecessor and more interesting term of 
comparison for the current Article 103 UNC, for at least two reasons: first of all, 
because the League of Nations (established during the Conference of Paris, right 
in the aftermath of the First World War) undoubtedly presents a number of 
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relevant affinities with the United Nations, being considered a forerunner of the 
modern organisation of the UN; secondly, because the wordings and structures 
of Article 20 of the Covenant and Article 103 UNC are notably different, even if 
they pursue a similar aim.160  The analysis of its historical predecessor is a 
fundamental step in order to better understand the genesis of current Article 103 
UNC and its logical premises, as well as to identify its underlying purpose and its 
effect. 161 
a. Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
Article 20 CLN reads: ‘1. The Members of the League severally agree that this 
Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se 
which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they 
will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. 
2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the 




160 For a systematic comparison between the Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN 
Charter: Russel Sobel, ‘The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An 
analysis of two international constitutions’ (1994) 5 Constitutional Political Economy 173; Rai 
Neetij, ‘A Comparitive Analysis Between the League Covenant and U.N. Charter’ (2010). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1695358.  
161 A number of relevant contributions exist with regard to Article 20 of the Covenant. In this 
respect, the works of Hans Kelsen offer a complete perspective. Hans Kelsen ‘Contributions a 
l’étude de la révision juridico-technique du Statut de la Société des Nations’ (1938) 45 Revue 
générale du droit international public 161, 197; Hans Kelsen, Legal Technique in International 
Law: A Textual Critique of the League Covenant (Geneva Research Centre 1939) 148. Among 
the first contributions to the study of Article 20 CLN, one may mention: Frederick Pollock, The 
League of Nations (Stevens 1922), 163, and Geoffrey G. Butler, A Handbook of the League of 
Nations (Longmans 1925) 80, as well as; Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Covenant as the Higher Law’ 
(1936) 17 British Yearbook of International Law 54. More recently, general analyses are offered 
by Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford 1961) 213; Elena Sciso, Gli Accordi Internazionali 
Confliggenti (Cacucci 1986) 561; Felipe Paolillo, ‘Article 30’ in Olivier Corten, Pierre Klein, Les 
Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités: Commentaire Article par Article (Bruylant 2006) 
1247, 1248; Andreas Paulus, Johann Leiss, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, 
Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (3rd edn, 
Oxford 2012) 2110, 2114; Robert Kolb, L’Article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies (ADI-POCHE 
2014) 36. 
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Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure 
its release from such obligations’162.  
 First of all, it is immediately clear that Article 20 of the Covenant can be 
ideally divided into three separate provisions, two of which are set forth by the 
first paragraph, and the third that literally corresponds to the third paragraph of 
the Article. The first provision can be identified in a ‘general abrogative norm’, by 
means of which Members of the League mutually agreed to abrogate obligations 
that were inconsistent with the Covenant. While the expression ‘obligations or 
understandings’ is not further specified by the Article, the meaning of the words 
seems to refer only to conventional sources of international law. Furthermore, the 
Article clearly states that obligations subject to abrogation were only those that 
existed inter se, that is to say between two or more Members of the League, 
explicitly safeguarding any other agreement that involved third parties (including 
those agreements entered into by one or more Members of the League and third 
parties). In other words, the first provision that is contained in Article 20 CLN was 
intended to abrogate any conventional norm, established between one or more 
Members of the League before the Covenant was signed, whose content was 
inconsistent with the Covenant itself. At a closer look, the provision did nothing 
more than codifying (or specifying) one of the basic customary principles that is 
applied to resolve antinomies between conventional norms: the chronological 




162 Hans Kelsen criticises the broad and rather unclear wording of Article 20 CLN, as it generally 
refers to ‘understanding’ or ‘engagements’, without properly referring to legal categories such as 
‘treaties’ or ‘agreements’. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: a Critical Analysis of its 
Fundamental Problems (Stevens 1950) 111. 
163 Kelsen, Legal Technique in International Law (n 161), 149. In this particular regard, Olof Hoijer 
clarifies that the effect of Article 20 CLN was to be limited to the abrogation of conflicting norms 
within pre-existing agreements, to the extent that these were separable from the context of the 
agreement itself. Olof Hoijer, Le Pacte de la Société des Nations. Commentaire théorique et 
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accepted that it would abrogate any previous conflicting norm that was entered 
into by the same contracting parties (such a rule is nowadays generally 
established by Article 30, paragraphs 3 and 4 VCLT). However – and this is 
probably the ‘innovative’ part of the rule itself – the abrogative force of the 
Covenant is affirmed by its Article 20 in general terms, so that even ‘special 
provisions’ established by previous agreements between the parties were 
intended to succumb, in case they were inconsistent with the Covenant.164  
 The second provision contained in Article 20 CLN, particularly in the last 
sentence of the first paragraph, was set to introduce an obligation, upon Members 
of the League of Nations, not to enter into future agreements (or undertake to 
perform any further obligations) that were inconsistent with the content of the 
Covenant. While the first provision was addressed to resolve conflicts between 
the Covenant and previous ‘obligations or understandings’, the purpose of this 
particular stand-still clause was to prevent conflicts between the Covenant and 
other conventional instruments of international law that Members of the League 
may wish to enter into in the future.165 In this second case, however, the wording 
adopted by Article 20 CLN seems to be less clear, both as regards the scope of 
such provision, and in terms of the effect that a violation of this undertaking may 
entail for the defaulting state. As of the scope of this provision, the absence of 
the locution inter se suggests that Members of the League should refrain from 




pratique (Spes 1926), 347. According to Lauterpacht (n 161), 58, the abrogative effect of the 
Covenant was to be extended to merely potential or ‘latent’ inconsistencies.  
164 See in this regard Jean Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations selon la 
Politique et la Jurisprudence des Organes de la Société (Sirey 1930), 568. 
165 According to David Miller, ‘States were no longer to be free to make treaties as they saw fit. 
They must at least conform the new Covenant’. David Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 
(Putnam 1928) 199.	
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indifferently. In effect, if the abrogative force of the Covenant should necessary 
be limited in scope to previous obligations existing between two or more Members 
of the League, the obligation not to enter into future undertakings could well be 
extended to any agreement whatsoever (i.e. even between a Member of the 
League and one or more third parties), whose conclusion ultimately rested on the 
sole contractual will of the Member involved. It seems reasonable to affirm, as a 
consequence, that the obligation not to ‘enter in any engagement inconsistent 
with’ the Covenant, should be referred both to any future engagements, 
irrespective of the parties involved. As regards the effect that a violation may 
bring along, however, one can envisage at least two possible interpretations of 
the rule. A ‘stronger’ reading of the provision (definitely closer to a monistic point 
of view) could suggest it to have some kind of real effect, either curtailing the 
international legal capacity of Member states, in order to prevent them from 
entering into obligations that were inconsistent with the Covenant, or simply 
having the effect to void any future engagement that happened to be in contrast 
with the same Covenant.166 A ‘weaker’ reading of the provision, more compatible 
with a dualistic point of view, could imply it to have merely obligatory effects, so 
that any undertakings that were inconsistent with the Covenants could validly be 
entered into by Members of the League of Nations, with the only (albeit serious) 
effect to entail the international responsibility of the defaulting state towards the 
community of the other Members, for acting in violation of the Covenant.167 
Indeed, the wording of the provision, with particular reference to the locution 




166 This idea is developed by Lauterpacht (n 161), 65. 
167 Emmanuelle Wyatt, ‘Article 20’ in Robert Kolb (ed), Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des 
Nations (Bruylant 2013) 787, 796; Kolb, L’Article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies (n 161), 43. 
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intentions of the contracting parties: on the one hand, the Covenant was probably 
the first attempt, for a multilateral treaty, to establish a supra-national forum of 
nation states, aimed at taking decision together in order to promote international 
peace and the welfare of peoples. Hence it was modelled as a classical 
instrument of international law that generally relies on the international 
responsibility of states in order to achieve their compliance (since obligations are 
generally lacking real or immediately justiciable effects). On the other hand, 
membership of the League of Nations at the date of its foundation was far from 
being universal: in this regard, a provision that could have the effect to limit the 
international legal capacity of Member states would carry strong uncertainty in 
reaching any agreement with third states, which could legitimately consider the 
Covenant as pacta tertiis. In effect, a partially different conclusion could be 
reached with regard to agreements entered into after the signature of the 
Covenant, by two or more Members of the League, with no third parties. Could 
one affirm that – in such a case – Members had reciprocally renounced their 
capacity to undertake new obligations that are inconsistent with the Covenant 
itself? The answer is not as straightforward as it may seem. In such a case, one 
may legitimately argue that the parties of the new agreement had voluntarily and 
mutually accepted not to enter in any future engagement that could be 
inconsistent with the Covenant, hence – de facto – curtailing their international 
capacity; however, this kind of extensive interpretation is not altogether 
convincing. On the one hand, the wording of Article 20 CLN unambiguously refer 
to a ‘solemn’ undertaking to refrain from entering into agreements in contrast with 
the Covenant, rather than suggesting any renounce in terms of legal capacity, 
and this is true irrespective of the parties of the ‘new’ agreement; on the other 
hand, nothing in Article 20 CLN can lead to maintain that the Covenant was (in 
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the intention of the contracting states) provided with a particular status or a 
special rank in the hierarchy of sources of international law, such as to supersede 
any contrasting future engagements entered into by Member states, or to impede 
said engagements to be undertaken. Eventually, it seems far more advisable and 
prudent to hold that, whatever the states involved, the second provision contained 
in the first paragraph of Article 20 CLN should be considered as a general 
prohibition to enter into future agreements that appeared to contrast with the 
Covenant, whose violation couldn’t bear any consequence in terms of real 
effects, but to affirm the international responsibility of the defaulting states 
towards the other Members of the League.168  
 The third provision contained in Article 20 CLN – that is represented by its 
second paragraph – can be regarded as a norm of closure, aimed at completing 
the legal framework established by the first paragraph, in order to ensure general 
respect of the Covenant by Members of the League and to remove any obstacle 
to the full performance of the obligations it established. In fact, while the first part 
of the first paragraph had the effect to abrogate previous obligations entered into 
between two or more Members of the League, in case they contrasted with the 
Covenant, this latter provision was in turn targeted at prior engagements that 
were inconsistent with the Covenant, whose parties were one or more Members 
of the League and one or more third states. In this case, as I argued before, 
Article 20 CLN could not have – alone – the effect to provoke abrogation of the 
contrasting norms, since (i) the contracting parties of the previous agreements 
were not the same of the Covenant and (ii) the Covenant itself could not be 




168 Kolb, L’Article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies (n 161), 44. 
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consequence, the provision imposed a duty onto Members of the League to take 
the necessary steps in order to free themselves from prior undertakings that may 
have the effect to impede a full performance of their obligations under the 
Covenant. In this case, the obligatory nature of Article 20 CLN is particularly clear: 
while this norm compelled Members of the League to act in order to be released 
from previous contrasting obligations, such duty could not be actually enforced in 
case of default and (once again) simply relied on the international responsibility 
of the violating state towards the others.169  
 My analysis showed that – by means of different provisions – Article 20 of 
the Covenant was, in fact, addressed both at actual conflict between the 
Covenant and pre-existing undertakings (either involving Members of the League 
only, or Members of the League and third parties), and at possible conflicts 
between the Covenant and future agreements. At a closer look, however, the 
general aim of Article 20 CLN could not be identified in establishing the primacy 
of the Covenant over any other source of conventional international law, neither 
in establishing a conflict avoidance rule, capable of solving any contrast in favour 
of the Covenant. It rather seems that – in drafting Article 20 of the Covenant – 
Members of the League aimed at preventing any possible conflict between the 
Covenant and other conventional sources of international law, with the aim of 
removing them from the international legal system, instead of outranking or 
superseding them by means of a higher source. And this conclusion is particularly 




169 Charles Rousseau, ‘De la Compatibilité des Normes Juridiques Contradictoires dans l’Ordre 
International’ (1932) 39 Revue générale du droit international public 133, 160. Ray (n 164), 570, 
stresses the absence of any independent review, other than the individual standpoint of the 
involved states, to assess whether an agreement was compatible or not compatible with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.  
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obligations might well continue to exist (and be applied) if (i) in case of 
subsequent agreements, one or more Members of the League violated their 
undertaking not to enter into them and (ii) in case of previous agreements 
between Members of the Leagues and third parties, one or more Members of the 
League did not take action in order to provoke their release from the obligations 
said agreements impose. In both cases the only consequence could be the 
international responsibility of defaulting states towards the others.  
Furthermore, having regard for the scope of Article 20 of the Covenant, it 
is certainly arguable that it could be applied to secondary sources of international 
law, established or approved within the League of Nations. First of all, it should 
be excluded that the abrogative effect provided by the first part of Article 20.1 
CLN could be extended to (forthcoming) secondary sources of international law, 
established by or within the League, without any specific indication to this effect. 
Arguing to the contrary, would lead to a general ‘precarisation’ of any agreement 
or engagement between two or more Members of the League, entered into either 
before or after the signature of the Covenant. While it is quite clear that such 
‘uncertainty of law’ would not have been accepted by many states, it is equally 
clear that the abrogative norm contained in Article 20.1 of the Covenant 
exhausted its effect with the entry into force of the said instrument, in relation to 
the sole agreements that might exist between two or more Members of the 
League at that particular time, and be incompatible with the Covenant itself.  
Similar considerations can be made with respect to the undertaking not to 
enter into any new treaties that were incompatible with the Covenant, and with 
the obligation placed onto Members of the League to take action in order to 
provoke their release from prior agreements, should they have been in contrast 
with the same Covenant. In both cases, the wording of Article 20 CLN suggests 
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the sole ‘parameter of compatibility’ to be the norms provided by the Covenant 
itself and not any kind of secondary legislation, adopted by or within the League: 
in fact – differently from Article 103 UNC (as will be seen hereinafter) – Article 20 
of the Covenant did not refer to the ‘obligations’ derived from the instrument, but 
rather and more specifically to the ‘terms’ of said instrument, thus limiting the 
scope of the provision. Indeed, within the context of the League of Nations (and 
having regard for the state of international law at the time), it would be very 
difficult for Member states to imagine that secondary or derived legislation could 
amend or broaden the scope of conventional obligations as to influence their 
freedom to act on the international stage. To argue in favour of the opposite 
solution would have implied such freedom (which stems directly from 
sovereignty) to vary from time to time, following the adoption of secondary 
legislation. As a consequence a treaty that was compatible with the Covenant at 
the time of its signature could subsequently ‘become’ incompatible with 
secondary legislation adopted within the League, thus obliging a contracting state 
to denounce the treaty that become incompatible with its obligations under the 
Covenant or – in any case – to act in order to be released from the same treaty. 
It is clear that similar consequences would have seriously impaired the capacity 
of Members of the League to enter into new international agreement with third 
states, given that said international agreements could – at an indefinite time in 
the future – have contrasted with the obligations that stemmed from the Covenant 
and have necessarily been re-negotiated (or worse).  
It follows from the above that – while it presented some similarities with 
current Article 103 UNC and tried to address similar issues – Article 20 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations could not be regarded as a primacy clause 
proper, but rather as a conflict prevention clause, whose aim was neither to 
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guarantee the primacy of the Covenant (and the legal framework it established) 
over any other treaty, undertaking or agreement, nor to set forth a new hierarchy 
of sources in international law, but to prevent the conflicts that might have 
occurred between the Covenant and other previous of future sources of 
international law. To do so, on the one hand, Article 20 CLN explicitly abrogated 
any incompatible undertaking previously entered into between two or more 
Members of the League, on the other it relied on the international responsibility 
of Members of the League in order to (i) avoid new agreements that might be 
incompatible with the Covenant to be entered into and (ii) oblige Members to act 
in order to be released from previous agreement with third parties whose 
obligations contrasted with the same Covenant.170  
Having understood the structure and effects of Article 20 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, I may now directly address the current Article 103 UNC, 
in order to identify its underlying purpose and its legal force. 
If one briefly recalls the text of Article 103 UNC (‘In the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’) a number of differences with 
Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations appear quite clearly and said 
differences represent, in my opinion, a very good ‘study tool’ for the purpose of 
my analysis. First of all, Article 103 UNC is certainly simpler than its predecessor, 




170 For a comparison between Article 20 of the Covenant and Article 103 UNC, under different 
points of view, see Sobel (n 160); Wyatt (n 167), 788; Kolb, L’Article 103 de la Charte des Nations 
Unies (n 161), 51; Kelsen (n 162), 111, 112; Hans Aufricht, ‘Supersession of Treaties in 
International Law’ (1952) 37 Cornell Law Quarterly 655, 683; Charles Rousseau, Droit 
International Public (Sirey 1970) 159. 
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prior or subsequent to the Charter, as well as any distinction ratione personae 
between agreements concluded by member states only, or by Members and non-
Members of the UN, and generally refers to other international agreements, 
irrespective for their positioning over time and their parties.171 To this extent, 
Article 103 UNC seems to adopt a clearer and stronger stance with regard to the 
primacy of the Charter, with the purpose of upholding such primacy in any case 
and without exception.172 This does not mean, however, that Article 103 UNC can 
be regarded as a stronger norm in terms of effects: in fact, differently from the 
provisions of Article 20 CLN, it neither set forth the necessary abrogation of 
previous undertakings, that might be in contrast with the Charter, nor imposes 
any sort of constraint to the international capacity of UN members, in terms of 
‘treaty-making power’; it simply provides for obligations under the Charter to 
prevail over UN members obligations ‘under any other international 
agreement’.173 Moreover, while Article 20 of the Covenant generally referred to 
‘obligations or understandings’, without further specification as of the particular 
source of international law they might stem from, Article 103 UNC is more specific 
as it makes reference to ‘other international agreement[s]’ as the sole sources 
subject to the primacy clause (to this extent, a literal interpretation of Article 103 
UNC might suggest its scope to be strictly limited to conventional international 




171 Joseph Sulkowski, ‘The Competence of the International Labor Organization Under the United 
Nations System’ (1951) 45 AJIL 286, 298  
172 Lazare Kopelmanas, L'Organisation des Nations Unies (Sirey 1947) 166; Rousseau (n 170), 
160; Thierry Flory, ‘Article 103’ in Jean Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies 
(Economica 1985) 1373; James Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International 
Law’ in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (vol. 319, Brill-Nijhoff 2006) 
370. 
173 Aufricht (n 170), 683; Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (n 162), 111, 112; Norman 
Bentwich, Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (Kraus 1951) 180; 
Paul Guggenheim, Traité de Droit International Publique (t 1, Georg 1967) 273.  
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explained hereinafter). Hence, while the ‘chronological dimension’ and subjective 
scope of Article 103 UNC would suggest to consider this norm as an evolution of 
Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations towards a stronger and more 
comprehensive model, its effects and objective scope appear to be more 
conservative and realistic (or probably less ambitious).  
At a closer look, the real difference between Article 20 of the Covenant 
and Article 103 UNC can be better explained in terms of approach: the drafters 
of Article 20 CLN considered it appropriate to provide a specific settlement for 
each situation of potential conflict between the Covenant and other ‘obligations 
or understandings’ of international law, by means of the three separate provisions 
that I analysed above. In order to do so, they resorted to general principles of 
international law – such as lex posterior derogat priori – and solely relied on the 
international responsibility of member states in order to ensure compliance with 
the ‘solemn undertaking’ not to enter into future agreements that contrasted with 
the Covenant, as well as with the codified ‘duty […] to take immediate steps’ in 
order to release themselves from previous obligations that the Covenant might 
conflict with. This approach – in general terms – makes the Covenant much akin 
an instrument of general international law, which is no surprise if one considers 
the historical context in which it was drafted. By contrast, Article 103 UNC does 
not introduce a set of specific provisions to deal with different cases of (actual or) 
potential conflict between the Charter and other international agreements that UN 
members are part of, it simply postulate the necessary prevalence of the former 
over the latter, without any further specification with regard both to the actual 
scope and effects of such prevalence and (consequently) to the legal category 
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which it can be traced back.174 In sum, Article 103 UNC (i) does not explicitly 
provide the Charter with a special force, capable of abrogating or nullifying 
previous agreements and (ii) does not set forth special obligations for UN 
members to comply with, in order to ensure actual prevalence to the Charter, it 
rather bind member states to ensure the prevalence of the UN Charter, without 
any specific reference in terms of legal instruments or procedures to be adopted. 
To sum up, while Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations proposed 
a detailed and ‘technical’ norm, whose provisions clearly identified a specific legal 
procedure to confront each case of conflict, Article 103 UNC only focused on the 
result to be achieved by UN members (the prevalence of the Charter over any 
other international agreement), irrespective of the legal path that may lead to the 
result itself. The former represents an example of procedural norm (a classical 
choice when it comes to deal with conflicts of laws), the latter is more a 
substantive or a principle norm (it tells member states ‘what the reality should be’, 
but not ‘how to realise it’). To this extent, Article 103 UNC seems to completely 
disregard the wide number of interpretative problems that may be brought along 
by a preconceived and aprioristic postulation of primacy for the Charter over any 
international agreement, erga omnes. The UN Charter and the obligations it 
imposes onto member states need to prevail, whatever the legal argument to 
achieve such prevalence may be and irrespective of the procedure to be followed 
by the interpreter. This kind of differences between Article 20 of the Covenant 
and Article 103 UNC reflect the different standpoints adopted by the drafters of 
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to be given to the treaty, and probably they also reflects the particular historical 
context of the time.175 In the case of the Covenant, it was drafted as a classical 
instrument of conventional international law and it aimed at respecting the legal 
environment of the time, without any revolutionary reach. In the case of the 
Charter of the United Nations – as will be better clarified hereinafter – it was 
intended as a purpose-oriented treaty, that may overcome the shortcomings of 
the League of Nations by means of a more political/less legalist approach and 
ensure a stronger position for the international organisation it was set to establish. 
If the Covenant of the League of Nations pledged to comply with international 
law, the Charter of the United Nations aimed at changing it from the foundation.176  
 The evolutionary path of the primacy clause from the Article 20 CLN-
model to the actual text of Article 103 UNC is particularly clear having regard to 
the travaux préparatoires177 of the latter provision, that I will briefly analyse, in 
order to understand the reasons underlying the change of perspective I have 
previously pointed out and set the basis for the interpretation of Article 103 UNC 
I aim at providing.  
b. From Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to Article 103 of 
the UN Charter: the need for a primacy clause 
The need to provide the future UN Charter with a norm ensuring its primacy over 
any other treaty was very clear since the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944. 
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similar – both with regard to its structure, and with regard to its scope – to the 
provisions contained in Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. To 
this extent, the proposals submitted at the Dumbarton Oaks conference generally 
showed a tripartite structure, providing (a) an abrogative clause, with respect to 
previous treaties concluded by member states inter se; (b) a provision aimed at 
preventing member states from entering into new agreements that could be in 
contrast with the Charter and (c) a final undertaking, for member states, to 
procure their release from previous agreements, entered into with third parties. 
Furthermore, some States also proposed to crystallise the general principle of 
international law according to which member states could invoke no provision of 
their domestic law, in order to refuse compliance with the Charter.178 Such formal 
and procedural approach, directly derived from the experience of the Covenant, 
represented the starting point for further discussions that took place in 1945, at 
the San Francisco Conference, within the Committee 2 of the IV Commission 
(titled Technical Committee on Legal Problems). In this context, some of the 
proposals aimed at reinforcing the effects of the abrogative clause, extending its 
reach to ‘present and future’ agreements, concluded inter se by member states; 
some others, by contrast, tried to adopt a more cautious approach, introducing a 
specific obligation to revise incompatible agreements, instead of providing their 
abrogation tout court. In addition, some proposals limited their reach to previous 
agreements only, while others aimed at curtailing member states treaty-making 
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In general terms the Committee debated and analysed a number of 
problematic legal issues – both in terms of legal reach of the future primacy 
clause, and in terms of its actual enforcement – that closely recalls some of the 
problems faced above, in relation to Article 20 of the Covenant. As regards the 
effects of future Article 103 UNC on previous agreements, in particular, different 
stances were maintained in relation to the appropriateness of providing an 
automatic abrogative clause (that could cause a number of problems in terms of 
legal certainty), instead of a milder obligation to amend only the parts of previous 
agreements that were judged incompatible with the Charter, in order to ensure 
their compliance with the principles of the United Nations. Furthermore, no 
general consensus was reached on the effects that the Charter should have with 
respect to previous agreements that involved third parties. To this extent, on the 
one hand, the Committee recognised that the functioning and the effectiveness 
of the new international organisation couldn’t be curtailed by the existence of 
previous treaties between members and non-members; on the other hand, 
however, a legal procedure capable of overcoming the ‘sacred’ principle of  ‘pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt’, without subverting the very structure of 
international law was probably impossible to find. In relation to future agreements, 
moreover, the positions within the Committee seemed to be more nuanced: some 
proposals appeared to consider the idea of limiting (or at least influencing) UN 
members in their treaty-making capacity; others proposed to introduce an 
obligation not to enter into future agreements that contrasted with the Charter and 
its principles, others preferred to stick to the Article 20 CLN-model, supporting 
the idea of a ‘solemn undertaking’ (without further specification). Probably the 
most critical and unresolved point – however – was represented by the actual 
assessment of the conflict between the Charter and other agreements and the 
	 101 
possibility to enforce the primacy clause to come. To this extent, while some of 
the contracting parties considered it appropriate to vest the General Assembly 
with all appropriate powers, in order to declare a treaty to be incompatible with 
the Charter, other refused to abandon the principle, well grounded in general 
international law, that it was only for states to interpret and assess the 
compatibility of different treaties they entered into.180 Such differences within the 
Committee and the stalemate they created clearly showed that the contracting 
parties were not able to reach the necessary consensus on a procedural norm, 
modelled on Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, capable of 
addressing with a specific provision any conflict that could be envisaged between 
the Charter and other international agreements, as well as the power to ascertain 
the very existence of such conflict and the consequence of a positive assessment 
on the conflicting treaty. States could not agree on a detailed legal framework to 
codify the primacy of the Charter and its legal consequences by means of 
applying the categories of classical international law. Moreover, some states had 
clearly expressed their opinion to be tout court against the idea of a primacy 
clause as part of the Charter (if modelled on Article 20 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations), especially with regard to previous treaties concluded by UN 
members with third parties, which could not have been called into question by 
means of pacta tertiis.181 This particular position was countered by those states 
that feared a Charter without an explicit primacy clause would have been 
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consequences that such an approach could have brought along on the 
capabilities and effectiveness of the new international organisation.182  
The debate having reached a dead end, the need for a radical change of 
approach emerged clearly within the Committee. In particular, as long as it was 
not possible to reach a general consensus on a primacy clause, to be structured 
as a strictly legal and procedural norm on the model of Article 20 of the Covenant, 
an alternative approach emerged, with a view to establish a simpler norm.183 In 
the intention of the Committee, the reach of this norm should be limited to 
affirming the primacy of the Charter over any other agreement, without any further 
specification. In so doing, the Charter would have simply affirmed its right to 
prevail, focusing on the desired (‘political’) effect and disregarding all technical 
difficulties – widely outlined above – related to the legal means and procedures 
necessary to achieve such effect. These problems should have been addressed 
on a case by case basis, overcoming the needs to explicitly provide for the effects 
of the Charter of previous agreement, either concluded inter se by UN members 
or involving third parties, to discipline the influence that the Charter could exert 
on UN members treaty-making capacity and to establish a legal procedure in 
order to evaluate (i) whether a treaty actually conflicted with the Charter and (ii) 
what legal consequences the primacy of the Charter should have for the 
conflicting treaty. Furthermore, the Committee felt it appropriate to clarify that the 
proposed primacy clause would not have necessarily implied for UN members to 
renegotiate previous agreement, since the prevalence of the Charter could have 
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or disapplication of conflicting provisions. In conclusion, following the report184 
adopted by the Committee, the rule set forth by Article 103 UNC was intended to 
establish – as a general principle and a ‘material result’ to be pursued – the 
prevalence of the obligations placed onto UN members by the Charter over any 
other obligation of conventional international law, irrespective of the procedures 
or legal arguments that may lead to such result and without establishing any rule 
of explicit hierarchy between different sources of international law. It was a matter 
of ‘obligations v. obligations’, to be dealt with each time an actual conflict arose 
(indeed, one can imagine either obligations that are intrinsically conflicting with 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or obligations that may 
occasionally collide with the same Charter. The latter scenario may be verified 
both in case a provision of general international law is applied in a way that 
conflicts with the Charter, and in case a supervening obligation under the Charter 
is such to contrast with previous obligations under a different instrument of 
international law, as will be explained hereafter). Moreover, with regard to 
potential conflicts between the Charter itself and subsequent international 
agreements, the Committee considered that an explicit limit to the international 
legal capacity of UN members was not altogether necessary given that, on the 
one hand, the prevalence of the Charter was affirmed with regard to any other 
international agreement (without necessarily implying a limitation of member 
states treaty-making power) and, on the other hand, the ‘good faith clause’, 
provided by Article 2.2 UNC, should have compelled UN members not to enter 
into obligations that might have impaired their own compliance with the Charter. 
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Commission of the San Francisco Conference on June 15, 1945 and 
subsequently approved by the contracting parties, with minor aesthetic 
changes.185  
The analysis of the path that led from Article 20 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations to Article 103 UNC (through the travaux préparatoires of the 
latter) helped me to point out a number of key elements that need to be properly 
taken into account for the purpose of this work, with particular regard to the actual 
meaning of Article 103 UNC and its rationale. The transition between the clause 
of the Covenant and the corresponding clause in the Charter shows an 
ideological and theoretical change of approach that cannot be ignored when it 
comes to understanding the scope of Article 103 UNC and its proper 
interpretation vis-à-vis other instruments of international law. As I outlined above, 
Article 20 of the Covenant was construed to be both a conflict avoidance clause 
and a conflict resolution clause. It was structured as a norm of general 
international law and aimed at establishing detailed framework in order to deal 
with each case of (actual or potential) conflict between the Covenant and different 
understandings. As a consequence, it provided different disciplines, procedures 
and effects, depending on the subjects of conflicting obligations (members of the 
League of Nations inter se or members and third parties) and on the time such 
conflicting obligations were entered into (before or after the League of Nations 
was established). Particularly, by means of Article 20 CLN, the parties of the 
Covenant explicitly abrogated any prior obligation or understanding inter se, that 
conflicted with the Covenant and undertook not to enter into any future agreement 
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take all the appropriate steps in order to procure their release from any prior 
obligation, entered into with third parties, that could impede them to perform their 
obligations under the Covenant. Notably, the norm made general reference to 
‘obligations’ and ‘undertakings’, to include a wider set of sources of international 
law, not limited to treaties. As I argued above, Article 20 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations was intended to set forth substantive legal provisions, with 
very limited needs for further interpretation, in coherence with the international 
law framework it was construed to comply with. Nonetheless, the wide number of 
problematic issues that Article 20 CLN had left unsolved (think about the 
obligation to renegotiate previous agreements with third parties, the unassigned 
power to assess which obligations actually conflicted with the Covenant and the 
difference between intrinsic conflict and occasional conflict) emerged in full within 
the preparatory works of the UN Charter and led the contracting parties to adopt 
a very different approach. Instead of providing a specific discipline for each 
scenario of potential conflict, Article 103 UNC simply provides for the Charter to 
prevail over any other agreement (here the word ‘agreement’ is preferred to the 
way vaguer ‘understanding’); it focuses on the purpose that should be achieved 
and leaves to the interpreter, on a case-by-case basis, the task of identifying the 
correct or at least acceptable legal path in order to achieve such result. The 
concept of prevalence as a ‘political’ principle managed to overcome en bloc the 
criticalities brought along by Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
bypassing the problem of ‘general and abstract’ legal categories in favour of a 
result-oriented provision, aimed at preventing any sort of conflict, regardless for 
the legal argument or procedure one could follow to achieve such result and for 
the effects on international obligations the Charter was set to prevail over.   
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III. SCOPE OF ARTICLE 103 of the UN Charter: a Hierarchy Rule? 
While it provided substantial help in reaching an (otherwise difficult) agreement 
on a primacy clause to be included in the Charter, the ‘political’ wording of Article 
103 UNC and the case-by-case approach it adopts left the interpreters substantial 
leeway as regards the legal effects to be attributed to the norm and its proper 
application. Indeed, as I argued above, the drafters of Article 103 UNC decided 
to focus on the effects they desired to achieve, without properly specifying the 
legal scope of the norm they were about to set up. Far from being a merely 
stylistic choice (in favour of synthesis or clarity), the wording of Article 103 UNC 
reflects profound theoretical differences and does not find its grounds on a 
common standpoint. The brief analysis of Article 20 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the travaux préparatoires of Article 103 UNC clearly 
outlined that Committee 2 of the IV Commission at the San Francisco Conference 
could not eventually find a common position in order to implement a strictly legal 
procedure, capable of ensuring the primacy of the Charter without opening a wide 
doctrinal discussion on its possible shortcomings, its potential contrast with 
‘classical’ principles of international law and the impossibility of regulating in 
advance any situations of conflict that the Charter might be confronted with. 
Differently from what usually happens, the travaux préparatoires of Article 103 
UNC could not help in identifying the intention of the drafters as of the rationale 
and the scope of the norm, they rather tell where the discussion started and the 
model drafters looked at (Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations), 
the criticalities they outlined with regard to such a model (a) the immediate 
abrogative effect of the norm; b) the limitation of the treaty-making power of states 
and c) the position of states that were third parties to the Charter) and the effect 
they desired to achieve irrespective of said criticalities (the prevalence of the 
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Charter over any other treaty). They eventually tell that the above-mentioned 
problems were not solved at the time and it is – therefore – for the interpreter to 
find the appropriate solution, on a case-by-case basis. Such choice, however, is 
not devoid of meaning (at least in political terms) when it comes to identify what 
kind of norm Article 103 UNC actually is. 
a. Arguments for constitutionalising international law 
A number of challenging scholarly debates have arisen around the scope of 
Article 103 UNC since its adoption in 1945, its effect towards third states probably 
being the most complicated issue to solve. For the purpose of my analysis, 
however, the systematic reading of the primacy clause has a special relevance, 
since it exerts a decisive influence on interactions between UN law and other 
legal regimes (within international law), therefore – ultimately – on the interaction 
and potential conflicts between UN law and EU law. In fact, to the extent of my 
analysis, I merely assumed that Article 103 UNC did not establish a hierarchy 
between UN law and other legal orders (within international law), placing the 
Charter at the top of said hierarchy. I maintained, by contrast, that Article 103 
UNC should be interpreted as a conflict avoidance clause (although one of a 
particular kind), whose application is limited to material cases of contrast between 
obligations that stem from the Charter and any other obligation of conventional 
international law. At a closer look, regarding Article 103 UNC as a hierarchy rule 
implies adhering to the monist choice with regard to interaction between UN law 
and different legal orders, where the latter are somehow ‘subordinate’ to the 
former and the Charter acts, lato sensu, as the constitution of the international 
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community.186 Differently, those who consider Article 103 UNC as a conflict 
avoidance norm, generally adopt a more nuanced approach to the problem of 
regime interaction, without going so far as to theorising (either implicitly, or 
explicitly) the existence of an ‘international constitutional norm’, that being the 
Charter.187 Starting from the genesis of Article 103 UNC (and its predecessor), 
the lines that follows will briefly represent the arguments in favour of the hierarchy 
rule and those in favour of the conflict avoidance clause, in order to conclude that 
– although the existence of a constitution for the international community would 
be an evocative idea – there is actually no legal ground in the Charter to underpin 
such theory. Conversely, reading Article 103 UNC as a conflict avoidance clause 
is more advisable, since it does not require to extend the meaning of the norm by 
means of interpretation, it is more respectful of the purpose the drafters aimed to 
pursue and, ultimately, it better suit the current needs of international law.  
 Legal theories that look at the Charter as a constitutional norm are nothing 
new: indeed, their first appearance dates back to the fifties.188 However, in those 
circumstances, the idea of categorising the Charter as the international 
constitution was the outcome of a political interpretation rather than a strictly legal 
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functional to reinforce the strong symbolic effect that the contracting parties 
desired to convey; on the other hand, the idea of an international constitution 
could be very helpful in order to stress its innovative effects with regard to 
classical international law. To this extent, referring to the Charter of the United 
Nations as a constitutional treaty was not intended to qualify the Charter as a 
constitution proper, but to outline its significance (either symbolic, political and 
ideological) within the context of international law, with particular regard to 
conventional international law. In this sense – at least initially – no one paid great 
attention to the revolutionary legal effects that vesting the Charter with a 
constitutional force would necessarily have implied, the first and most evident 
being the establishment of a hierarchy of the legal sources of international law, 
which was previously unknown. More recently, however, the theory that looks at 
the Charter as a constitutional treaty has been developing in a more substantial 
way, trying to identify within the Charter itself the (fundamental or) constitutional 
principles of the international community (i.e. the community of states) and to 
outline in the international legal order those characters that identify a 
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First of all, the Charter is undoubtedly a ‘constituent one’, both from a 
substantial and from an institutional point of view. Although states have probably 
never toyed with the idea of establishing some sort of international constitution or 
global governance, nonetheless the process they undertook with the Charter led 
to the development of a common framework of values and principles that aimed 
at being the foundations of a peaceful coexistence and fruitful global cooperation. 
As it often happened with national constitutions, the Charter has codified some 
pre-existing principles and peremptory norms, generally accepted by the 
community of states as a whole (i.e. sovereign equality and certain rules of jus 
cogens), and recognised the consensus that the international community had 
reached on other ones (i.e. the prohibition of the use of force; the principle of self-
determination of peoples; the promotion of respect for human rights and 
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Grundnorm.190 From an institutional point of view, the Charter created a new 
organisation, the United Nations, which represents the gathering of the 
international community. It also defined the institutional structure of the 
organisation, the powers and attributions of its different bodies along with the 
duties and rights of member states. In fewer words, on the one hand, the Charter 
set forth the binding values and purposes of the community of states, while, on 
the other hand, it provides a general legal framework to regulate relations 
between states, either on a bilateral basis and as a community. This does not 
mean, obviously, that one can expect the whole set of principles and rules that 
govern the life of the international community to be codified within the Charter. 
As it happens with nation states, in spite of general attempts to organise the 
constitution within one or few comprehensive documents, the constitutional order 
further grows and develops even beyond what is written, with the effect of 
reinforcing – rather than weakening – the fundamental norm.   
Another argument that is often spent in favour of the constitutional nature 
of the Charter is definitely its inclusive character: to date, membership of the 
United Nations is almost universal and – with some exceptions – the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the Charter have been voluntarily accepted and shared 
even by the few non-members of the organisation. Such global acceptance of its 
values and basic norms would make it reasonable to look at the UN Charter as 
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usually represent the heritage of values and principles generally shared by a 
community of people and, to this extent, the parallelism with the Charter could be 
maintained. 
By contrast, one may easily argue that non-member states would hardly 
be bound by the institutional framework of the United Nations, that is to say the 
decisions of UN bodies (particularly the enforcement system provided by Chapter 
VII of the same Charter). However, those who support the idea of the Charter as 
an international constitution tend to stress the fact that non-member States have 
in most cases proven willing to abide by the decision adopted by UN bodies – 
namely Security Council resolutions – even if they were not formally bound by 
such decisions 192  (for example, this is the case of Switzerland before its 
accession to the United Nations as a full member, in 2002). This circumstance 
would serve, in their view, to show how the value of the Charter as the 
fundamental norm of the international community is recognised by states 
regardless of their actual membership of the United Nations. 
A third argument, which is often resorted to in favour of the constitutional 
dimension of the Charter is its dynamism and its proven capability to evolve in a 
way that is consistent with changes that emerge in the international community. 
To this extent, the success of many modern national constitutions comes from 
their capability to be flexible instruments, in order to meet (through interpretation) 
the evolving needs of the community they are expected to govern, still being rigid 
enough to preserve their fundamental principles and values. Indeed, since 1945, 




192 See, for example, Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A 
Constitutional Perspective (Martinus Nijoff 1998), 109. But contra, Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII 
Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart 2004), 97. 
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and political changes (the Cold War before, the War on Terror), seemingly without 
losing its capability to represent the ultimate normative framework of the 
international community. According to some scholars the interpretative processes 
that allowed the Charter to preserve its central role within an evolving social and 
political framework are much close to the ones that characterises domestic 
constitutional law.193  
Fourthly, some stressed the parallelism between the Charter and national 
constitutions as it would realise an institutional structure based on the separation 
of powers.194 Since the origins of the tripartite system, in Montesquieu’s The Spirit 
of The Laws, this principle has continuously evolved to represent one of the 
founding elements of democracy per se. Within modern constitutions, the 
existence of a separation of powers is a necessary prerequisite for the proper 
functioning of an institutional system based on democracy as concentration of 
power in the hands of a sole institution radically excludes any checks and 
balances. In this regard, these scholars envisage in the institutional structure of 
the Organisation and the different attributions that the Charter grants to UN 
bodies a clue of the constitutional nature of the same Charter and the legal 




193  See Francis Paul Walters, A History of the League of Nations (Oxford 1960) 1. Such 
interpretation seems to be recalled by the Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which 
considers the object and purpose of a treaty as a main source of interpretation and introduces 
specific safeguards for ‘constituent instruments of international organisations’, whose purposes 
and rules should remain unaffected. In this regard, either the International Court of Justice has 
developed a method of interpretation which focuses on the purpose of each Charter provision, in 
the context of the principles set forth by the Charter as a whole, thus closely recalling the concept 
of ‘implied powers’, nowadays widespread in constitutional (and European) law. In this respect, 
the practice of different UN bodies has gradually become a source of interpretation per se, as it 
has commonly happened with constitutional bodies within domestic legal systems.   
194 Blaine Sloan, ‘The United Nations Charter as a Constitution’ (1988) 1 Pace Y.B. Int’l L. 61, 77. 
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In the light of these four main arguments, those who support the 
constitutional nature of the Charter draw a few extremely relevant normative 
conclusions.195 The entry into force of the Charter would have established a 
brand-new international legal order, characterised by the existence of an 
international system of governance, where the UN bodies represent constituted 
powers, and a proper hierarchy of legal sources. More importantly, the legal 
system established by the Charter would be a universal one, addressed also to 
non-members, since the natural scope of a constitution is to bind each and any 
member of the community it governs (in this case, the international community of 
states). Furthermore, according to the constitutional interpretation, the Charter 
would also apply to non-state entities, such as other international organisations, 
but also individuals, companies and other legal persons. To this extent, Article 
103 UNC is interpreted as a structural provision, since (i) it would establish a 
proper hierarchy of norms within international law, with the Charter being placed 
‘on the tip of the pyramid’, (ii) the hierarchy it establish would be binding for the 
whole international community, including non-members, (iii) any norm that is 
contrary to the Charter would be ‘unconstitutional’ and – as a consequence – null 
and void.  
b. A constituent treaty, not a constitution 
This theory is not altogether convincing. First and foremost, it apparently suffers 
from a clear logical defect. Authors that support the constitutional interpretation 
of the Charter start from the ‘observation’ of the Charter itself (i.e. its role within 
the international community, its structure and its interpretation) and maintain it 




195 See Kolb, L’Article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies (n 161), 312-316.  
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summarise: (a) it is a constituent instrument, since it found a new organisation 
with its own legal system; (b) it set forth the fundamental values and purposes of 
community of member states; (c) it provides a general legal framework to regulate 
relations between member-states, either on a bilateral basis and as a community; 
(d) it was accepted by (virtually) any state in the world, given that membership of 
the United Nations is – to date – almost universal and non-members have, in a 
number of cases, voluntarily abided by the Charter; (e) it can be regarded as a 
flexible and ‘living’ instrument, capable of being interpreted in order to meet the 
evolving needs of the international community. At the same time, it is rigid enough 
to preserve the fundamental values that lie at its core; (f) it established an 
institutional system characterised by a separation of powers between UN bodies 
(in terms of ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ powers) that recalls the one provided by 
domestic constitutions. Given these similarities with domestic constitutions, 
authors who support the constitutional nature of the Charter maintain196 that it 
should necessarily enjoy the same force and the same scope of a national 
constitution, namely: it should be considered the higher-ranking norm within a 
proper hierarchy in the international legal order, it should apply to the whole 
international community (and not only to member states) and it should be capable 
of nullifying any conflicting norm (to be considered lower in rank), according to 
the principle lex superior derogat legi inferiori. By contrast, these consequences 
are neither necessary, nor can they be drawn from positive law. The logical 
scheme followed by constitutionalists can be summarised by two consequential 
arguments. First: (1) all constitutions have the ‘X’ character; (2) the Charter has 




196 As discussed in para. III.a, above. 
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have the ‘Y’ power and the ‘Z’ scope; (3) the Charter is a constitution; so (5) the 
Charter have the ‘Y’ power and the ‘Z’ scope. The first argument, however, is not 
a proper syllogism and, as a consequence, the proposition (3), that grounds the 
whole logical structure, is not necessarily true. In fact, maintaining that ‘all 
constitutions have the ‘X’ character’ does not imply that all legal instruments that 
have the ‘X’ character are, themselves, a constitution. Indeed, the constitutional 
theory tries to draw normative consequences a priori, from the simple observation 
of structural similarities between the UN Charter and modern national 
constitutions. These arguments tend to represent the Charter for what it should 
be in the idea of the constitutional doctrine, rather than for what it actually is, 
based on positive law and its general application by member (and non-member) 
states; ultimately it presents a conceptualist political/philosophical interpretation 
of the Charter, rather than one based on positive legal arguments, be them literal 
or teleological.197 Although the idea of a global constitution may somehow be 
suggestive, as I observed above, the travaux préparatoires clearly suggest that 
founding states were neither trying to establish a new global governance, nor to 
set forth a new rigid hierarchy of the sources of international law as they drafted 
Article 103 UNC. In fact, the text of Article 103 UNC adopted at the San Francisco 
Conference reflected the necessary compromise between different theoretical 
stances that could hardly be reconciled. As I remembered above, the main 
unsolved problems that emerged during the preparatory works were – in 
particular – the legal effects of the Charter with regard to previous understandings 
that might conflict with the Charter itself (should it enjoy a stronger nullifying 




197 See Milanovic (n 136), 77, Liivoja (n 136), 584, 612. 
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with regard to previous understanding that were entered into by UN members 
and non-members (i.e. its effects towards third states). Some of the founding 
states proposed a ‘stronger’ text of Article 103 UNC, establishing a hierarchical 
relationship between the Charter and any other instrument of international law, 
including those agreements entered into by member states and third parties. By 
contrast, others adopted a more problematic and nuanced approach to these 
problems, refusing to broaden the scope of Article 103 UNC to such extent, and 
no common position was eventually reached. Taking a closer look, the problems 
I just described above represent two key-issues when it comes to qualifying the 
Charter as a constitution in strictly legal terms: describing the Charter as a 
constitution proper means adhering to the first and stronger thesis that wanted 
the UN Charter to be hierarchically superordinate to any other instrument of 
international law, and applied universally. This thesis found no unanimous 
support within the San Francisco Conference. The current text of Article 103 
UNC, by contrast, reflects the choice of the contracting parties to introduce a 
‘variable geometry’, purpose-oriented norm, that focused on the effect to be 
achieved (ensuring the prevalence of the Charter), without prescribing the means 
member states should adopt in order to pursue that same effect. This conclusion 
implies that the legal reasoning to be followed, to ensure the primacy of the 
Charter, may be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the 
circumstances and on the subjects involved. Something very different from what 
happens with national constitutions. With particular regard for the effect of the UN 
Charter, moreover, one may add that – in order for the same Charter to prevail 
over other instruments of international law – it is often neither necessary, nor 
desirable that the latter be nullified or abrogated. In relation to temporary 
measures adopted by the Security Council, for example, the simple derogation 
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or interim suspension of conflicting obligations might be a sufficient and 
appropriate means in order to ensure the prevalence of the Charter and UN law 
at large.  
Similar logical flaws can be identified with regard to the ‘global 
membership’ argument and the ‘voluntary obedience’ argument as well. In 
relation to the almost-global membership of the UN, one may raise at least two 
objections, the first one is somehow a ‘definitory’ one and the second is one of a 
strictly formal nature: (i) while it is certainly true that a constitution is a 
fundamental norm that is accepted by and binding for the entire community it is 
set to govern, not every norm that is accepted by and binding for an entire 
community (be that of people or of states) is necessarily a constitution;198 (ii) even 
if one could affirm that every norm that is accepted by and binding for an entire 
community is a constitution (which is not), membership of the United Nations 
does not represent the entire community of existing nation states all over the 
world, since an almost-global membership is not sufficient to postulate the global 
acceptance of the Charter as the international constitution. In addition, voluntary 
obedience of non-members to the principles enshrined in the Charter and to the 
decisions adopted by the Security Council by virtue of its statutory powers does 
not necessarily vest the Charter with a constitutional power. In fact, the voluntary 




198 To this extent, one may recall the similar debate on the constitutional nature of EU Treaties 
(that I dealt with in Chapter 1, above): if EU Treaties are commonly regarded (given their 
constituent nature) as ‘constitutional treaties’, since they established a common set of rules and 
values that govern the European community of states, nonetheless they cannot be considered as 
a European constitution stricto sensu. The reason for not ratifying and abandoning the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome in 2004, lied mostly in its constitutional 
tone and in its ambition to establish a proper constitutional framework for the EU. The greater 
part of the innovations brought by the 2004 constitutional treaty was somehow recovered by the 
Treaty of Lisbon that struggled to repeal, however, any direct reference to a constitutional charter 
and continued to rely on the ‘contract-like’ model, proper of conventional instruments of 
international law. 
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a constitutional norm, that is to say its imperative power: obedience to a 
constitutional norm is always necessary for any members of the community and 
never voluntary.  
It is useful, in this regard, to briefly consider Article 2.6 UNC, according to 
which ‘[t]he Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the 
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security’. Principles 
referred to in Article 2 UNC are, namely, sovereign equality and the general ban 
on the threat or use of force in order to settle disputes between states. This 
obligation, imposed onto UN institutions by the Charter of the United Nations, is 
sometimes interpreted to maintain that the UN Charter enjoys binding force for 
non-members as well.  
It was argued199 that the principle of sovereign equality, which represents 
one of the very foundations of the international legal order, could not be effective 
before Article 2.4 UNC200 introduced a general ban on the threat or use of force. 
To this extent, since non-members are both protected by201 and expected to 
comply with the principles set forth in Article 2 UNC (i.e. a violation of the general 
ban on the threat of use of force may be sanctioned by the Security Council, 
under Chapter VII UNC, irrespectively of the member or non-member status of 
the ‘perpetrator’ and of the ‘victim’) it may be maintained that non-member states 




199 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(n 189), 112-114. 
200 ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations’. 
201 Since Article 2.4 UNC refers to ‘any state’. 
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This view is supported by making reference to the opinion of Hans 
Kelsen,202 whose substantial reasoning rely on the fact that, if the UN Charter 
attaches sanctions to non-member states when they adopt certain behaviours, 
then an obligation exists for non-member states to adopt contrary behaviours. 
I respectfully dissent. 203 First of all, compliance with the general ban on 
the use or threat of force by non-members, based on the actual risk of sanctions 
adopted by the UN Security Council against them, is not sufficient to maintain 
that non-members are legally bound to comply with the UN Charter. The logical 
equation: (A) all subjects that are bound by law X must obey law X; (B) subject N 
complies with law X; so (C) subject N is bound by law X; is not a valid syllogism.  
Non-member states may be compelled to comply with the UN Charter and 
refrain from the use of threat of force due to the potential impact that sanctions 
adopted at the UN level (and applied by the vast majority of the community of 
states) may have against them. This does not necessarily mean – however – that 
they perceive compliance with the UN Charter as a legal obligation, but rather as 




202 Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (n 162), 117	
203 Opinions contrary to an over-extensive interpretation of Article 2.6 UNC are proposed, among 
others, by Jeremy Matam Farral, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge 
2007), 66; Christina Eckes, EU Counter Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of 
Individual Sanctions (Oxford 2009), 231, 232; Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Armed Groups (Hart 2016), 98. In a quite old essay, Georg Schwarzenberger, reasoning 
on the concept of sovereignty and starting from classical concepts in international law (such as 
the idea of consent and the principle pacta tertiis), firmly opposes any chances for the UN Charter 
to impose obligations upon non-members. Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Forms of Sovereignty: 
An Essay in Comparative Jurisprudence’ (1957) 10 Current Legal Problems 264, 280. While he 
recalls the ideas of Hans Kelsen (n 162), 117, in his comment to Article 2 UNC, Wolfgang Graf 
Vitzthum, does not go this far to conclude that this provision renders the UN Charter binding for 
non-members as well. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, ‘Article 2’, in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford 2002) 22. Interestingly, Kamil Mielus talks about the 
introduction of a ‘quasi-duty’ upon non-members. Kamil Mielus, ‘Legal Implications of Palestine’s 
Enhanced Status in the UN General Assembly’ (2014) 3 Polish Review of International and 
European Law 51, 63. The thesis of Rain Liivoja, according to which the provision of Aricle 2.6 
UNC is not aimed at binding non-members, but rather the organisation (to take action against 
non-members) is the one I feel to share. Rain Liivoja (n 136), 595. 
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international legal order, based on sovereign equality, as established by the UN 
Charter, comes from the quasi-universal adherence of states to the UN legal 
system and their inherent force as a community. This circumstance, however, is 
not sufficient to maintain that the UN Charter has universal binding force, in 
abstracto. 
Even if one considers compliance by non-member states as the 
recognition of an international obligation, still this fact wouldn’t imply for the 
Charter to be necessarily considered as a constitution proper. By contrast, the 
only conclusion that one may legitimately draw is that some provisions of the UN 
Charter are considered by the concerned states as customary international law 
(and this is probably the case). 
Moreover, from an institutional point of view, the different functions the 
Charter assigns to various UN bodies could hardly be regarded as a separation 
of powers in the sense of what happens at the domestic level, to wit, the provision 
of a system of law-making, administration and adjudication, whose relationships 
are governed by a correct system of checks and balances. First of all, as many 
commentators have argued, no proper separation of powers could exist within an 
organisation that – by its very nature – does not exert the power and functions of 
a nation state, but a set of limited statutory attributions, provided by in the Charter 
itself. In fact, UN political and institutional bodies could not be compared with 
constitutional organs, usually established by national fundamental laws: in 
particular, the UN General Assembly could hardly be regarded as a legislature, 
since its powers are not properly legislative ones and it does not exert any control 
over the Security Council; indeed, no institutional relationship of trust actually 
exists between the two bodies. In addition, as regards the Security Council, it 
would be very difficult (if not impossible) to classify its resolutions as legislative 
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or executive acts, which makes a clear distinction between the executive and 
legislative powers within the UN somehow blurry. The Security Council itself 
could not be compared to a ‘world government’, since its attributions are generally 
‘limited by subject’ and, more importantly, no proper enforcement mechanism 
exists to compel member states to abide its binding decisions. Last but not least, 
while a number of Courts – either permanent or temporary – do exist within the 
Organisation of the United Nations, the most important being the International 
Court of Justice, none of them can possibly be regarded as the representative of 
the UN judiciary power. In fact, the UN Charter did not provide the Organisation 
with any independent judicial body, in order to review the legitimacy of the acts 
adopted by UN institutions and agencies, as well as member states, vis-à-vis the 
Charter itself.204  
It is not for this chapter to further indulge on the analysis of the many 
distinctions that make the Charter something very far from a national constitution. 
However, a few more words could be spent in order to clarify to what extent the 
adjective ‘constitutional’ may correctly be referred to the Charter and what 
conclusions one could not draw from such an adjective. The UN Charter can 




204 It must be pointed out that the idea of ‘constitution’ may acquire different meanings in legal 
literature, depending on the concept it is set to convey. A quite relevant number of scholars 
(among those who support the ‘constitutional theory’ in international law) adopt relatively thin 
definitions of ‘constitution’, which can easily be satisfied by constituent treaties, such as the UN 
Charter or EU Treaties (see, for example, the ideas of Doyle, Suy and Fassbender, especially in 
‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’, at n 189). Said definitions are rooted on a 
broader conceptual approach, which tend to identify in some key elements (such as the 
establishment a kind of international governance) the ‘indicators of constitutionalism’. Earlier 
constitutional positions (see the ideas of Kopelmanas and Kaeckenbeeck at n 188) were widely 
based on the presence of a common set of fundamental values. I do not disregard these semantic 
differences, but I hold that – in order for a legal instrument to be granted the hierarchical status 
and the overwhelming force of a constitution – broad conceptual similarities are not enough. In 
this respect, Christian Walter offers a quite different perspective on the concept of global 
constitutionalism, describing it as a process in fieri. Christian Walter, ‘International Law in a 
Process of Constitutionalization’ in André Nollkaemper, Janne Elisabeth Nijman (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford 2007) 191. 
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established ex novo a new international organisation, namely the United Nations. 
It surely shows some of the characters of a constitution, since it lays down the 
fundamental principles of the organisation it established and codify the shared 
values all member states are called to respect. Furthermore, alike a constitution, 
it set forth the institutional structure of the new organisation and the distribution 
of powers within such organisation. In order to properly address the Charter as a 
constitutional treaty, however one cannot expect it to be the exact projection of 
national constitution at the international level. What should be outlined – with 
respect to the Charter – is the existence of a constitutional structure, made up of 
fundamental principles and an institutional framework, that does not imply for the 
Charter to enjoy the same power and broad scope of a constitution proper. In 
conclusion, the idea of a constitutional Charter can be acceptable as long as it 
serves to outline its many affinities with national basic laws; however, one should 
always keep in mind that such comparison can only be based on theoretical 
parallelisms, rather than identities on the merits. In fact, what should be rejected 
is a theory that tries to draw from these structural affinities a number of legal 
consequences that can find no basis in positive norms, neither from a literal, nor 
from a teleological point of view. In other words, while it can be assumed that the 
Charter has a constitutional structure and – lato sensu – a constitutional function 
for the United Nations, it is certainly not intended to serve as a constitution under 




205 Nonetheless, the great majority of scholars today rely on a hierarchical idea of international 
law, even if differently nuanced. See, for instance, Paulus and Leiss (n 161), 2112; Fassbender, 
‘The United Natrions Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (n 189); Clarence 
Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International 
Law 401, 436; Aufricht (n 170), 682; Theodor Meron, ‘On Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ 
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(2006) 1900 AJIL 324, 327; Oliver Diggelman, Tilman Altwicker, ‘Is There Something Like a 
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IV. ARTICLE 103 OF THE UN CHARTER AS A SOURCE OF INTERPRETATION: 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EU 
My conclusion leads to abandon the idea of Article 103 UNC as a hierarchy rule 
that was set forth in order to preserve the constitutional role of the Charter, in 
order to address its function as a conflict avoidance clause, even if one of a 
particular species. Indeed, those legal theories that consider Article 103 UNC 
from a hierarchical point of view, tend to describe this provision as something 
very far from general international law (be that conventional or customary), that 
is traditionally grounded on a substantial equality between different sources of 
law, both in terms of rank, and in terms of (reciprocal) effect. In this regard, the 
‘constitutionally-oriented’ reading of Article 103 UNC tend to verticalise the 
relationship between the Charter and other sources of international law, within a 
legal environment that is still mostly characterised by horizontal interactions. 
Reading and interpreting Article 103 UNC as a conflict avoidance clause appears 
to be more coherent with both the textual structure of the provision itself, and the 
ratio legis that inspired its drafting at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 
(keeping in mind the lack of a common position and the relevant number of 
criticalities that flamed the debate around the late Article 20 of the Covenant of 
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As I broadly discussed above, at a closer look, the text of Article 103 UNC does 
neither provide, nor suggest for the Charter to be hierarchically super-ordinated 
to other sources of international law. In fact, under a conceptual point of view it 
does not refer – either directly or indirectly – to the idea of hierarchy, but to the 
broader notion of prevalence, where it is generally accepted that rules of 
prevalence do exist between sources of the same rank. Furthermore – and this 
is a relevant interpretative argument as well – Article 103 UNC does not wish to 
regulate the interaction between the Charter and other sources of international 
law, but rather between the ‘obligations [imposed onto UN members by the] 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement’. This 
particular wording unambiguously suggests that Article 103 UNC was not 
intended to establish a hierarchy between the Charter and other sources of 
international law in abstracto, but to resolve the conflicts that may occur in terms 
of concrete application of such norms and simultaneous performance of the 
obligations they set forth. It was not intended as a strictly legal or procedural norm 
but was rather drafted as a pragmatic political norm (a metanorm), taking a less 
legalistic and more principled approach. As I observed above, the wording of 
Article 103 UNC, gave rise to a number of broad interpretations, which tended to 
identify in the primacy clause a constitutional or hierarchical rule. By contrast, as 
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establishing the hierarchical pre-eminence of the Charter, but simply ensuring its 
prevalence in case of conflict. It is up to member states – on a case by case basis 
– to identify the appropriate legal means in order to pursue the result that Article 
103 UNC clearly represents. Indeed, even those international courts that adopted 
a strictly monist approach with respect to international legal conflicts involving UN 
law (e.g. the General Court of the EU in Kadi I) made no explicit reference to a 
relationship of hierarchy between the UN Charter and other sources of 
international law, which could represent a dangerous precedent to be 
established.  
As I briefly outlined before, the existence of a rule of prevalence does not 
necessarily imply the existence of a corresponding relationship of hierarchy 
between different sources of law. In fact, one may certainly affirm the primacy of 
a norm over another norm, being the two norms placed on a plan of hierarchical 
equality. One would never hold a conventional rule, established between two or 
more states, to be super-ordinate to a general rule of customary law in terms of 
hierarchy: the former could prevail over the latter based on a relationship of 
specialty, still being absolutely equal as for their rank. Furthermore, a 
conventional rule, established between two or more states, can certainly be 
derogated by a subsequent conventional rule having the same object, 
established between said states, without being outranked by the supervening 
norm. These two examples show how the prevalence or primacy of a norm can 
be achieved – in these cases, by means of the classical interpretative principles 
of lex specialis and lex posterior – without resorting to any kind of hierarchy rule. 
The issue of prevalence of a norm over another may well be addressed in 
concreto, as long as a conflict occurs, without having any influence on the 
hierarchy of the sources of international law and – more importantly – without any 
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permanent effect on the legal status (i.e. nullity or annulment) of the recessive 
norm.  
In conclusion, if one considers Article 103 UNC far from any ideological 
constitutionally-oriented preconception, one can hold that the rule it set forth does 
not establish a fixed hierarchy between different sources of international law, with 
the Charter and UN law on the top of the pyramid, but introduces a particular 
conflict avoidance clause, aimed at ensuring the primacy of the obligations 
imposed onto UN member states by the Charter over any other obligations of 
conventional international law, in case a concrete conflict is verified. Article 103 
UNC does not provide for a fixed legal procedure in order for UN law to prevail; 
it rather allows the interpreter to follow the path that better suits each particular 
case.  
As a consequence, the norm that happens to conflict with the Charter may 
be derogated, suspended or simply left unapplied, depending on the particular 
circumstances at stake.  
Ultimately, under a functional point of view, one may adhere to the legal 
theory that considers Article 103 UNC as a particular species of the rule lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, where the UN Charter (and UN law at large) 
should always be regarded as the ‘special rule’, in contrast with other norms of 
conventional international law. Furthermore, this specialty rule is itself a 
conventional rule and not one derived from general international law. One 
eventually understands the maxim Carta pro lege speciali habetur, quae derogate 
legi generali, where the lex specialis is obviously the whole set of UN law, and 
the legi generali is embodied by other international agreements. 
This focused overview on Article 103 UNC led me to show how – in fact – 
no proper relationship of hierarchy can be established between the UN Charter 
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and EU Treaties. Article 103 UNC, often invoked207 to maintain the constitutional 
dimension of the Charter in terms of legal effects, should be, by contrast, properly 
interpreted as a particular species of conflict avoidance clause (i.e. as a rule of 
interpretation). Such rule is capable of ensuring the primacy of UN-derived 
obligations in case a conflict actually occurs with other conventional obligations 
of international law, such as those deriving from EU Treaties, without altering the 
formal and substantial equality of the legal sources. The standpoint I maintained 
above represents – in my view – a strong argument in favour of the nuanced (or 
‘case by case’) approach that I proposed in Chapter 1, when it comes to deal with 
the interaction between UN law and EU law in the delicate field of human rights.  
 Being clear that Article 103 UNC does not curtail the international ‘treaty-
making’ capacity of Member States, neither it imposes to repeal conventional 
norms that might (potentially) conflict with the UN Charter, Member States will be 
called to carefully evaluate – on a case by case basis – the actual compatibility 
between the full performance of their obligations under the UN Charter and their 
obligations under the EU Treaties, to understand whether a joint performance is 
feasible, or whether UN law should prevail over EU-derived obligations. Having 
ultimately rejected the idea of the UN Charter as an international constitution, that 
naturally permeates the autonomous legal systems of European law, I can now 
clearly reaffirm that the EU – in its international legal capacity – is not a subject 
of UN law as its Member States are. Furthermore, neither the drafters of the UN 
Charter imagined making other international organisations directly subject to UN 
law, nor Member States decided to exclusively perform their obligations under 




207 See, for example, Fassbender ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community’ (n 189), 573, Skubiszewski (n 189), 891. 
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subject to UN law). As no proper hierarchy can be established between UN law 
and EU law, an act adopted pursuant to UN law, by a UN body, has in general 
no authority to repeal or derogate an act adopted pursuant to EU law, within the 
EU legal system. 208  As I observed, Member States could either decide to 
implement Security Council resolutions by means of a common action within the 
EU or rather to provide such implementation on their own, depending on the 
compatibility of UN measures with the EU Treaties. If said compatibility can be 
maintained, Member States will be able to take action together within the EU legal 
framework in order to implement UN Security Council Resolutions. In this case 
EU secondary legislation should comply with both UN law and EU law and the 
ECJ should enjoy jurisdiction to exert a full and substantial judicial review. By 
contrast, in case Member States considers UN measures to be incompatible with 
EU law, pursuant to Article 103 UNC, they should perform their obligations 
outside the EU legal framework, whose norms should yield to the primacy of UN 




208 For the sake of clarity, this does not mean that UN law can never have a direct effect within 
the EU legal system. As my dissertation has shown, UN law can be ‘incorporated’ within the EU 
legal system as and to the extent EU law so provides, within the limits of the Treaties and of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
209 Since the conflict between UN law and the EU Treaties is usually limited to one or more specific 
provisions of UN secondary law, one cannot envisage the temporary suspension of the conflicting 
norms in the Treaties, that would be greatly disproportioned in relation to the particular case and 
would bring along more damages than advantages. With regard to derogation, looking at general 
principles of international law, it may properly apply in case the two conflicting treaties involve the 























UN BLACKLISTS AS A CASE STUDY: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE 
PERSPECTIVES 
I. Introduction – II. Before Kadi I: a decade of one-way monism – III. After Kadi I: 
learning from the EU lesson? – IV. Chances for a multilateral approach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As I reach the third and last stage of this research, I have been passing through 
an extensive analysis of some debated issues, brought forward by the interaction 
between the UN and the EU legal systems in the field of human rights. I first tried 
to address these problems from a European perspective – and from the ECJ’s 
point of view in particular – following the judicial path of the well-known Kadi I 
case, from the General Court to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Within both judgments, which lied on diametrically opposed theoretical 
backgrounds (being the monist theory for the General Court and the dualist 
theory for the ECJ), I identified a number of shortcomings and open questions 
that brought me to consider the need to overcome such classical dichotomies, in 
favour of a more nuanced approach to the problem, capable of taking into account 
both the specificity of the European Union as an international organisation and 
the pressing need not to subvert the international legal order. In my opinion, a 
long-term approach could not be properly developed by relying alternatively onto 
European law or UN law (rectius, struggling to establish a rule of hierarchy 
between the two legal orders), but should take into account the reciprocal position 
of the two within the ‘broader picture’ of international law. It is – ultimately – a 
matter of maintaining some kind of coherence within the international legal 
system, which unilateral (or ideological) points of view risk fatally undermining. 
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On the one hand, the unique dimension of the EU as an international 
organisation, with its own ‘autonomous’ legal system, cannot be ignored. Over 
the years, the efforts spent by the majority of Member States towards a ‘more 
perfect union’, paired with the judicial activism of the ECJ, led to an apparently 
irreversible cross-contamination between national legislations and EU law, where 
the former represented the sources of common constitutional values (rectius, the 
‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’, in the words of the ECJ) 
and the latter provided an overwhelming source of harmonisation and 
standardisation in terms of primary legislation (even though the widespread 
popular belief that set the percentage of EU-derived sources of law within 
domestic legal systems at 80% is devoid of any serious statistical basis). In this 
regard, the increasing number of acts adopted by means of regulations – that are 
directly applicable within the territory of each Member State – after the Treaty of 
Lisbon provided a remarkable contribution. It is quite obvious, as a consequence, 
that the so-called EU core values, i.e. those principles and values that are 
common to the constitutional traditions of Member States, passed through the 
evolutionary interpretation of the ECJ, are nowadays a primary source of 
constitutional interpretation, adopted by many constitutional courts across 
Europe, when it comes to deal with fundamental rights and civil liberties. On the 
other hand, however, the original nature of EU law as part of the international 
legal system cannot be entirely forgotten or set aside by reason of the 
constitutional cloak EU institutions, and the ECJ in particular, have vested 
themselves with over the years.  
On the UN side, at least two key elements should be taken into account. 
First of all, as I had the chance to argue within the second Chapter, the 
constitutional dimension of the UN Charter should not be over-emphasised. While 
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it does present the characteristics of a constituent legal instrument, it nonetheless 
cannot be regarded as an international constitution, establishing a fixed hierarchy 
of norms within the international legal order. Apart from over-enthusiastic and 
philosophically-oriented interpretations, the Charter cannot be interpreted but 
coherently with the intentions of its drafters (i.e. the founding members of the UN) 
and with its original rationale, which were very far from any attempt of 
constitutionalising the international legal order and limiting UN member states’ 
legitimate sovereignty and treaty-making powers. As discussed above, Article 
103 UNC – invoked by a number of scholars as a pivotal hierarchy rule – should, 
conversely, be read as a conflict-avoidance clause (even if provided with a 
particularly binding force, according to Article 30 VCLT) that establishes the rules 
of precedence between different sources of international law. Secondly, one 
should take into due account that the UN itself is grounded on a set of shared 
principles, outlined within Chapter I of the Charter, which include (Article 1.3 
UNC) ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all’. To this extent, each and any act of UN bodies should be 
regarded and interpreted in such a manner as to be consistent with fundamental 
human rights, including Security Council Resolutions adopted pursuant to 
Chapter VII UNC. This element can be a crucial one along the path of my 
reasoning, if one considers ‘internal coherence’ the cornerstone of any legal 
system, or at least one of them. 
Indeed, the legislator of the UN Charter (i.e. UN member states) certainly 
expected the Security Council to act consistently with the basic principles and 
purposes of the Organisation, set forth by Articles 1 and 2 UNC, as consistency 
with such principles was set as implicit condition of legitimacy for UN secondary 
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legislation.210 However – as the ECJ correctly pointed out in Kadi I – the UN legal 
system provides no judicial and independent review of secondary UN law (such 
as Security Council Resolutions), in order to assess its consistency with the 
Charter.211 The legitimate answer to this ‘lack’ of judicial review, though, cannot 
come from the activism of supranational or regional courts (such as the ECJ 
itself), but should be sought within the UN system, looking at the international 
legal order as a whole and preserving its coherence, while enhancing the positive 
interactions between its different components.  
In this respect (to summarise some of the key points of the previous 
Chapters), (a) the EU is not under a direct and immediate obligation to perform 
UN Security Council Resolutions, nor Article 103 UNC has the similar effect of 
establishing a proper hierarchy between UN and EU law; (b) nonetheless, EU 
Member States may consider it appropriate (given the competences they chose 
to transfer to the EU) to perform UN-derived obligations by means of EU 
secondary legislation. In any case, however, (i) EU legislation adopted in order 
to implement UN Security Council Resolutions has to comply with the EU Treaties 
(including constitutional traditions common to Member States) and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by the ECJ, (ii) if such compliance 
is not feasible, pursuant to Article 351 TFEU, Member States remain at any effect 
capable of fully implementing UN measures by means of domestic law (and duty 




210 Article 24.2 UNC explicitly provides that, while discharging its duties, the UN Security Council 
‘shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’, which include 
the promotion of human rights.  
211 The absence of an independent judicial review of secondary legislation within the UN legal 
system is not surprising, if one considers the rationale behind and the origins of the Organisation, 
mainly grounded on diplomatic and inter- governmental relationships between Member States. 
Given the very structure of the Security Council – in particular – and its initial focus, the need for 
a third-party assessment on the legitimacy of its decision was simply not perceived (and probably 
not wanted at all) by the drafters of the UN Charter.  
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not only a procedural one) to assess the legitimacy of EU secondary legislation, 
even if it is adopted to implement UN Security Council Resolutions, that should 
be struck down if they violates fundamental human rights.  
Given all these assumptions, one further step is still missing in order to 
close the circle of my reasoning. As I observed above, Article 1.3 UNC set the 
promotion and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom as one of the 
crucial purposes of the Organisation. The open wording of this clause allows it to 
be interpreted consistently with the evolution of the international legal doctrine on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights onwards. In fact, international practice clearly shows how the idea 
of human rights and fundamental freedom has constantly evolved over the years 
towards a more inclusive and protective stance, thanks to the actions of a number 
of players, which include several UN bodies and agencies, supranational courts 
(such as the European Court of Human Rights), regional courts, such as the ECJ, 
and constitutional courts. The cross-contamination between different legal 
orders, both horizontally and vertically, led a number of scholars to talk about an 
emerging ‘multilevel system of protection’ for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that tend towards a real globalisation. In this context, the EU (and the 
ECJ in particular) and EU Member States (with their long-established 
constitutional courts) has emerged as forerunners in terms of reliability and 
accountability, often ‘raising the bar of protection’ and leading the way of legal 
interpretation.  
As regards the UN Security Council, its relationship with human rights has 
certainly changed since its establishment, along with the evolution in the scope 
of its action. In particular, the role of the UN Security Council has evolved over 
the years in order to include protection of human rights, at large, within the 
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concept of ‘maintaining international peace and security’. 212  The subject is 
definitely wide and it is not for this work to deal with it extensively; some brief 
remarks, though, can add a few important elements to my analysis. 
 Interestingly, over the years, protection of human rights has become one 
of the policy areas which the UN Security Council has devoted itself the most, 
being eager to intervene in international crises, including by resorting to 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 213  However, while 
important steps have been taken by the Security Council to set higher standards 
of protection for human rights at the international level and to confront violations 
perpetrated by state and non-state actors, less attention was paid at the UN level 
to the protection of such rights ‘within’ UN Security Council measures. 
At first, it would be legitimate to maintain that analogous standards should 
by applied by the UN Security Council both in relation to third-party actions, and 
in relation to its own policies. Despite that, especially with regard to the second 
side of this problem (i.e. protecting Human Rights within UN Security Council 
policies) a clear identification of these standards is far from being easy.  
Looking at the UN Charter, the reference contained in Article 1.3 UNC (in 




212 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Remarks by Vera Gowlland-Debbas’, in (2009) 103 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 199. This view is shared by Jared 
Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, ‘Evolution of the Security Council Engagement on Human 
Rights’, in Jared Genser, Bruno Stagno Ugarte (eds), The United Nations Security Council in the 
Age of Human Rights (Cambridge 2014) 3, 7-24, and Daphna Shraga, ‘The Security Council and 
Human Rights-From Discretion to Promote to Obligation to Protect’, in Bardo Fassbender (ed), 
Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (Oxford 
2011) 8, 11. These last two works, in particular, provide interesting insight on how the practice of 
the UN Security Council have evolved since the sixties, from considering respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as a matter of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ (and therefore excluded by the 
jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, under Article 2.7 UNC), to one of the Council’s most 
important area of intervention. 
213 See Genser and Stagno Ugarte (n 212), 14-24. 
214 Article 24.2 UNC reads as follows: ‘[i]n discharging [its] duties the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted 
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adapting to the evolutions that the concept of human rights have encountered in 
international law.215 From a procedural point of view, however, it remains unclear 
what possible consequences might be drawn in case the UN Security Council 
allegedly acted ultra vires and illegitimately sacrificed human rights.216 The idea 
that such acts could be considered as voidable would imply the existence of a 
body, vested with the authority to declare them void. Plainly, this is not the 
case.217  
In addition, international case-law offers no particular support in relation to 
this issue. When it was confronted with the problem, the European Court of 
Human rights variously avoided it by resorting either to a peculiar presumption of 
compliance of UN Security Council acts with human rights218 or by maintaining 
the existence of a ‘margin of appreciation’ recognised to UN member states in 
implementing UN Security Council resolutions, in order to avoid violations of 
human rights.219  
The somewhat ‘extreme’ idea to consider those acts null and void,220 




to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, 
and XII’. 
215 In this sense, see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al Jedda v United 
Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23, paras. 100-102. Contra, and in favour of a limited reference to the 
standard of protection that existed at the time the UN Charter was drafted, Orakhelashvili (n 84).	
216 A further problem is brought along by the fact that respect for human rights is not always an 
absolute clause: as states are entitled by a number of instruments of international law to adopt 
derogatory measures in case of public emergency, so should be the UN Security Council. See, 
in this respect, Dapo Akande, ‘The Security Council and Human Rights: What is the role of Art. 
103 of the Charter?’ EJIL:Talk!, 30 March 2009, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-security-
council-and-human-rights-what-is-the-role-of-art-103-of-the-charter/. 
217 See Rosalyn Higgins, Philippa Webb, Dapo Akande, Sandesh Sivakumaran, James Sloan, 
Oppenheim’s International Law. United Nations (vol. 1, Oxford 2017), 421, 422 especially at n 70. 
218 This is the position adopted in Al Jedda (n 215). 
219 This is the general argument of the Court in Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18, para. 
185.	
220 A theory supported by Dapo Akande, ‘International Organisations’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), 
International Law (Oxford 2014) 248, 262 and, to some extent, by Von Bodgandy (n 84). This is 
also the separate opinion of Judge Morelli in Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, 222.  
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pick’ resolutions that they are willing to comply with, and discard others on the 
basis of alleged human rights violations. 
From a European perspective, one may legitimately wonder why ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’ referred to in Article 1.3 UNC should ever be 
considered as something different from (or less than) ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ as protected by the EU Treaties, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and common constitutional traditions of Member States. On 
the one hand, it may be observed that EU Member States are also members of 
the United Nations, and some of them gave an invaluable contribution to the 
establishment and development of both Organisations. This shared membership 
should lead EU Member States to act within the UN in a way that is coherent with 
their commitments under the EU Treaties and with their own constitutions. On the 
other hand, Article 351.2 TFEU prompts Member States to assist each other and 
act jointly (‘adopt a common attitude’) to eliminate the incompatibilities between 
the EU Treaties and other international agreements, which they are a party of. 
Such provision of the EU Treaties could probably be a substantial part of the 
answer to the problem of the interaction (and conflict) between the UN and EU 
legal regimes in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.221 While the 




221 This provision can be easily paired with Article 34 TEU, according to which ‘Member States 
shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They 
shall uphold the Union’s positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organise this coordination […]. Member States which are 
also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member 
States and the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the 
Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of 
the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter’. 
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system, conversely, Member States are bound to engage within the UN222 in 
order to influence and shape the policies of the Organisation and render them 
coherent with the level of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
enshrined in the EU Treaties, as interpreted by the ECJ, which include common 
constitutional traditions.223  
This solution is ultimately a political and diplomatic one, very far from the 
judicial model of protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
embodied by the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and national 
constitutional courts. Nonetheless, it seems today to be the only viable path to 
ensure the coherence of the international legal system at large, enabling EU 
Member States to comply with their obligations under the UN Charter, on the one 
side, and favouring global adherence to the higher standards of protection for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, applied within the EU, on the other.     
As a consequence, the following paragraphs will revert to the case of 
individual sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, in the fight against 
international terrorism, analysing – in parallel – the evolution of UN secondary 
legislation (namely Security Council Resolution) and the corresponding acts 
adopted at the EU level, in order to implement such measures. My analysis will 
focus on the main ‘shortcomings’ of UN measures, vis-à-vis the principles 
established by the ECJ in Kadi I, and the indirect effect this judgment had on UN 
legislation adopted afterwards, with the aim of understanding to what extent EU 




222 As Vera Gowlland-Debbas maintained, a viable settlement of the unsolved problem of human 
rights standards to be respected by the UN Security Council must be pursued within the UN legal 
system. See Gowlland-Debbas (n 212), 202. 
223 See Machiko Kanetake, ‘The Interfaces between the National and International Rule of Law: 
The Case of UN Targeted Sanctions’ (2012) 1 INTERFACES Research Paper, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188915, 27, 34.  
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could better achieve the result of eliminating incompatibilities between the EU 
Treaties and UN law. In this respect, Paragraph II will analyse the pre-Kadi I 
scenario, characterised by an evident predominance of the UN ‘securitarian’ 
stance, plainly and uncritically followed by EU institutions, and introduce the EU’s 
own model of individual sanctions. Paragraph III will outline some relevant 
precedents to Kadi I, with a particular focus on the crucial role played by the ECJ 
in fine-tuning the EU blacklists system, in order to ensure its compatibility with 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EU 
Treaties. Subsequently, it will address the post-Kadi I evolution of UN policies, 
towards a stronger protection of the individual, both from a procedural and from 
a substantial point of view. Taking stock of said positive evolution, my analysis 
will try to understand the influence of European stances within the UN, with the 
purpose of understanding – in Paragraph IV – whether the ‘political solution’ that 
I sketched above could ultimately lead to multilateral approach to the protection 
of human rights, settling conflicts between the UN and EU legal systems.  
II. BEFORE KADI I: A DECADE OF ONE-WAY MONISM 
Differently from what one may imagine, the commitment of the UN towards the 
prevention and suppression of terrorism financing dates back to 1999, well before 
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Security Council Resolution 1267224 
can legitimately be considered the ‘mother’ of a well-developed series of 
Resolutions, aimed – inter alia – at addressing the growing amount of financial 
resources available to (and flowing towards) terrorist organisations and so 




224 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999. 
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America (that hold a permanent seat in the Security Council), Res. 1267 was set 
to provide adequate countermeasures to two terrorist attacks that took place in 
Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar el Salaam (Tanzania) in 1998, against US diplomatic 
missions. While no certain evidence was provided – at the time – in order to 
identify those responsible of these two attacks, nonetheless Res. 1267 shows 
how the international community, and particularly the States seating in the 
Security Council,225 considered Usama bin-Laden and his Al-Qaeda network, 
sheltered by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a serious threat to international 
peace and security (in relation to the Taliban regime, early Resolution 1214226 
had already expressed serious concerns, due to the ‘deteriorating political, 
military and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan’).  
At this point, it must be briefly pointed out that the power to impose 
sanctions – vested in the Security Council by Article 41 UNC – and the 
mechanism of ‘international security’ established by Chapter VII UNC, as a whole 
were intended by the drafters of the Charter (at the San Francisco Conference) 
to deal with primary actors in international law: i.e. States. The political-diplomatic 
system set up within the Charter, in order to confront actual or potential threats 
to international peace and security (once again widely based on the principle of 
unanimity and characterised by strong veto powers), the very nature, the 
membership and the functioning of the Security Council itself, clearly reflect the 
rationale that lies behind this set of provisions.227 Nonetheless, since its early 




225 The Security Council was at the time composed as follows: China, France, Russia, United 
Kingdom and the United States as permanent members; Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, 
Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, The Netherlands and Slovenia as Non-permanent members. 
226 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of 8 December 1998. 
227 See Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge 2007) 
60-78. 
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(‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall […] decide what measures 
shall be taken […] to maintain or restore international peace and security) and 
Article 41.1 UNC (‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions […]’) so 
as to include non-State actors within the group of potential targets.228 While 
almost any resolution adopted under Chapter VII UNC, be it addressed to States 
or non-State entities, indirectly affected individuals, further innovation was 
brought along with Res. 1267 and especially with Resolution 1333.229 On the one 
side, these Resolutions directly targeted (among others) Usama bin-Laden, both 
in its capacity as the leader of Al-Qaeda and as a natural person; on the other 
side, Resolutions 1267 and 1333 were not solely intended to compel a State or 
non-State entity to comply with Security Council’s requests or recommendations 
– so removing or reducing the threat to international peace and security – but 
were rather maily structured as a set of potentially permanent measures, aimed 
at disrupting the targeted State or non-State entity (so directly removing the threat 
to international peace and security) in spite of their widely expected non-
compliance. It is not for this work to indulge on the procedural and substantial 




228 See Noah Birkhauser, ‘Sanctions of the Security Council against Individuals – Some Human 
Rights Problems’, European Society of International Law, available at http://www.esil-
sedi.org/english/pdf/Birkhauser.PDF, 2; Thomas Biersteker, Sue Eckert, ‘Strengthening 
Targeted Sanctions through Fair and Clear Procedures’, Watson Institute Publications, 2006, 
available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/strengthening-targeted-sanctions-
through-fair-and-clear-procedures, 7; Scott Vesel ‘Combating the financing of terrorism 
while protecting human rights: a dilemma?’, in Mark Pieth, Daniel Thelesklaf, Radha Ivory (eds) 
Countering Terrorist Financing. The Practicioner’s Point of View (Peter Lang 2009) 205, 212. For 
a problematic approach to the general issue, see Davorin Lapas, ‘Sanctioning Non-state Entities’ 
(2010) 81 Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 99, and also Maria-Lydia Bolani ‘Security Council 
Sanctions on Non-State Entities and Individuals’ (2003) 56 Revue Hellénique de Droit 
International 401.  
229 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 of 19 December 2000, analised hereafter. 
	 143 
However, these particular features are of significant importance for the sake of 
my research and need to be kept in mind, since (a) they characterise (with slightly 
different accents, over the years) any resolution adopted, to date, by the Security 
Council in this field and (b) they represent the ultimate reason for some of the 
criticalities and inconsistencies that will be  encountered in a while.  
a. Origins of blacklisting: Resolution 1267 and the first European reaction 
Turning to the substance of Res. 1267, it identified two areas of intervention and 
seek to establish dedicate measures for the both of them. First of all, it intended 
to limit logistic capabilities of the Taliban (and in general their possibility to move 
from or towards the Afghan territories under their control). To this extent, it 
imposed onto UN member states an obligation to ‘[d]eny permission for any 
aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated 
by or on behalf of the Taliban’,230 in order to paralise the ability of high-ranking 
members of the Taliban regime abroad to return to Afghanistan and – in parallel 
– to curtail their range of action outside the Afghan territory. Second, it intended 
to strike down, as far as possible, the economic and financial resources of the 
Taliban regime and to impair its commercial activities, be they legal or illegal. In 
this regard, it provided for ‘funds and other financial resources, including funds 
derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or 
by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban’ to be promptly frozen 
within any UN Member State.231 From a procedural point of view, the Resolution 
established a Committee within the Security Council (the ‘Sanctions Committee’), 




230 Res. 1267, para 4(a). 
231 Res. 1267, para 4(b). 
	 144 
be banned from take-off and landing as long as the funds and properties to be 
‘frozen’. The same Sanctions Committee was also vested with the power to 
examine, on a case-by-case basis, any request for exemption in relation to the 
adopted measures, that might be filed for humanitarian reasons only, and to 
perform periodical reviews in order to assess (i) the impact of the imposed 
sanctions and (ii) the level of compliance with the same sanctions.232  
In the aftermath of the adoption of Res. 1267, the EU responded on 15 
November 1999 with Common Position 1999/727/CFSP. 233  The Common 
Position in question, lapidarily stating that ‘[a]ction by the Community is needed 
to implement’ sanctions imposed by the Security Council234 (and without much 
digression on the legal basis that required such action by the Community), simply 
committed Member States to adopt legislation in order to ban ‘[f]lights to and from 
the European Community carried out by aircraft owned, leased or operated by or 
on behalf of the Taliban under the conditions set out in [UN Security Council Res. 
1267]’235 and to freeze ‘[f]unds and other financial resources held abroad by the 
Taliban under the conditions set out in’ the same Resolution.236 Having regard to 
Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, on a proposal from the Commission, on 14 
February 2000 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) 337/2000,237 with a view to 
provide the maximum legal certainty, as well as uniform implementation of Res. 
1267 within Member States. In terms of legal basis, the Council resorted to Article 




232 Res. 1267, para 6. 
233  Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP of 15 November 1999 concerning restrictive 
measures against the Taliban [1999] OJ L294/1.  
234 Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, Whereas 2. 
235 Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, Article 1. 
236 Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, Article 2. 
237 Council Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 of 14 February 2000 concerning a flight ban and a 
freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan [2000] OJ 
L43/1. 
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joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union 
relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the 
Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations 
with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent 
measures’. In this case, the necessity for the Community to intervene in lieu of 
Member States was justified by the need to preserve a fair and uniform 
competition within the Internal Market. As regards the merits, the Regulation 
looked merely reproductive of the Resolution it was set to implement, written in 
the broad and often vague register proper of the Security Council, without any 
noteworthy addition. It provided for aircrafts that were listed by the Sanctions 
Committee to be banned from taking-off and landing within the territory of the 
Community238 and for any funds and other financial resources identified by the 
same Sanctions Committee to be immediately frozen.239 The lists of aircrafts 
targeted by the flight ban and the funds and financial resources to be frozen were 
transcribed into two annexes, which the Commission was tasked with updating 
by means of a delegated regulation, based on the decisions of the Sanctions 
Committee, ‘for reasons of expediency’. 240  As regards exemptions, the 
Regulation further clarified that the only body empowered to grant ad hoc 
exemptions from established sanctions was the Sanctions Committee itself, 
under the conditions set forth by Res. 1267, with no discretion for European 
institutions to exert any kind of review. Notably, the Regulation specified that 
requests for exemptions should have been addressed (by any affected individual) 




238 Regulation (EC) 337/2000, Article 5.  
239 Regulation (EC) 337/2000, Article 3. 
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States’, a list of which was also attached.241 The latter point is particularly relevant 
for the sake of my analysis, since it underlines the rigid procedural stance 
adopted both by the Security Council and by the Council. Indeed, as I noticed 
above, the Security Council was (in the idea of the San Francisco Conference) 
established to deal with States at a political and diplomatic level. It was, as a 
consequence, particularly uncomfortable and unfit to deal with non-State entities 
and individuals in a direct (not politically mediated) relationship, administering 
complex complaint procedures. Therefore, a choice was made to let Member 
States deal with individual procedures aimed at evaluating any request for 
exemption, in order to submit it to the Committee. The effects of this choice on 
the actual chance to obtain an exemption need no further explanation. 
The measures in question – as adopted by the Security Council and then 
implemented by the Council – raised significant concerns in terms of protection 
of individuals’ rights and freedoms, both from a substantial and from a procedural 
point of view.242 First of all, the flight ban imposed on certain aircrafts owned 
and/or operated by the Taliban directly affected freedom of movement. While a 
right to ‘free movement’  beyond States’ borders is generally not recognised at 
the international level, still preventing a wide number of aircrafts (both civilian and 
military ones) from taking from and landing in UN member states could indirectly 
impair the right to life and health (if one thinks about the need to fly from a country 
to another in order to receive appropriate medical care) of innocent individuals 




241 Regulation (EC) 337/2000, Article 6. 
242 For a clear synopsis of such concerns – at the time – see August Reinisch ‘The Action of the 
European Union to Combat International Terrorism’, in Andrea Bianchi (ed) Enforcing 
International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart 2004) 119, 132. See also, in general, Imelda 
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encountered unjust hardships in reuniting with their families, both in Afghanistan 
and abroad. Second, the administrative freezing of funds and other economic 
resources (such as immovable properties) obviously limited the right to property 
and may have brought along a number of problems as for the guarantee of 
everyday essential needs for individuals. From a procedural point of view, it is not 
clear – and it was not ever disclosed – on what basis the Sanction Committee 
should have selected the aircrafts to be prevented from flying as well as the funds 
and other economic resources to be frozen. Individuals and entities affected by 
the sanctions were neither noticed in advance that evidence existed in order to 
justify the adoption of restrictive measures against them, nor allowed to directly 
contest such evidence. Indeed, no evidentiary rule was provided at all. The right 
to a due process of law, when it comes to measures that limits individual rights, 
was further restricted by the absence of any form of recourse, judicial or 
administrative review, in order to have sanctions lifted, in whole or in part. As I 
outlined above, if a limited number of exemptions did exist on humanitarian 
grounds, still the procedure to request such exemptions was devoid of any proper 
guarantee and let to the discretion of any UN Member State to receive individual 
demands, assess their grounds and worthwhileness, and decide to submit them 
(or not) to the Sanctions Committee.  
Although these issues were particularly clear, by Regulation (EC) 
337/2000 the Council chose not to address any and opted for a straightforward 
transposition of UN measures within Community law, so embracing a particularly 
orthodox monist position, in relation to the relationship between UN and 
European law. In fact, while in February 2000 the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Right had yet to come, still UN measures overtly conflicted with established 
principles of Community and EU law (one may refer to the Article F TEU – in its 
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post-Amsterdam version – according to which ‘1. The Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law’). Nevertheless, these problems remained confined to a scholarly 
debate and very less perceived as material conflicts between UN and Community 
law, at least until the advent of the ‘war on terror’, in late 2001.243 In fact, some 
scholar disputed the very power of the Council to adopt sanctions against non-
State entities (including individuals), pursuant to Article 301 EC, that allowed the 
Council to ‘interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with 
one or more third countries’. In particular, a literal argument and one based on 
ratio legis were spent to contest the over-extension of the Council’s foreign policy 
attributions, resorting to the so-called theory of implied powers. 244  Even this 
formal and procedural argument, however well founded, had little grip on 
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b. Resolution 1333: targeting Usama bin-Laden 
The adoption and subsequent implementation of Res. 1267, described above, 
did not actually prevent other serious attacks to be performed against US targets 
and urged the Security Council to widen the scope of its action, aiming not only 
at the Taliban regime, but also at Usama bin-Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.   
On 19 December 2000, right after the suicide bombing of the American 
destroyer USS Cole in the Aden Harbour, the Security Council took further steps 
to reinforce the sanctions adopted by means of Res. 1267. Res. 1333, inter alia, 
(a) imposed a general embargo on the transfer or sale of arms and other military 
equipment to the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control (as designated by 
the Sanctions Committee), including technical advice, assistance, training and 
similar services;245 (b) urged a general reduction (in terms of number and level of 
staff) of diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime;246 (c) imposed the closure 
of any Taliban office in the territory of UN member states, including any office of 
the Afghan airline company; 247  (d) extended the freezing of funds and any 
financial asset, already provided by Res. 1267, including ‘Usama bin Laden and 
individual and entities associated with him as designated by the’ Sanctions 
Committee, members of Al-Qaida as well as any other individual or entity 
associated with bin-Laden or the Al-Qaeda network, and provided for the 
Sanctions Committee to maintain an updated list of such individuals and entities 
‘based on information provided by States and regional organisations’; 248  (e) 
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headed to land in the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control (including the 
prohibition to overfly the territory of UN member states) and imposed a general 
travel ban for any senior officials of the Taliban.249 The Security Council also 
decided to instruct the UN Secretary General and the Sanctions Committee to 
periodically review and report the humanitarian implications of the measures 
imposed by Resolutions 1267 and 1333.250  
The reaction of EU was timely: Common Position 2001/154/CFSP,251 
adopted on 26 February 2001 (partially amended Common Position 
96/746/CFSP, adopted in 1996 to impose a first embargo on the transfer and sale 
of arms to Afghanistan, and) committed Member States to implement any of the 
new measures established by the Security Council. Council Regulation (EC) 
467/2001 252  was further adopted on 6 March 2001 to turn Res. 1333 into 
Community law. The last Regulation repealed previous Regulation (EC) 
337/2000 and integrated into a single regulatory text both the provisions of 
Resolution 1267, as amended by Resolution 1333, and further measures 
introduced by the latter. Just like it had done before, the Council did not introduce 
any substantial specification to the measures adopted by the UN Security Council 
– in order to overcome some of the criticalities outlined above – nor it provided 
for any change in terms of the exemption procedure, that remained substantially 
the same. Even in this case, the Commission was empowered to amend and 
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251  Council Common Position 2001/154/CFSP of 26 February 2001 concerning additional 
restrictive measures against the Taliban and amending Common Position 96/746/CFSP [2001] 
OJ L57/1. 
252 Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods 
and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and 
other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 337/2000 [2001] OJ L67/1. 
	 151 
funds and financial resources were to be frozen, on the basis of the periodical 
updates performed by the Sanctions Committee.  
Regulation (EC) 467/2001 marked no change in the monist attitude of the 
European Council towards UN law and its implementation, notwithstanding the 
number of critical issues that the initial set of measures against the Taliban had 
raised. Indeed, this second round of measures tightened the sanctions regime 
under at least two points of view: first, the scope of the flight ban was substantially 
broadened, switching from a prohibition of take-off and landing imposed onto 
certain planes owned or operated by the Taliban, to a general prohibition for any 
plane taking-off from or heading towards the territory of Afghanistan under 
Taliban control, to take-off, land or fly-over in the territory of the Community, with 
a view to disrupting airline connections between Member States and Afghanistan; 
second, the freezing of funds and economic resources (that was initially targeted 
to the Taliban and to individual or entities linked to the Taliban regime) was 
substantially extended to the person of Usama bin-Laden and to any individual 
or entity associated with the same bin-Laden and with the Al-Qaeda network. It 
should be noted, in addition, that Res. 1333 called upon UN member states (and 
regional organisations) to cooperate with the Sanctions Committee in order to 
review and update the list of individuals and entities whose assets should be 
frozen, id est inviting UN member states to play an active role in gathering 
information on potential affiliates or supporting entities of bin-Laden and the Al-
Qaeda network and providing it to the Sanctions Committee.253 Such provision 
offered Member States a viable alternative to criminal prosecution – very far from 
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agencies in collecting secret evidence against individual, with few or no chances 
to be challenged in a court of law. It is quite clear how this form of administrative 
and concealed procedure (without any chance of actual participation, even ex 
post facto, of concerned individuals), alternative to ordinary prosecution in a due 
process of law, introduced a further element of conflict between Member States 
duties under the UN Charter and their obligations under the EU Treaties. In fact, 
not only were the Member States obliged to implement measures adopted by the 
Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, they were also directly involved 
in establishing the factual assumptions (or presumptions) for such measures to 
be taken, de facto introducing a permanent derogation to the presumption of 
innocence. To this latter extent, in particular, a key element of the Resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council is their duration. As a matter of fact, provisional 
security measures that may temporarily restrict individual rights and freedoms, 
adopted at the administrative level, are legitimate – under certain conditions – 
according to EU law and constitutional principles common to Member States. 
Resolutions 1267 and 1333, by contrast, introduced measures that were, at least 
in theory, potentially permanent, since their termination was conditioned to 
compliance by the Taliban with a number of requests of the UN and the United 
States in particular (i.e. surrendering Usama bin-Laden and ceasing to host the 
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This line of action by the UN Security Council is even more noteworthy, if 
one considers that the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, clearly moved towards a criminal-law approach to the phenomenon 
of terrorism financing (to be treated as an offence) that at least partially 
contrasted, even on the application level, with the stance of the Security Council.  
c. The aftermath of 9/11: Resolution 1373 and the EU’s own blacklists 
As it is sadly known, the efforts spent by the UN Security Council in contrasting 
operational and financial capabilities of Usama bin-Laden, the Al-Qaeda network 
and the Taliban regime did not prevent the barbaric 9/11 attacks against the 
United States of America. The day after the attacks, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1368,255 which condemned the attacks, and declared them 
‘a threat to international peace and security’. On 28 September 2001, the Security 
Council took further steps towards the reinforcement of its counter-terrorism 
system of sanctions, by means of Resolution 1373.256 This Resolution represents 
a milestone 257  in the evolution of the Security Council approach to the 
phenomenon of terrorism for at least a couple of main reasons, first the 
Resolution switched from a subjective approach to the problem (i.e. targeting the 
Taliban, Usama bin-Laden and the Al-Qaeda network) to a global approach, 
aimed at confronting any form of terrorism; second, the Resolution (following the 
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Terrorism and other international instruments aimed at combating terrorism in 
general), provided obligations onto Member States to introduce criminal 
sanctions against terrorists and those who provided funds to terrorists, thus 
opening the door to a sort of ‘second track’ in the fight against terrorism, which is 
not alternative but additional to the sanctions regime. In particular (and among 
other provisions), Resolution 1373 imposed onto UN member states (a) a duty to 
freeze ‘all funds and other financial assets or economic resources of person who 
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the 
commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by such persons; and of persons or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction 
of such persons and entities’, including funds that may derive from properties;258 
(b) a duty to criminalise the ‘wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly 
or indirectly, of funds […], with the intention that […] or in the knowledge that they 
are to be used in order to carry out terrorist acts’;259 and (c) a duty to prohibit any 
person or entity to make any funds, financial assets or economic resources 
available to the same individuals or entities whose funds were due to be frozen.260 
In addition, the same Resolution established a new Committee within the Security 
Council, consisting of all its members, in order to review the implementation of 
the new measures (the ‘Antiterrorism Committee’)261 and further pushed on the 
importance of exchange of information (i.e. of intelligence information) 262 
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terrorist acts.263 It should be carefully noted that Res. 1373 neither replaced, nor 
repealed, the sanctions regime established by the Security Council through 
Resolutions 1267 and 1333, which continued to be in full force, along with the 
Sanctions Committee. Furthermore, Resolution 1373 did not provide itself a 
proper definition of ‘terrorist acts’ – leaving the notion open to interpretation – and 
neither established a system of lists in order to identify those individuals and 
entities whose funds should have been promptly frozen by UN member states, 
nor provided for any pre-determined exemptions (including any procedure to 
request or grant such exemptions).  
The broader scope of Res. 1373, together with its partially different (one 
could argue, less self-executing) approach, left the European Community a wider 
leeway in order to give effect to UN measures within the territory of Member 
States. Particularly, the provision of an open clause with regard to the activities 
and conducts to be targeted and the absence of any pre-compiled blacklist of 
individuals and entities, allowed the European Community to develop its own 
system of measures for preventing and countering terrorism financing. In fact, on 
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and Regulation (EC) 2580/2001, 265  which established a complete European 
system of financial sanctions. Community legislation in question – first of all – 
introduced the very first European definitions of ‘terrorist act’266 and ‘terrorist 
group’;267 while the former definition was still quite ample and purpose-oriented 
(including a list of behaviours and offence that would have been classified as 
‘terrorist acts’ if committed in order to reach a terrorist purpose), still it represented 
a substantial step forward taken by the European Community in relation to the 
UN practice, and not the only one. First of all, inclusion of individual or entities in 
the European blacklist could be ordered only ‘on the basis of precise information 
or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision has been taken by 
a competent authority in respect of the [individual or entity] concerned’ and such 
decision be based on ‘credible evidence or clues’;268 while said decision should 
not necessarily be a final one, the definition of ‘competent authority’ was limited 
to judicial authorities, with the only exception of cases where judicial authorities 
were not competent to adopt a decision according to national law.269 Second, the 
Council provided for specific safeguards in order to avoid cases of mistaken 
identity, by demanding each name included in the European blacklist to be 
‘appended’ with sufficient particulars to ‘permit effective identification of specific 
human beings, legal persons, entities or bodies’. 270  Third, a periodical 
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ensure that solid grounds existed for maintaining any name on the list.271 On the 
one hand, the establishment of a European framework for financial sanctions 
introduced some improvements in terms of protection for individual rights that 
must be taken into account: the effort to provide a definition of terrorist act, to rely 
preferably on judicial decisions in order to insert a name on the list, and the further 
provision of a regular review (at least every six months) of the list itself are some 
examples. On the other hand, still the set of provisions presented some major 
flaws: first of all, it was established that the names of individual and entities listed 
by the Sanctions Committee (pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333) as 
affiliated to the Taliban regime, Usama bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda could also 
appear on the European blacklist, hence realising a risky overlap between the 
sanctions directly ‘administered’ by the UN and those proper of the European 
Council; second, Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 established a number of cases that 
may lead ‘the competent authorities of the Member States’ to grant exemptions 
in order to spend frozen funds for ‘essential human needs’,272 for the ‘payment of 
taxes’ or other public services, or for the ‘payment of charges due to a financial 
institution in the Community’.273 However, the procedure established for granting 
such exemptions widely relied on discretionary choices made by competent 
authorities274 in Member States, did not provide for effective participation of those 
affected and did not grant any form of judicial or independent recourse. 
It should be made very clear that Res.1373 and the European provisions 
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phenomenon in general, with no distinction whatsoever, based on the ideological 
background or the international dimension of the threat. As a consequence, the 
measures introduced with the provisions at stake (generally still in force 
nowadays) were plainly resorted to Member States in order to target (and list) 
any kind of individual or organisation suspected of or convicted for having 
committed terrorist acts (including national and local terrorist groups, such as the 
ETA and the IRA), in a clear example of heterogenesis of the ends. In fact, it is 
at least debatable that Res. 1373, adopted under Chapter VII in order to respond 
to a serious threat to international peace and security, could ever be interpreted 
as to include terrorist acts that were, for their very nature, matter for national 
criminal investigations. From the point of view of the relationship between UN law 
and EU (or Community) law, this is a quite clear example of how a formal and 
monistic stance by Member States within the European Council could perhaps 
hide some kind of opportunistic attitude in exploiting UN-derived measures in 
order to bypass European and constitutional constraints in such a sensitive 
matter.   
The normative parenthesis represented by Resolution 1373 – however – 
did not interrupt the flow of Resolutions aimed at directly targeting the Taliban, 
bin-Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. On 16 January 2002, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1390,275 aimed at strengthening measures contained 
in Resolutions 1267 and 1333. Particularly, the latter Resolution confirmed and 
renewed all such measures for a further term of twelve months and provided – in 
addition – (a) a complete ban for the individuals listed by the Sanctions 
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from entering in or transiting through the territory of UN member states, with the 
exceptions of entries or transits to be authorised, on a case-by-case basis, by the 
Committee itself,276 and (b) extended the embargo on ‘arms and related materiel 
of all types’ as well as related services, to any individual or entity listed by the 
same Sanctions Committee.277 The Resolution further provided for the Sanctions 
Committee to review its list periodically, based on the information received by 
States and regional organisations, in order to keep it up to date, and to prepare 
periodic reports on the state of implementation of the measures so established.278 
The European Council responded to the renewed sanctions regime on 27 
May 2002, through Common Position 2002/402/CFSP279 and Regulation (EC) 
881/2002,280 which repealed any previous acts on the same matter (without 
prejudice for the ‘autonomous’ sanctions regime established pursuant to Res. 
1373, by Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Regulation (EC) 2580/2001) and 
plainly recalled the text of the new Resolution. For the purpose of my analysis, 
three elements deserve some comments: first of all, the Resolution (and 
European implementing legislation) introduced a stronger limit to the freedom of 
movement of listed individuals – and consequently, as I briefly explained above, 
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– pairing the flight ban with a much more invasive prohibition on entering in and 
transiting through the territory of UN member states. In this respect, such a strong 
and long-lasting restriction could potentially be in conflict with the free movement 
of persons within the Community, provided (in 2002) by Article 39.1 EC,281 to the 
extent that the affected individual was a citizen of a Member State. In addition, 
one may just notice that the prohibition on entering the territory of a UN Member 
State could overtly clash with the principle of non-refoulment, that many scholars 
considers to have acquired the status of jus cogens; second, an unprecedented 
‘embargo’ against individuals, groups and non-State entities was introduced, that 
was even more restrictive in terms of safeguarding the right to private property of 
any concerned individual; third – from a procedural point of view – the legal basis 
of Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 was extended from Article 301 EC to Article 308 
EC, in so implicitly recognising the lack of an explicit power vested in the 
European Community to adopt restrictive measures, such as the one considered 
here, against non-State entities and individuals. 
d. The first evolution of the UN framework 
The first hints of some kind of European ‘return influence’ on the UN Security 
Council can be found in subsequent Resolution 1452, 282  adopted on 20 
December 2002. In particular, taking into account the growing number of 
individuals listed by the Sanctions Committee (on the request of UN member 
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freezing, in order to exempt funds and financial resources to be spent for ‘basic 
expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and 
medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums and public utility charges’, legal 
fees, or ‘charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds’, provided 
that the concerned State had notified the Committee of the intention to apply an 
exemption and such exemption was not denied within forty-eight hours.283 The 
Committee, upon request of any State, could also grant extraordinary 
exemptions.284 The Resolution further provided that interest earned on frozen 
accounts could be added to such account and payments due under contracts or 
obligations that arose prior to the ‘date of freezing’ could be added to the same 
accounts (and frozen, in turn).285 The Council welcomed these new measures as 
part of Community law by Common Position 2003/140/CFSP286 of 27 February 
2003 and Regulation (EC) 561/2003 287  of 27 March 2003, that amended 
Common Position 2002/402/CFSP and Regulation (EC) 881/2002 accordingly.288 
A number of four subsequent Resolutions, from January 2004 to 
December 2006 (while reiterating the whole sanctions regime), introduced further 
refinements to the sanctioning system, in order to provide some elementary 
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and to better establish procedures to be followed for listing and de-listing. Said 
amendments prelude to the significant changes that the whole system have 
encountered from December 2009 on, and anticipate the gradual overcoming of 
the ‘one way’ monist and hierarchy-based approach, adopted by both the UN and 
the then-Community since 1999. In particular, the actions taken by the Security 
Council (that did not require amendments to the relevant European provisions) 
apparently show how the European model of individual sanctions had started to 
exert growing influence on the members of the Security Council, foreseeing the 
structural changes that the ECJ judgment in Kadi I would have brought along. 
First of all, Resolution 1526289 of 30 January 2004 – inter alia290– provided for 
States that submitted names of individuals or entities to the Sanctions 
Committee, to include identifying information and background information, ‘to the 
greatest extent possible’ in order to demonstrate their actual association with the 
Taliban, Usama bin-Laden or Al-Qaeda and to avoid spreading cases of mistaken 
identity;291 it further provide for the same States to inform ‘to the extent possible, 
individuals and entities included in the Committee’s list of the measures imposed 
on them’.292 This notification obligation – in particular – was set in order to avoid 
for concerned individual and entities to be informed of the measures adopted 
against them only as a consequence of the detrimental effects such measures 
exerted on their rights and freedoms. Secondly, Resolution 1617293 of 29 July 
2005, introduced a seemingly non-exhaustive list of conducts that could indicate 
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Laden or Al-Qaeda. It also provided, for the State requesting entities or 
individuals to be listed, to submit a detailed statement of case describing the basis 
of its proposal. Furthermore, with regard to notification (introduced by Res. 1526), 
it specified such notification to be made in writing and to include ‘listing and 
delisting procedures’ to be administered by the State in question.294 In relation to 
the latter Resolution, the effort to clarify some kind of listing-criterion is a 
remarkable step forward if compared with the initial stance of the Security Council 
in Res. 1267.295  
Third, Resolutions 1730296 and 1735297, adopted on 19-22 December 
2006 respectively, opened the door to a direct and unusual ‘dialogue’ between 
UN bodies and those individuals and entities that were affected by the 
sanctions.298 Res. 1730, in particular, established a dedicate office within the UN 
Secretariat (called focal point), tasked with receiving delisting requests by 
concerned individuals or entities and clarified the procedure to be followed in 
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and burdensome (it required the ‘designating’ State, as well as the State of 
citizenship and residence to be consulted and any delisting petition to be upheld 
by at least one member of the Sanctions Committee), it can however be regarded 
as a milestone in the history of the Security Council, which overcame a traditional 
limit and admitted non-State subjects to directly be involved in its proceedings. 
Res. 1735 (while further renewing the sanctions regime) insisted on the need, for 
any State proposing individuals and entities for listing, to submit specific 
information to support its proposal in light of the criteria established by the 
Security Council, the nature of such information and any supporting documents, 
specifying whether any part of the statement of case may be ‘publicly released 
for the purposes of notifying the listed individual or entity’.300 Although it was not 
mandatory to release any part of the statement of case for the benefit of the listed 
individual or entity, still this provision represented a first step in order to make 
those ‘sanctioned’ aware of the grounds for their inclusion on the lists and allow 
(even if at a very early stage) some kind of disclosure for the sake of defence.301  
III. AFTER KADI I: LEARNING FROM THE EU LESSON? 
 
The evolution of the European stance on UN-derived sanctions (and the slow but 
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the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi I. Indeed, the same Kadi case-law did not come 
entirely out of the blue: both the General Court and the ECJ had the chance to 
review a number of complaints related to the EU ‘autonomous’ system of counter-
terrorism financial sanctions, established by Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 
and Regulation (EC) 2580/2001, pursuant to Res. 1373. As I had the chance to 
point out, the EU blacklists system was ab origine characterised by a stronger 
level of protection for human rights and fundamental freedom, both from a 
substantial and from a procedural point of view (which was at least partially 
followed by subsequent UN resolutions).302 However, what is crucial here for the 
purpose of my analysis, is the nature of European measures and their 
relationship with Res. 1373. Differently from what happened with other Security 
Council Resolutions, the latter did not establish an UN-administered listing 
procedure but provided for UN member states a number of specific goals to be 
achieved (i.e. curtailing terrorism financing in general), through a set of 
sanctioning and preventive measures, to be adopted within and pursuant to 
domestic legal systems. In particular, no preformed list of individuals and entities 
to be targeted was provided, leaving any UN Member State free to establish its 
own listing criteria and procedures, in line with the very broad and general 
wording of the Resolution.  
 As the European Community took her steps in order to provide a common 
European set of rules in response to Res. 1373, it was no more a simple 
‘executor’ of UN measures (i.e. giving a binding force to UN Security Council 
Resolutions within the territories of Member States); instead, it acted as an 
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definition of terrorism, with a view to identifying the scope of the measures, (b) 
introducing its own procedure and grounds for listing, 303  (c) introducing 
exceptions and derogations and (d) providing for a recurring review (to be 
performed every six months) in order to assess the permanence of the grounds 
that had led to listing. Such a different relationship of the European measure with 
UN law (that can be summarised in the absence of any ‘mandatory’ listing, as 
well as the provision of derogations and/or exceptions established at the 
European level), led the General Court and the Court of Justice to adopt – from 
the very beginning – a significantly different stance on judicial review. In 
particular, given the internal (European) nature of the rules established by 
Regulation (EC) 2580/2001, starting from the well-known OMPI case304, both the 
General Court and the Court of Justice considered such measures to be fully 
reviewable on the merits, vis-à-vis the protection of Human Rights afforded by 
the EU Treaties, as well as by the case law of the ECJ and the European Court 
of Human Rights.  
a. Role and influence of the ECJ case-law 
The case-law of the ECJ305 provided a series of interesting improvements to the 
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individual and entities that were included in the European list. First of all, the ECJ 
reminded that strict respect for the rights of the defence is a long-established 
principle of law, to be ensured in any proceedings that may end up with a 
measure that adversely affect individuals or entities, even in the absence of rules 
governing the proceedings at stake. Such principle requires that the person 
against whom an adverse decision may be taken, should be ensured the right to 
make his view known on the evidence against him upon which the contested 
decision is based. As a consequence, according to the Court, any individuals or 
entities affected by the asset freezing measures adopted by the Council should 
be informed on the evidence on which the adoption of restrictive measures was 
grounded and be given the opportunity to confront that same evidence. 306 
However, given the particular nature of the measures and the public interest they 
aimed at protecting, the Court recognised that the Council couldn’t be obliged to 
communicate such evidence prior of including an individual or entity on the list, 
since a preventive notification would substantially affect the ‘surprise effect’ that 
was inherent to the effectiveness of the measures themselves. From a procedural 
point of view, as a consequence, listed individuals and entities should be 
informed of the grounds for their inclusion on the list after the measure has been 
adopted and have the possibility to make their views known to the Council and 
bring an action before the ECJ (rectius the General Court) to have the Council 
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 The Court further stressed that Article 253 EC (current Article 296 TFEU) 
should be fully and unconditionally applied to Council Decisions providing for the 
freezing of funds of an individual or entity, being a fundamental principle of 
European law: consequently, the Council should provide an adequate statement 
of reason for the measure to be adopted, disclosing in a clear and unequivocal 
fashion the whole reasoning followed in order to adopt the measure at stake, as 
to enable both those concerned and the competent court to understand the 
reasons of the affecting measure and review its lawfulness.308 It must be noted, 
at this stage, that the Court insisted on the fact that the total absence of a 
statement of reasons could not be effectively remedied after an action was 
brought in court, since this would force the petitioner to defend himself without 
being aware of the grounds for listing.309 In consequence, the Council should 
show to have correctly verified that a decision exists of a competent authority in 
a Member State (as regards first listing) and that its consequences are still in 
force (for the confirmation of previous listing).  
 The Court also considered that the rights afforded within the European 
proceedings – which include the right to bring action before the General Court 
and the Court of Justice – should always be balanced with the level of protection 
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rights of defence and the right to a fair hearing, these have a narrower scope 
when the Council acted on the basis of decisions of national judicial authorities, 
whose own proceedings were conducted in accordance with the principles of a 
due process of law.310 Conversely, in case the Council acted on different grounds 
(i.e. decisions adopted by the public prosecutor, or administrative decisions), 
proceedings at the European level should ensure higher standards of protection. 
While it admitted certain derogations to disclosure of evidence and information 
for limited reasons of public security and public interest (e.g. in order to protect 
sensitive information or avoid reprisals) the Court clearly provided that no 
exception could be granted to its own right to access any relevant evidence or 
information in order to review the legitimacy of Council Decisions.311  
 The influence of the mentioned case-law is clearly perceivable in 
Resolutions 1730 and 1735, which took the first steps towards the enhancement 
of procedural rights of affected individuals and entities within the UN blackists 
system, and also in Resolution 1822312, that provided for a brief statement of 
reasons to be published on the Sanctions Committee website, alongside any 
listed name. The decision of the ECJ in Kadi could be read – in this regard – from 
two different perspective, both related to coherence: under a European point of 
view, the ECJ couldn’t resist further tension between the rights and guarantees 
afforded to individuals and entities in relation to the EU autonomous blacklist 
system and the substantial absence of safeguards offered to individuals and 
entities included in the UN blacklists (not to consider the link between the two 
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authorised listing of individuals or entities on the basis of their inclusion in the UN 
list), if one except the respect of jus cogens. Under an international point of view, 
the Court intended to force Member States to adopt a firmer stance on the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the UN level, in order to 
promote the application of (tendentially) uniform standards, preserve the 
legitimacy of European implementing legislation and safeguard the coherence of 
the international legal system as a whole. 
 This attitude of the Court of Justice is even clearer if one considers the so-
called Kadi II case, where the GCEU313 and the ECJ314 were asked to rule (again) 
on the legitimacy of preventive freezing measures applied by the EU Commission 
to Yassin Abdullah Kadi, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1822. In 
granting Mr Kadi’s claims, both the CGEU and the ECJ made frequent reference 
to the Court previous case-law in Kadi,315 OMPI316 and Stichting Al-Aqsa,317 in 
order to maintain that a full judicial review of EU measures implementing UN 
Security Council resolutions was still needed. In particular, while they recognised 
that (in the aftermath of the Kadi I case), stronger procedural guarantees were 
introduced at the UN level, still both Courts considered them inadequate, in order 
to ensure full respect of any individual’s procedural rights.318 In this respect, the 
GCEU and the ECJ stressed that the improvements set up by the UN Security 
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measures and argued that any final decision to list or de-list an individual was 
ultimately based on consensus within the UN Security Council itself (hence, 
failing to comply with EU judicial/independent review standards). 
 Interestingly enough, the GCEU and the ECJ took quite different stances 
as regards procedural rights to be granted at the EU level, while implementing 
UN Security Council measures. In adopting an extensive interpretation of the ECJ 
ruling in Kadi I, the GCEU argued that – before implementing the disputed UN 
measures – the Commission should have granted the concerned individual some 
access to evidence that grounded his listing, in order to safeguard his right to 
refute such evidence and ultimately his right to defence. The Court criticised the 
Commission’s sole reliance on the ‘statement of reasons’ provided to Mr Kadi, 
pursuant to Res. 1822, stigmatising the lack of balance between the claimant’s 
interests and ‘and the need to protect the confidential nature of the information in 
question’.319 This stance by the GCEU seem to disregard, at least in part, the fact 
that – while implementing restrictive measures adopted at the UN level by the 
Security Council – EU institutions do not carry out any autonomous inquiry and 
are not necessarily aware of the pieces of evidence that were collected against 
the concerned individual. In fact, while it applied principles that were established 
in previous case-law of the ECJ (briefly described above), the CGEU did not take 
into account the intrinsic difference that exist between the EU’s own blacklists 
(were EU institutions clearly bear full responsibility for the whole listing procedure, 
including the power to assess whether allegations brought against the prospect 
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lack a substantial knowledge of evidence that is needed to perform a substantial 
case-by-case evaluation. 
 The approach of the ECJ is more prudent and shows a balancing effort 
that deserves praise. According to the ECJ, ‘the fact that the competent European 
Union authority does not make accessible to the person concerned and, 
subsequently, to the Courts of the European Union information or evidence which 
is in the sole possession of the Sanctions Committee or the Member of the UN 
concerned and which relates to the summary of reasons underpinning the 
decision at issue, cannot, as such, justify a finding that those rights have been 
infringed’.320 In sum, the ECJ recognises that the EU Commission may not be in 
the condition of autonomously reviewing and disclosing to the concerned party 
‘information or evidence’ that were evaluated by the UN Security Council in order 
to adopt restrictive measures against an individual. What needs to be evaluated 
by the EU Commission (and by the Courts, in turn) is whether the information that 
is contained in the ‘statement of reasons’, released by the UN Security Council, 
provides sufficient evidence to consider restrictive measures be well grounded 
and proportionate, ‘taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory 
evidence’321 that were filed by the concerned individual. This approach by the 
ECJ, once again, indirectly addresses UN institutions, calling for listing decisions 
to be adopted ab origine on the basis of solid evidence and that such evidence 
was made available to concerned individuals and the EU Commission, in order 
to avoid implementing measures being struck down by the Court of Justice.  
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The message from the ECJ was probably heard across the Atlantic and the first 
‘response’ to the European call was Resolution 1904, adopted by the Security 
Council on 17 December 2009. 322  Inter alia, this Resolution introduced a 
completely renewed delisting procedure, focused on the activity of an 
Ombudsperson – to be selected by the Secretary-General among ‘eminent 
individual[s] of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high 
qualifications and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, 
counter-terrorism and sanctions’ and assisted by an independent Office (the 
Office of the Ombudsperson) – in order to receive delisting requests filed by 
individuals and entities, review them on the merits and subsequently prepare a 
comprehensive report to be analysed by the Sanctions Committee in order to 
adopt a decision. It was provided by the Resolution that the Ombudsperson ‘shall 
perform [its] tasks in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek 
nor receive instructions from any government’. The procedure to be followed by 
the Office of the Ombudsperson (described in Annex II to the Resolution), 
provided a direct engagement with the petitioner (i.e. the individual or entity 
demanding delisting) in order to allow a better understanding of the grounds for 
listing and to ensure the petitioners’ points of view on such grounds to be received 
and properly considered. While any form of independent judicial review continued 
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substantial step in the direction that the ECJ had pointed in Kadi and its previous 
judgment. In particular, the appointment of a third and independent body (whose 
independence was explicitly guaranteed by the Security Council) was a 
completely unprecedented and relevant improvement with regard to the 
procedural rights guaranteed to individuals and entities targeted by the UN 
counter-terrorism financial sanctions. In particular – in a way that is coherent with 
the ECJ case-law – the Office of the Ombudsperson aimed at ensuring stronger 
protection for the rights of defense and the right to be heard (as well as for the 
right to be aware and understand the reasons for listing), with little prejudice for 
the effectiveness of the whole system in terms of security needs and protection 
for sensitive information.  
 Subsequent Resolutions 1988 and 1989 adopted on 17 June 2011323 – 
taking into due account the changed situation in Afghanistan and the recent killing 
of Usama bin-Laden in May 2011 – split the UN sanctions systems against the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda into two separate legal instruments, and re-established 
two separate Committees of the Security Council, one of which (under Res. 1988) 
should focus on the Taliban and the other (the former Sanctions Committee, 
under Res. 1989) should focus on Al-Qaeda and associated entities. While no 
major changes occurred to the overall shape of the blacklists system, a few 
differences should be noted in terms of procedure: first of all, the new Committee 
and the new lists established under Res. 1988 did not focus on terrorists or 
terrorist activities, but rather on threats to peace and security in Afghanistan, 
engaged in a difficult process of national reconciliation. To this respect, the 
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movement) were amended accordingly, in order to target those members or 
affiliated of the Taliban group that represented a threat to the process of peace 
in Afghanistan. In line with this new perspective, the delisting procedure in 
relation to Res. 1988 was brought back within the scope of previous Res. 1706 
(currently adopted for any other sanctioning system within the UN) and excluded 
the competence of the Office of the Ombudsperson, which remained unchanged 
for the Al-Qaeda blacklist. This particular choice helps understanding the 
perception of the (global) counter-terrorism sanctioning system as a matter of 
exception at the UN level. In species, the reinforcement of procedural safeguards 
and a stronger involvement of the interested individuals or entities is understood 
as necessary as long as the sanctioning system addresses a global issue, with 
no or few links with the situation in a particular State (in this regard, the Security 
Council felt to use its powers under Chapter VII UNC against individuals and 
entities, irrespective of an actual threat to peace and security in a particular State, 
and agreed to ensure further procedural rights); by contrast, as long as it steps 
back to a more ‘classical’ context, the need for stronger guarantees is considered 
as weaker and less central to the reasoning of the Security Council. This is 
probably because, differently from what happened with global counter-terrorism 
blacklists, in the case of the Taliban group (as in the cases of other sanctioning 
systems adopted by the Security Council with regard to the situations in a number 
of States)324 the new democratic Afghan Government should remain the first 
counterpart of the Security Council from a political and diplomatic point of view, 
even with specific regard to the assessment of the grounds for listing and delisting 
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group. The EU responded to this amended framework with Common Position 
2011/486/CFSP325 and Regulation (EU) 753/2011, both adopted on 1 August 
2011 (and still in force), that reflected the ‘two tracks’ system provided by 
Resolutions 1988 and 1989. Since it was adopted subsequently to the Lisbon 
Treaty, the legal basis of Regulation (EU) 753/2011326 is found in the new Article 
215.2 TFEU327, which explicitly vested the Council with the power to ‘adopt 
restrictive measures […] against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State 
entities’, so filling the disputed legal gap that I briefly discussed above and ending 
widespread resort to the ‘implied powers’ doctrine, pursuant to current Article 352 
TFEU,328 which is now clearly excluded (by Article 352.4 TFEU) in the field of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.329 In addition, Recital 4 of the Regulation 
clarified that it was construed and should be applied as to respect fundamental 
rights and the principles recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. While this 
declaration may seem a mere formality, on the contrary its inclusion within the 




325 Council Decision 2011/486/CFSP of 1 August 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed 
against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in 
Afghanistan [2011] OJ L199/57.  
326 Council Regulation (EU) 753/2011 of 1 August 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed 
against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in 
Afghanistan. 
327 Former Article 301 EC. 
328 Former Article 308 EC. 
329 It may be noted that Article 215 TFUE, that replaced Article 301 EC after the Treaty of Lisbon 
(and was therefore drafted in 2007), shows an early influence of the scholarly debate related to 
the protection of human rights while implementing UN measures. According to its third paragraph, 
restrictive measures adopted by the EU – such as asset freezing – ‘shall include necessary 
provisions on legal safeguards’. Such brief provision is nonetheless sufficient to maintain that, as 
I argued within this work, any restrictive measure adopted by EU institution need to respect EU 
legal principles in relation to human rights protection. Interestingly enough, a similar provision 
was included, in 2004, in Article III-160 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, that 
was later abandoned.  
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the relationship between UN and EU law and, more importantly, a full awareness 
of the conditions of legitimacy that the ECJ set forth in Kadi.  
 The following evolutions of the UN blacklists system did not add much, for 
the purpose of this analysis, to the main features I tried to outline within this 
paragraph and did not require any relevant intervention on the European side.330 
From the point of view of procedural rights, in particular, Resolution 2083, 
adopted on 17 December 2012, 331  provided for the focal point that was 
established by Res. 1730 to receive requests for exemption that should be 
previously addressed to competent authorities of UN member states, in so 
reinforcing the direct engagement of concerned individuals and entities in the 
proceedings of UN bodies (and finally overcoming the necessary interposition of 
States that had survived, for the purpose of demanding exemptions, until that 
moment). Eventually, Resolution 2161, adopted on 17 June 2014,332 allowed 
individuals claiming to have been listed as a result of mistaken identity to refer 
the matter to the focal point.  
IV. CHANCES FOR A MULTILATERAL APPROACH 
As paragraphs above have shown, the UN blacklists system and its 
implementation at the European level represent an interesting case-study in order 
to test the relationship between UN and EU law in the field of human rights and 




330 This work does not address measures other than asset freezing (and related sanctions, such 
as travel bans and arms embargo) in the context of the fight against terrorism, which were – 
nonetheless – adopted by the Security Council over the years. Notably, from 2014 on, the Security 
Council have addressed the ISIL and Al Nusrah Front, as well as the phenomenon of the so-
called foreign fighters, at large (the latter with Resolution 2178, adopted on 24 September 2014). 
Subsequently, asset freezing measures have been extended to ISIL and ANF (with individuals or 
entities related thereto), by Resolutions 2199 (2015); 2253 (2015) and 2368 (2017). 
331 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2083 of 17 December 2012. 
332 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2161 of 17 June 2014. 
	 178 
in Chapters 1 and 2 – my analysis tried to understand whether it is possible to set 
aside the contrasts arising from unilateral approaches (both on the UN and on 
the EU side) in order to focus on the advantages a multilateral approach can bring 
along, if one adopts the right paradigm, aimed at preserving the overall 
coherence of the international legal order. 
 My analysis demonstrated that the primacy of UN law can be preserved 
and reconciled with the specialty and autonomy of the EU legal order, through 
the positive action of Member States at a political and diplomatic level, and the 
keys of this reconciliation lie both in the UN Charter and in the EU Treaties. On 
the one side, Article 1.3 UNC includes among the primary purposes of the 
Organisation ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms’; in so doing, it provides respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as a condition of legitimacy for any act adopted under the 
UN Charter itself, including secondary UN law (and Security Council 
Resolutions). Notably, the clause drafted at the San Francisco Conference is an 
open one, capable of recognising and consolidate – from 1945 onwards – the 
long evolutionary path that characterised the doctrine of human rights and 
fundamental freedom, as well as the content of the rights and their scope. On the 
other side, since the advent of the European Communities, the European 
approach to the protection of human right and fundamental freedoms has proven 
to be an avant-garde one, combining the long-standing traditions of European 
Constitutional courts, with the influential contribution of the Council of Europe 
(and its European Court of Human Rights) and ultimately with a noteworthy 
evolution of the ECJ case-law that has increasingly re-shaped its role as a 
‘bastion’ of human rights. If one should take into due account that EU Member 
States are also (first-line) members of the United Nations, a reason of consistency 
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imposes to hold that the developments achieved by EU Member States in the 
field of human rights and fundamental freedoms (also and above all within the 
EU itself) should also play a decisive role in interpreting Article 1.3 UNC and 
shaping the UN legal system as a whole. In other words, EU Member States 
could not behave within the UN legal system in a manner that is not coherent with 
their own constitutional traditions and the common principles enshrined in the EU 
Treaties. 
 This particular ‘backwards’ argument has its normative counterpart in 
Articles 34 and 351.2333 TFEU: the first one places an obligation onto Member 
States to act co-ordinately in international fora in order to uphold the EU positions 
and – with specific regard to Member States that are members of the UN Security 
Council – to defend the ‘positions and interests of the Union’; the second 
provision encourages Member States to cooperate in order to remove the 
incompatibilities between the EU Treaties and other international agreements 
that they participate in. Without prejudice for the primacy of UN law – pursuant to 
Article 103 UNC – it is undoubted that Member States have are duty bound to act 
within UN bodies, in a way that is coherent with their being a party of the EU 
Treaties and the EU legal system at large (and with their common constitutional 
traditions). Hence, the problem of conflicting obligations imposed onto Member 
States by UN and EU law should neither be solved resorting to a monist or formal 
approach, based on the alleged existence of a hierarchy of treaty norms within 
the international legal order, nor insisting on the specialty and autonomy of EU 
law, whose fundamental principles should act as counter-limits for contrasting 




333 The provisions of current Article 351 TFEU were formerly part of Article 307 EC (after the 
Treaty of Nice), of Article 234 EC (after the Treaty of Maastricht) and of Article 234 EEC. 
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103 UNC should not be intended as a hierarchy rule and provisions of UN law 
cannot be applied within the EU legal order if they conflict with fundamental 
principles of European law; On the other hand, membership of the EU does not 
release Member States from their duties under the UN Charter: under Article 
351.1 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 103 UNC, they should leave the EU 
Treaties unapplied and implement UN measures (that are contrary to EU law) 
within their domestic legal systems.334 The latter solution – however – is such to 
preserve the primacy of UN law and the specialty of EU law, while frustrating the 
unity and consistency of the international legal order.  
 What my analysis have shown is that a ‘third way’ to coherence is possible: 
based on both the provisions of the UN Charter and those of the EU Treaties, 
Member States have a duty to influence UN rulemaking in order to make it 
coherent with the level of protection of human rights enshrined in the EU Treaties. 
In the case of UN blacklists, the evolution of this phenomenon is clearly 
perceivable and follows the evolution of EU law and the role of the ECJ. In 
species, from 1999 to 2006, the influence of European stances on UN policies 
was less evident and characterised by a relatively slow pace. The introduction of 
the EU’s own blacklists system (pursuant to Resolution 1373) served as a 
benchmark for the Security Council – whose initial Resolutions on the subject 
matter were adopted in a context of emergency – to introduce a number of 
specifications and improvements that gradually enhanced the level of procedural 
rights afforded to concerned individuals and entities. From 2006 to 2009, the role 
played by European ‘doctrines’ was increasingly clear: one of the reasons for this 




334 Provided that this is coherent with the fundamental principles of their own constitutions. 
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blacklists system, which fixed a number of loopholes in the European provisions 
and established well-defined guidelines for EU institutions in order to comply with 
EU human rights standards. Finally, from 2009 to 2011 the return-influence of 
European principles on UN Security Council Resolutions was of the greatest 
importance: the Kadi judgment of the ECJ stressed the need for internal 
coherence within the EU legal system, recognising that the same principles 
established by the Court in relation to EU autonomous blacklists should also be 
applied to the implementation of UN-administered blacklists. Such firm stance by 
the ECJ had the effect of compelling Member States to act at the UN level in 
order to further enhance the level of protection for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms within UN blacklists system, with particular regard to procedural 
guarantees, in line with the requirements of the ECJ. 
In sum, while it is not for the ECJ to review the legitimacy of UN measures, 
going beyond the ‘border’ of the EU legal system, its judgments certainly played 
a crucial role in recalling Member States to their obligations under the EU 
Treaties: for the sake of safeguarding (a) the primacy of UN law, (b) the principles 
of EU law and (c) the coherence of the international legal system, it is for States 
to engage within UN bodies, with a view to influencing the policies of the 
Organisation and ensuring their coherence with EU fundamental principles, to the 
extent that is possible in relation to the nature and structure of the UN. As I 
anticipated at the beginning of this Chapter, the proposed solution is a political 
and diplomatic one, as it tends to settle legal conflicts by amending one of the 
provisions at stake (i.e. the one that is less protective for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms). Nonetheless, it has the undoubted merit of being 
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realistic335 and valorising the role of the European judiciary beyond the scope of 
its own jurisdiction, as both a fundamental tool of political influence and a stimulus 
for EU Member States to properly exert such influence. Far from being a perfect 
answer to any problem of contrast between UN and EU law, it seems in the field 
of human rights the more viable (and with no doubts the only currently available) 
route to allow Member Sates complying with their obligations under the UN 
Charter, while favouring global adherence to the European standards of 
protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms and preserving the overall 





335 Foreseeing or invoking the establishment of a system of independent judicial review to assess 
the legitimacy of UN secondary law would probably be much more challenging from a theoretical 





How to reconcile the seemingly conflicting obligations imposed onto EU Member 
States by UN law and EU law in the field of human rights, in the particular case 
of individual sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council to prevent and combat 
the financing of transnational terrorism? This is the fundamental question that has 
occupied me since the very beginning of this research and the one I tried to 
answer with my analysis. To do so, I combined both an empirical and a theoretical 
approach, paying attention to the exegesis of positive law, to the interpretation 
offered by the case-law of the ECJ and to the importance of political relationships 
in the solution of conflicts between different legal systems, in the field of public 
international law.  
I started tackling the problem from a European point of view, proposing a 
reasoned analysis of a landmark case in the history of EU judiciary: the Kadi I 
case. My focused review of the judgments rendered by the General Court and 
the ECJ led me to conclude that the traditional (and competing) approaches to 
the interactions and conflicts between different legal systems – namely the 
monistic one (adopted by the General Court) and the dualistic one (adopted by 
the ECJ) – presented a number of weak points and needed to be overcome in 
favour of a more nuanced attitude to the problem. In this regard, the key question 
to be considered is: under what conditions is the EU entitled or even obliged to 
implement UN law – including Security Council Resolutions – in place of EU 
Member States? The answer to this question is less straightforward than it 
seems.  
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My reasoning clarified that the EU – being an international organisation 
with its own legal personality, autonomous from its Member States – is not directly 
and individually bound by the set of duties and obligations that derives from the 
UN Charter, separately from EU Member States. In fact, to date, the EU is neither 
a member of the UN, nor it legally succeeded Member States in their rights and 
obligations towards the UN. Furthermore, differently from what happened with 
other non-members of the UN, the EU is not a direct addressee of the resolutions 
of the Security Council. As a consequence, no rule of public international law 
obliges the EU to directly implement Security Council resolutions, including 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, whose scope is limited to the obligations of the 
‘Members of the United Nations’ and cannot be plainly extended to the EU, by 
means of sole interpretation. Accepting this theoretical premise, however, cannot 
lead to infer that UN law should remain completely irrelevant for the EU. While it 
cannot be regarded as directly applicable to the EU, Article 103 UNC still imposes 
an obligation onto Member States to ensure that their duties under the UN 
Charter prevail over any other commitments under different instruments of 
international law, being such the EU Treaties and the ECHR. In this regard, UN 
law (including secondary law, such as resolutions adopted by the UN Security 
Council) should take precedence over any other obligation of international law in 
case of conflict. To this extent, EU Treaties contain a number of specific 
provisions, whose aim is that of recognising the primacy of UN law and avoiding 
potential conflicts of laws. Notably, Article 351.1 TFEU explicitly safeguards any 
international agreement entered into by Member States prior to their accession 
to the Community (such as the UN Charter) from being repealed, derogated or 
its fulfilment being prejudiced by Member States’ obligations under EU law. 
Besides, Article 347 TEU establishes an ad hoc duty of consultation between 
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Member States, in order to comply with those international obligations that they 
‘accepted for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security’ (this 
being an explicit reference to the purpose of the UN, and especially to Chapter 
VII UNC), without prejudice for the correct functioning of the common market.  
While the conjunction of Article 103 UNC and Article 351.1 TFEU provide 
an obligation for EU Member States to disregard European law, whereas it may 
interfere with their obligations under UN law, maintaining a corresponding duty of 
Member States to perform their obligations under the UN Charter by means of an 
action of the EU is groundless. On the one hand – as my analysis has shown – 
references made by EU Treaties to UN law are not such to affirm that Member 
States implicitly agreed to make the EU bound by UN law and to autonomously 
implement Security Council resolutions, neither can such a duty be derived from 
the transfer from Member States to the EU of the powers required to comply with 
some duties under the UN Charter. On the other hand, the duty of consultation 
established by Article 347 TEU cannot be interpreted as a delegation of powers 
and duties from Member States to the EU, in order to implement Security Council 
resolutions (and other obligations aimed at maintaining international peace and 
security) by resorting to the EU legal framework; it simply requires EU Member 
States to ‘consult’ in order to avoid that implementation of UN measures affect 
the functioning of the common market.  
This does not mean, however, that Member States cannot consider it 
appropriate to abide by their obligations under the UN Charter by means of acts 
adopted at the EU level, provided that such acts are adopted in compliance with 
the EU Treaties, both from a procedural and from a substantial point of view. 
As I had the chance to point out, the EU was established by its founding 
Treaties (and by their subsequent amendments, over the years) as a complex 
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international organisation, based on an autonomous supranational legal system, 
with its own fundamental principles, its law-making procedures, its rules on the 
allocation of powers and its own jurisdiction, having the authority of adjudicating 
the legitimacy of EU secondary legislation, both from a substantial and from a 
procedural point of view. While it cannot be considered a constitutional order per 
se – as I argued above – still the EU legal order shall be regarded as a 
conventionally-established and self-standing legal system, whose three main 
characteristics are entirety, separateness and closure. As a consequence, the 
EU legal order does not admit any external interference or any integration with 
extraneous legal systems, unless it is explicitly provided by the EU Treaties. In 
this respect, for any secondary legislation adopted by EU institutions to be valid 
and lawful, it should necessarily be consistent with the law-making norms and 
procedures provided by the EU Treaties, as well as with the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the EU Treaties themselves and in particular: (i) the EU 
should enjoy the power and/or be competent to adopt that particular act in the 
field in question (necessity of a legal basis); (ii) the act should be adopted by the 
competent institutions within the EU; (iii) the act should be adopted following the 
proper law- making procedures; (iv) the act should comply with the fundamental 
principles, which Member States conventionally established within the EU 
Treaties as general parameters of legitimacy for any act of the EU. These four 
conditions admit no exceptions whatsoever. In this respect, the ECJ shall always 
enjoy full jurisdiction to assess the legitimacy of EU secondary legislation – 
including the merits of such legislation – be it adopted to comply with Member 
States obligations under the UN Charter or not.  
Adhering to these conclusions does not risk – as some have argued – to 
compromise the primacy of UN law (and Security Council resolutions) within the 
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international legal order, since the scrutiny of the ECJ shall be focused only on 
EU secondary legislation and not on UN legal instruments: Member Stats could 
either decide to implement Security Council Resolution by means of an action 
within the EU legal framework (according to Article 215 TFEU) or rather to provide 
for such implementation on their own. In the former case, EU legislation adopted 
to implement UN Security Council resolutions should comply with both UN law 
and EU law (I referred to this condition as ‘double compliance’), making no sort 
of exception with regard to any other act of EU, and the ECJ should enjoy a full 
jurisdiction to exert a substantial judicial review, as set forth by the EU Treaties, 
with no reservation. In the latter case, Member State will have full legal capacity 
to implement Security Council resolutions on their own, encountering no limits by 
reason of the EU Treaties, whose provisions should yield to the primacy of UN 
law and remain unapplied in case of conflict, pursuant to Article 351.1 TFEU. In 
this case, no violation of the EU Treaties could be invoked by European 
institutions, which should refrain from interfering with Member States 
performance of their duties under UN law; Member States – in turn – would be 
obliged to ‘consult’, in order to avoid the functioning of the single market being 
compromised. Obviously, such duty of consultation could be aimed at finding a 
common attitude towards the implementation of UN-derived obligations (in the 
effort of overcoming possible contrasts between UN law and EU law, as 
encouraged by Article 351.2 TFEU), but still entails no further and implicit 
obligations, as some tried to suggest.  
Conclusions reached in Chapter 1 (and retraced above) rely on the main 
assumption – further developed in Chapter 2 – that Article 103 UNC should not 
be regarded as a hierarchy rule, but rather as a conflict avoidance clause, even 
if one of a particular species. As I have shown, over the years, a number of 
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international scholars has over-emphasised the role of the UN Charter within the 
international legal order, trying to identify it as the very constitution of the 
community of States. This idea was strongly based on the interpretation of the 
primacy clause – contained in Article 103 UNC – as establishing a hierarchy in 
the international legal order, where the UN Charter was superior in rank to any 
other instrument of international law. My analysis led me to conclude that the idea 
of Article 103 UNC as a hierarchy rule, while it entails interesting consequences, 
is nonetheless fallacious and ill-grounded. First of all, the text of Article 103 UNC 
does neither provide, nor suggest for the Charter to represent the constitutional 
instrument of the community of States or to be super-ordinated to other sources 
of international law. From a conceptual point of view, Article 103 UNC does not 
refer to the idea of hierarchy, but rather to the notion of prevalence, and it is well 
understood that a relationship of prevalence may exist between sources of the 
same rank (one may simply think to the variety of methods known by legal theory 
for resolving antinomies, among which the hierarchy rule is only one of many). 
Second, the ratio legis of Article 103 UNC, as it emerges from the analysis of the 
travaux préparatoires at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, suggests that 
the founding members of the United Nations never intended to establish a rule of 
hierarchy in order to grant the UN Charter a position superior to any other treaty 
or rule of international law, neither they considered it appropriate to renounce (in 
part) their treaty-making capacity in order to ensure the hierarchical superiority of 
the new Charter. Indeed, the idea of a primacy clause for the UN Charter fostered 
debate among the drafters, which struggled to reach a compromise on the current 
wording, to be substantially weaker than former Article 20 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. Third – and this may appear as a consequence of what I 
outlined before – Article 103 UNC does not wish to regulate interactions between 
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the Charter and other sources of international law, but rather between obligations 
imposed onto UN member states by the Charter and obligations under any other 
international agreement: this choice suggests the will to resolve conflicts that may 
arise from the concrete application of the Charter and other agreements, in terms 
of simultaneous performance of conflicting obligations, rather than establishing 
any kind of hierarchy in abstracto. In sum, Article 103 UNC can be regarded as a 
purpose-oriented norm, rather than a strictly procedural one, whose aim was and 
still is nowadays that of ensuring the prevalence of obligations derived from UN 
law over any other international obligations member states may be subject to. 
As I widely observed in Chapter 2, the idea of ‘constitution’ may acquire a 
number of different meanings in legal literature, depending on the concept that it 
is set to convey. In the case of the UN Charter, it can be certainly considered as 
a ‘constitutional’ or ‘constituent’ treaty, since it established a new organisation – 
the United Nations – laying down its fundamental principles and the shared 
values all members are bound to respect. Also, it provided for the institutional 
structure of the organisation and the allocation of powers within different bodies. 
However, while the Charter may have – at least in part – a constitutional structure, 
this does not imply it should be read as a constitution proper. It would be utterly 
erroneous, both from a logical and from a legal point of view, to stress structural 
affinities between the UN Charter and national basic laws, in order to draw a 
number of legal consequences that find no basis in positive norms (namely Article 
103 UNC), neither from a literal, nor from a teleological point of view. Hence, if 
one can talk about the constitutional function of the UN Charter for the functioning 
of the United Nations, the community of states did certainly not intend to establish 
a constitutional hierarchy for the international legal order.  
	 190 
It comes from the above that – within the EU legal order – no provision of 
the EU Treaties can be set aside or howsoever derogated by UN legislation, 
neither UN Security Council resolutions can be implemented by means of an act 
of EU institutions if such implementation conflicts with the fundamental principles 
that are enshrined in the EU Treaties. 
On the other side, no provision of EU law and no EU institution (including 
the ECJ) can interfere with Member States’ duties under the UN Charter, whose 
mandatory performance cannot be refused, suspended or delayed on the basis 
of European principles, including those related to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, without violating Member States obligations towards 
the UN and its members.  
My analysis came to show that a long-term approach to the problem of the 
interaction between legal systems, in the particular field of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, cannot be properly developed by relying alternatively on 
European law or UN law, in the struggle of establishing which system should 
prevail over the other.  By contrast, the reciprocal position of both the EU and the 
UN legal systems within the broader international legal order should be taken into 
account. On the one hand, it should be recalled that the UN Charter is grounded 
on a set of shared principles, which include ‘promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all’, as provided by Article 1.3 
UNC. As a consequence, each act of UN institutions – including Security Council 
resolution under Chapter VII UNC – should be regarded and interpreted in such 
a manner as to be consistent with the aforementioned principle. As a matter of 
internal coherence of the UN legal system, the legislator of the UN Charter surely 
expected Security Council (a crucial institution for the safeguard of global peace 
and security) to act consistently with the basic principles and purposes of the 
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Organisation. In sum, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom may be 
well regarded as a condition of legitimacy for UN secondary legislation. While the 
UN legal system is devoid of any form of independent review, it is not for courts 
belonging to different legal systems (such as the ECJ) to artificially fill this gap.  
Indeed, the open and quite simple wording of Article 1.3 UNC allows it to 
be interpreted in accordance with the evolution of the international legal doctrine 
on human rights and fundamental freedom: a process that involves a number of 
different players, including UN bodies and agencies, supranational courts such 
as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, regional courts such as the ECJ and domestic constitutional courts. In 
this regard, the EU and its Member States provided a very strong contribution to 
the development of transnational (or global) principles in the field of human rights 
law, inspired by a stronger protection of individual liberties. Such contribution very 
much derives from the cross-contamination between the constitutional traditions 
of Member States, which led to develop a set of fundamental principles regarded 
by the EU as common constitutional values. As I argued, there is no reason to 
regard the ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ addressed by Article 1.3 
UNC as something different from ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ that 
are protected by EU law (within the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights), so that the condition of legitimacy established by the UN 
Charter for UN secondary legislation – including Security Council resolutions – is 
theoretically comparable to that established by the EU Treaties for EU secondary 
legislation. Differently from what many European scholars may wish, however, 
the way to go from theory to practice cannot rely on the sole judicial activism of 
the ECJ but should focus on Member States double membership of the EU and 
the UN as well as on Article 351.2 TFEU. Being both a party of the UN Charter 
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and of the EU Treaties, Member States should act within the UN in a way that is 
coherent with the fundamental principles of EU law and common constitutional 
traditions. What is more, according to Article 351.2 TFEU, Member States should 
‘adopt a common attitude’ to prevent or overcome any conflict between the EU 
Treaties and the UN Charter. In fact, as I argued in Chapter 3, Member States 
are bound to engage within the UN in order to influence and shape the policies 
of the Organisation and render them coherent with the level of protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, enshrined in the EU Treaties, as 
interpreted by the ECJ, which include common constitutional traditions. 
My analysis of the interaction between UN and EU law in the specific field 
of measures aimed at preventing the financing of international terrorism, provided 
in Chapter 3, clearly showed how European principles – including those that were 
developed by the ECJ – have gradually influenced UN rulemaking  (especially 
over the last ten years), compelling Member States to act at the UN level in order 
to achieve a level of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms that 
is in line with the requirements of the ECJ, with particular regards to procedural 
guarantees afforded to concerned individual and entities.  
As I argued at the end of Chapter 3, the ultimate solution to the problem 
of conflicting interactions between UN and EU law in the field of human rights can 
be more political than strictly legal. It necessary relies on the diplomatic action 
exerted by Member States at the UN level and ultimately on their own 
commitment. Nevertheless it seems, nowadays, the only realistic and viable 
option in order to foster the role of the EU (and its Court of Justice) on the 
international stage, as a relevant player, compelling Member States to favour 
global adherence to European standards for human rights protection and – a the 
same time – allowing Member States to comply with their obligations under UN 
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